Opinion of the Court. combination of persons from interfering with and preventing shipowners from shipping a crew may be maintained on the ground of preventing a multiplicity of suits at law, and for the reason that damages at law [697] for interrupting the business and intercepting the profits of pending enterprises and voyages must, in their nature, be conjectural, and not susceptible of proof. 54 Fed. Rep. 40, affirmed." SAME INJUNCTION PENDENTE LITE EVIDENCE.-Evidence that, by reason of the action of a combination of persons, the crew left complainants' ship as she was about to sail, and that another crew could not be procured for nine days, and then only with the assistance of the police authorities and the protection of a restraining order, while other vessels in the vicinity had no difficulty in getting crews, is sufficient to authorize the court to enjoin interference with the business of the complainants by such combination pendente lite. 54 Fed. Rep. 40, affirmed. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana. In Equity. Bill of Blindell Bros. & Co. and others against Charles Hagan and others to enjoin interference with their business as shipowners. From a decree granting an injunction pendente lite, (54 Fed. Rep. 40,) defendants appeal. Affirmed. John D. Grace and J. Wara Gurley, Jr., (Gurley & Mellon, on the brief,) for appellants. F. B. Earhart and H. P. Dart, for appellee. Before PARDEE and MCCORMICK, Circuit Judges, and TOULMIN, District Judge. TOULMIN, District Judge. The only practical question presented by the record is whether the court below had jurisdiction of the case, as made by the bill. We concur in the conclusion reached by the learned judge who decided the case below, as expressed in his opinion, and which is made a part of the record, that the jurisdiction of the court is maintainable on general principles of equitable jurisdiction; and a careful examination of the • Syllabus copyrighted, 1893, by West Publishing Co. Opinion of the Court. case satisfies us that, under all the facts before it, there was no error in the court awarding a preliminary injunction. The decree is therefore affirmed. [85] WORKINGMEN'S AMALGAMATED COUNCIL OF NEW ORLEANS ET AL. v. UNITED STATES. (Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. June 13, 1893.) [57 Fed., 85.] CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS REVIEW OF ORDER GRANTING TEMPORARY INJUNCTION.-The circuit court of appeals will not reverse an interlocutory order granting or continuing a temporary injunction unless it is clearly shown that the same was improvidently granted, and is hurtful to the appellant. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana. In Equity. Suit by the United States against the Workingmen's Amalgamated Council of New Orleans, La., and others, to restrain the defendants from interfering with interstate and foreign commerce. An order was made in the court below granting a temporary injunction, (54 Fed. Rep. 994,) and defendants appeal therefrom. 'Affirmed. M. Marks, (A. H. Leonard and Evans & Dunn, on the brief,) for appellants. F. B. Earhart, for the United States. Before MCCORMICK, Circuit Judge, and TOULMIN, District Judge. MCCORMICK, Circuit Judge. November 10, 1892, the district attorney for the eastern district of Louisiana, acting under the direction of the attorney general, in the name of the United States, exhibited in the circuit court for said eastern district of Louisiana a bill for a Temporary injunction granted by the Circuit Court for Eastern Louisiana (54 Fed., 994). See p. 110. Syllabus copyrighted, 1894, by West Publishing Co. Opinion of the Court. injunction under the act of congress to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraint and monopolies. 26 Stat. 209. The circuit court exercised just caution, and gave respondents ample time to show cause why the preliminary injunction sought should not be granted. Respondents improved the time thus allowed them, and, in all the forms in use in such proceedings, submitted matters of law and fact in opposition to the granting of the temporary injunction. The motion for the temporary injunction continued pending, and the hearing of it was adjourned from time to time until the 27th March, 1893, when the circuit court passed the decree granting the temporary injunction, as prayed for in the bill, as to the appellants, and the respondents appealed. The appellants assign as error the overruling by the circuit court of each of the grounds of objection urged in that court against the granting of said injunction. These are well summarized, discussed, and disposed of in the very able opinion of the judge of the circuit court who passed the decree now sought to be reversed. The matters of law presented to and considered by him were not well taken by the appellants, respondents below, and the circuit court's ruling to that effect was correct. The bill exhibited is clearly within the statute, and the pleadings of the respondents were not such as [86] to require the refusal of the prayer for a temporary injunction. The volume of assisting and counter affidavits was large, and the conflict of this testimony sharp and emphatic, such as must, in the nature of the case, make variant impressions on the minds of different judges as to the facts shown. The summary of the proof made in the opinion of the judge of the circuit court is fairly supported by the record, and shows that there was proof tending to support the allegations of the bill. The providing by law for an appeal from an interlocutory order granting an injunction certainly clothes the court of appeals with the power and charges it with the duty of reviewing, and in a proper case reversing, the action of the trial court in granting such injunctions; but as to issues of fact, presented as they only can be presented in such cases, the findings of the facts expressed or implied in the action of the trial court should be given due weight, and its action, so far as it rests Syllabus. on, or is affected by, the state of facts proved, should not be reversed unless it is made clearly to appear that it was improvident and hurtful to the appellant. In this case the most that can be urged against the order having relation to the state of the proof is that it was unnecessary. It only enjoined the appellants from doing, pending this suit, what the statute forbids and provides may be prevented by injunction. On this appeal from an interlocutory order, which we affirm, we deem it unnecessary to anticipate the further progress and final hearing of this case by an expression of our views as to the full scope and sound construction of this recent and important statute. The order of the circuit court is affirmed. [58] UNITED STATES v. TRANSMISSOURI FREIGHT ASSOCIATION ET AL.o (Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. October 2, 1893.) [58 Fed., 58.] STATUTES-CONSTRUCTION.-Every statute must be read in the light of the general laws upon the same subject in force at the time of its enactment.b SAME CRIMINAL LAWS-COMMON-LAW OFFENSE ADOPTED BY CONGRESS.-Where congress adopts or creates a common-law offense, and in doing so uses terms which have acquired a well-understood meaning by judicial interpretation, the presumption is that the terms were used in that sense, and courts may properly look to prior decisions interpreting them for the meaning of the terms and the definition of the offense where there is no other definition in the act. MONOPOLIES-RESTRAINT OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE.-The contracts, combinations in the form of trust or otherwise, and conspiracies in restraint of trade declared to be illegal in interstate and international commerce by the act of July 2, 1890, entitled "An act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies," (26 Stat. 209, c. 647; Rev. St. Supp. 762,) are the contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade that had been declared by the courts to be against public policy and void under the common law before the passage of that act. a Decision in the Circuit Court, Kansas (53 Fed., 440). See. p. 80. Reversed by the Supreme Court (166 U. S., 290). See p. 648. Syllabus copyrighted, 1894, by West Publishing Co. Syllabus. SAME. The test of the validity of such contracts or combinations is not the existence of restriction upon competition imposed thereby, but the reasonableness of that restriction under the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Public welfare is first considered, and, if the contract or combination appears to have been made for a just and honest purpose, and the restraint upon trade is not specially injurious to the public, and is not greater than the protection of the legitimate interests of the party in whose favor the restraint is imposed reasonably requires, the contract or combination is not illegal. Shiras, District Judge, dissenting, on the ground that this rule is not applicable to corporations charged with public duties. [59] SAME-COMMON-LAW RULE. The ground on which certain classes of contracts and combinations in restraint of trade were held illegal at common law was that they were against public policy. PUBLIC POLICY-HOW DETERMINED.--The public policy of the nation must be determined from its constitution, laws, and judicial decisions. SAME INTERSTATE COMMERCE.-The act of February 4, 1887, entitled "An act to regulate commerce," demonstrates the fact that from the date of the passage of that act it has been the public policy of this nation to regulate that part of interstate commerce which consists of transportation, and to so far restrict competition in freight and passenger rates between railroad companies engaged therein as shall be necessary to make such rates open, public, reasonable, uniform, and steady, and to prevent discriminations and undue preferences. EQUITY-HEARING ON BILL AND ANSWER-EVIDENCE.-When a suit is heard on bill and answer, the allegations of fact in the bill that are denied in the answer are to be taken as disproved, and the averments of fact in the answer stand admitted. SAME. Where the contract is admitted, but the allegations tending to show its sinister purpose, tendency, and effect contained in the bill are denied by the answer, and averments tending to show a just and honest purpose, tendency, and effect are made, the latter averments contained in the answer stand admitted, and the contract will be presumed to have been made for an honest and legitimate purpose, unless the provisions of the agreement clearly show the contrary. In the examination of such a contract, fraud and illegality are not to be presumed. CONTRACTS-PUBLIC POLICY.-Freedom of contract is as essential to unrestricted commerce as freedom of competition, and one who asks the court to put restrictions upon the right to contract ought to make it clearly appear that the contract assailed is against public policy. SAME RESTRAINT OF TRADE-ANTI-TRUST ACT.-A contract between railroad companies forming a freight association that they will |