from Batabano to Nueva Gerona, on the Isle of Pines. Spanish, French, German and American lines of steamers have reached Havana from the European ports and from New York and New Orleans.

The telegraph system in the island, like that of Puerto Rico, extends to all the principal towns and villages and is in the hands of the government. Cuba is connected by submarine cables with the rest of the world by three distinct lines and there was no time during the war when communication between the Madrid government and Havana was interrupted.

HELD BY THE

The Isle of Pines is no doubt a permanent possession of the United States, whatever may be the ultimate disposition of Cuba. The treaty of peace with Spain ceded it directly to our government. This island, which lies some sixty miles directly south of BataTHE ISLE OF PINES 'bano, and, consequently, just south of the city of UNITED STATES. Havana, is nearly one-third the size of Puerto Rico. It is about thirty-five miles from north to south and a little more than that from east to west at its greatest extent, with a total area, not including the great bay to the west, of about 1,000 square miles. The population is about 2,000. Communication has been kept up with Cuba by steamers from the port of Batabano to Nueva Gerona, on the north coast, the principal town of the island. This town was founded in 1853 and now has some 900 inhabitants. The village of Santa Fe, fourteen miles distant, is much frequented on account of its wonderful hot springs.

The Isle of Pines consists in reality of two islands, separated by a tidal swamp. Toward the eastern end of this swamp, a few rocky ledges, flush with the water, have been utilized to construct a stone causeway between the two sections. These present a marked contrast, that on the north being wooded and mountainous, its soil extremely fertile, while the southern section is low, rocky and barren. The principal products are marble, many beautiful varieties of which exist in large quantities, rock crystal, tortoise shells, pine and turpentine, cedar, mahogany, and other valuable woods. There are also deposits of silver, mercury and iron.

Under the Spanish regime, this island has been used as a penal settlement and colonization has been discouraged. It was here that

the case of Evangelina Cisneros began to attract attention. The northern half of the island is exceedingly healthful and at times has been used as a sanitarium for Spanish RESORT AND SANsoldiers, broken in health in Cuba. It is believed that SICK SOLDIERS. permanent occupation by the Americans will develop

ITARIUM FOR

it rapidly. Surveys are being made at the present time, which have resulted in finding two harbors which can be improved without difficulty, so that access can be had to them by vessels of any draft. The Isle of Pines will be our nearest outpost to the Nicaragua canal and should prove of great value as a naval station.

Since the American occupation of Cuba two reports have been made to the United States Government by army officers sent to make investigations of the resources of the Isle of Pines. Each report has verified the opinions of its value. It is probable that the commerce between the island and Cuba will be diverted to another port than Batabano. The channel from Nueva Serona to Batabano is shallow and difficult, but there is a channel of four fathoms depth all the way from the island to Coloma, a port on the south side of the province of Pinar del Rio, just south of the city of the same name.

CHAPTER XLI.

COMMERCIAL REORGANIZATION OF CUBA.

Condition of Cuba at the Close of the War-How the Island Is to Be RehabilitatedThe Cubans a Peaceful People-Unjust Judgments Upon Cubans by American Soldiers-The Cuban in War and in Peace-The Professional Men of Havana— Revision of the Penal Code-Hardships of the Spanish Code in Its Original Form-Sanitation of the City-American Experts to Solve the Problem-Influx of Americans to Havana-Adventurers and Speculators-An Effort to Settle Commercial Conditions-Important Committees Appointed-Change of Methods of the Railways-Administration of the Government Telegraph Lines.

T

HE reorganization of peace and prosperity in the island of Cuba is a problem which should not be difficult of solution in an island where nature has such marvelous recuperative power. Devastated as were the fields and plantations which had been overrun by Spanish and insurgent armies, it seemed to the casual observer a year ago that a decade would be required to obliterate the signs of ruin. It will indeed require many years to repopulate the island where nearly one-fifth the citizens have died from starvation and suffering within the last three years. It will require many years to clear away the ruined plantation houses and sugar mills destroyed by marauders. But so far as the productive capacity of the country is concerned, there is reason to believe that within two years it will outstrip all its previous records, beginning a new era of prosperity amazing in its proportions. The climate and nature's bounty will be the greatest contributor to this condition. Next will come the prompt and generous introduction of American capital and American enterprise, which are already beginning to make themselves felt. Finally will come the labor of the Cubans, applied to the latent resources of the island..

The Cubans have wanted nothing so much as peace. They are by no means as restless, aggressive and difficult to control as the

people of the South and Central American republics. The latter races come from a mixture of Spanish and aboriginal Indian blood. The Cuban people are a mixture of Spanish and African negro blood, this mixture, of OF THE CUBANS course, not occurring in every individual, but appear

A GLANCE AT THE CHARACTER

ing in every class and every phase of life sufficiently to be reckoned with as a factor. Out of these different combinations come different characteristics, and I have no fear that the history of Cuba will be marred by the succession of revolutions and governmental fiascos that have retarded prosperity in our sister republics. The Cuban did not revolt against Spanish rule until driven to it by desperation. Once brought to the belief that he might as well die fighting the oppressor as from oppression itself, he fought stolidly and steadily until the American intervention came to his relief.

I have a word to say for the Cuban in respect to the judgments formed upon him by the American soldiers in our late war. The Cuban army was a distinctly inferior body, poorly equipped, poorly organized and poorly fed. Its soldiers were by no means such soldiers as those in our own ranks. For three years they have been carrying on a guerrilla warfare with little ammunition, few weapons, no commissary whatever, often no food, and no clothing but rags. They have marched and starved and fought and starved with equal stolidity.

The only valid excuse which the United States had to enter war with Spain, was to bring peace and relief to a distracted country at our doors and to aid a struggling people in their effort to free themselves from the yoke of oppression. It was this spirit which was presumed to stimulate the American volunteer when he enlisted and went to war. If the Cuban soldier had been the equal of the American mentally and physically, if he had been as well armed, well clothed and well fed, he would not have needed our aid. It was because he was distinctly an inferior that we gave our assistance. Then came a grievous thing. When the American soldier reached Cuba, presumably knowing all these things and stimulated by them, he looked about him and saw the Cuban.

WHY WE WENT
TO WAR

WITH SPAIN.

"The Cuban is our inferior," he said; "he is ragged, he is dirty, he

is half-starved and steals our food whenever he can get it; he will not work and he will not fight when we tell him to. The Cuban is no good."

For myself I am unable to hold the Cuban to blame for any of these things. It is because they were true to a given extent that we went to help them. Sometimes the Cuban ran, instead of fighting. I have known a Cuban force to enter a general engagement with the Spanish with just five rounds of ammunition in the cartridge belts. I fail to see what they should have done instead of running after they fired all of these. I am impelled to the belief that in like circumstances I might have reserved my fire and run first.

It is true that the Cuban troops in many cases proved of little military value to the American army. But it is not hard to understand why an exhausted, ragged, hungry force that had been fighting for three years and now saw a strong, fresh army come to its relief, should, in an actual revulsion of feeling, lapse from their energy and let the re-enforcements do all the work, even to save their freedom. They were hungry and they stole food; they were proud and they would not build roads and dig ditches.

If we are to be successful in our dealings with alien people who are coming under our domination, it is necessary for us to study them, judge them and rule them by methods which fit them OUR OBLIGATIONS instead of those which appeal to us. The Cubans are what they are because of their centuries of life under the Spanish yoke and the demoralizing tutelage of Spanish methods. We should be cautious of shallow judgments against them.

TO OUR ALIEN
COLONISTS.

The progress of reorganization in Cuba has been an interesting one. The backbone of the revolution was the professional class of Havana, and the other cities. Nearly all the doctors, lawyers and other professional men are Cubans. The business men are mainly Spaniards. The intellectual life of Havana is Cuban. The Spaniards are traders. They are very keen and successful merchants and have a certain contempt for the "non-producers," as they call the professional men. These professional men nearly all sympathized with the insurgent cause. Some of them were very open in their sympathies and joined the armies;