tempted, to be ignorant how to sin. This guard we lose in the society of wicked men this point enlarged on, showing how ready they are to second our temptations in order that they may triumph in our fall, and illustrated by the case of a person subject to violent passion, going into the company of one who would place arms in his hand, and rejoice to see the extravagance of his fury. Thirdly: all acknowlege that there are difficulties in religion, even with all the assistance and advantages that may be had; the nature of the case requires this; for being here in a state of trial, and in order that we may give proof of our virtue, faith, and ready submission to God's will, if there were no difficulty, there would be no trial. Now knowing our all to depend on this trial, it must be extreme folly in any man to refuse any help that may make his work easy, or to expose himself to difficulties that may render its issue more uncertain; yet this every one does who lays himself open to the art and cunning, and deadly insinuations of evil men, industrious in the bad cause they serve: (Prov. iv. 16, 17.) These verses enlarged on, showing that when the fulness of meat and drink has driven out thought and care, there springs up a brutal courage, which neither fears God nor regards man. Even this sensual indulgence, independent of its consequences, exposes us to the wrath of God: Riotous persons and drunkards shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. This crime is heightened by a kind of selfmurder, destroying the man formed after God's image, and leaving him in a worse condition than a helpless beast of the field. Should you propose to share these enjoyments with the libertines, and guard against all other kinds and degrees of wickedness, yet even this is destructive of the hopes of religion. If you bring but a taste and relish with you for such pleasures, use and custom and example will soon make you a proficient; and you will be surprised too late at finding yourself lost in excesses which you never thought of. Your cheerful nights and succeeding heavy mornings will indispose you for . thought and reflection, and thus your sense of religion will gradually decay. This whole case beautifully laid out, showing how the former comforts of an innocent mind will yield to misgiving fears, and drive a man to desperate intemperance; and then nothing but the extraordinary grace of God can save him; and whether he deserves this, let any one judge. But the mercies of God, like the sun, rise on the evil and the good, on the just and the unjust. Perhaps then he will awaken you once more to a sense of danger. This is the best thing that can befal you: but could you be sure of this, there is no encouragement in it to enter into the societies of wicked men; for even thus you little think what misery you are preparing for yourself. When immersed in sensuality, the gentle calls of the Spirit will not awaken you; rougher methods are then necessary: this point enlarged on, showing that the methods to be used for rousing a lethargic or apoplectic man, are to be employed in spiritual distempers: by such methods was David called back to himself: this case enlarged on. Yet the external evils and afflictions which we call down on ourselves, will be but a light part of our misery; for

when at length we come to see nothing to keep us from everlasting ruin but our slender thread of life, what despair will possess our minds! This awful state enlarged on to the end.

DISCOURSE LX.

2 CORINTHIANS, CHAP. IV. VERSE 18.

For the things which are seen are temporal; but the things which are not seen are eternal.

PART I.

THE motives to obedience in all religions are thus far the same, that they depend on the belief of another invisible world, and the different state of men in it for though it has been urged, with some show of reason, that virtue is its own reward, and that man's chief happiness would consist in the practice of it, independent of any other rewards, yet this, even if true, is far too narrow a foundation to build religion on; as it would only influence men of abstracted thought and reason. The generality of mankind live by sense, and take their measures of happiness, not from the remote conclusions of reason, but from their present feeling, and from the impressions which they receive from their daily intercourse with men and things; and the rewards and punishments of religion are calculated to this sense and feeling, excepting only that they are distant, and incapable of being made the present objects of sense; and therefore they operate so weakly on the minds and affections of men. Herein lies the advantage of the things of this world, that the man of thought and reflection cannot but see them, while the man of no thought sees nothing else: hence the distinction made by the Apostle in the text. In this lies all the force and strength of worldly temptations and pleasures; for were the enjoyments of this world and those of the next equally remote, there could be no competition between them. This most men would find to be true, would they but observe a little what passes in themselves and others: this point enlarged on. If it be true now, that it is wise to prefer the pleasures of life to the hopes of futurity, it will be true fifty years hence, that a man acted wisely by so doing; for truth is always the same; and yet if he lives till then, it is great odds but that he judges otherwise; as we find men do every day this point enlarged on. Hence arises the difference, that in one case reason is excluded by sense and the prevailing power of present objects; in the other it is free, and judges from the truth and nature of things. Throw out sense and appetite, and the question will be reduced to these two points: I. Whether we can have sufficient evidence for the existence of the things not seen, as may make

Sense is the

them capable of being brought into competition with the things that are seen, the existence of which is in this question out of doubt ? II. Whether the value of the things which are not seen be so great, that we ought in prudence to forego the enjoyment of the things which are present with us? There are several ways by which we satisfy ourselves of the existence of things without us: the chief of these is sense. This evidence extends to this world and the things of it; and though some have taken great pains to doubt the existence of these, yet it is a question whether any man did ever reach that perfection of scepticism. This evidence may be styled the strongest in one respect, as it most universally affects mankind, who more readily receive the reports of sense than the conclusions of reason. Not but that the evidence of reason is as strong for the existence of things not seen, as sense is for the things which are seen; as is manifest in the proof of a first cause so likewise from the testimony of others we believe in the existence of things which they have seen, but we have not; this is the evidence of faith, and on it men act in their dearest concerns in this world: this point enlarged on. Hence it is no manner of proof that things do not exist because they are not seen, as they may admit of another proof: yet the wisdom of the voluptuous man is founded in this prejudice: he thinks it wisdom not to part with a certainty for an uncertainty: this point enlarged on, with respect to the things of this world, which he sees and feels, and to future things, which lie out of the way of his senses. measure of his certainty, else why should he judge as he does? His senses only prove his present existence in this world; not that he shall not live hereafter in another; and yet from the former he concludes in prejudice to the other world; which is very absurd, since this evidence affects not, one way or other, the belief of future rewards and glories: this point enlarged on. Hence therefore sense can judge only on one side; it can be no rule in this dispute; for a rule must be a common measure of the things to be estimated, and applicable to both. Let sense prove, as strongly as you will, the existence of this world, and the things of it, how can it affect the belief of another? That you live now proves not that we shall not live hereafter; therefore the evidence of sense for this world ought not to prejudice our belief of another. The advantage of this evidence of sense is great, because it is the first that men come to the use and application of; and thus they learn to trust to it in all cases. Men come later to the use of reason, for the evidence of which they have less occasion; and they use still less than they have occasion : being then not equally acquainted with the certainty of this evidence as with the demonstrations of sense, the deductions of reason satisfy them less than the reports of sense. Such is the true state of this question. Now if the evidence for unseen things be not of equal weight with the evidence of sense, the things which are not seen can never be made so clear as to compete with the things that are seen; though the means by which we arrive at the knowlege of the former may afford an evidence equal to the evidence of sense. Many things are known only from reason, and yet are as well

received as any report of sense: this point enlarged on, with respect to the productions and works of nature. Another evidence for things not seen is faith, an evidence to which the world in temporal affairs pays great respect, however shy they may be of admitting it as a principle of religion: this point enlarged on, showing that a man believes more about this world and its affairs, on the report made from other people's senses than he does from his own. This then the world must admit as good evidence for things not seen; since on it men believe the certainty of most things in the world. Now this evidence, where it is perfect, falls little short of that of sense; and men in many cases make no difference between them; which shows that this kind of evidence may be so strong as to leave no room for doubts or suspicions. Where then lies the reason of the objection against the things of another world, because they are not seen, and therefore not to be preferred to the things of this world, which are seen? Neither want their proper evidence; and being possessed of it, they are not the worse for not having that evidence which does not belong to them. If then the case is so, it is extreme folly and want of thought to pursue the objects of sense in opposition to things unseen, without a thorough examination of their evidence and certainty. When you are told that for the blessings of another life we have the certainty of reason and faith, you must own the arguments are proper: the nature of the proof you cannot suspect; and if it be sufficiently strong, you must acknowlege it to be demonstrative in this as in all other like cases. The things of another world may be objects of sense to those of the other world, and are therefore capable of having the evidence of eye-witnesses: so that, should one come down from Heaven, and report the state of things there, his evidence must be admitted, the proof of his coming from Heaven being supposed. Besides, this question concerning future rewards and punishments is not the principal one in religion: it presupposes the belief and knowlege of God, else there is no room for it: a question then will arise, whether God can qualify men to be witnesses to the world of these unseen things? Doubtless he can reveal these things to men if he pleases; and were the world satisfied that he had revealed such things to such and such men, they must admit them as good witnesses in that case: it comes therefore to this point; can men satisfy the world that God has indeed spoken to them? This enlarged on. Since these things, then, are capable of such good evidence, it will be worth while to inquire whether they have it or no; nor will it be the effect of wisdom to reject them unheard, and to follow the impressions of sense at the hazard of final ruin. It would be strange if a man who has eyes and ears doubted the evidence of things continually thrust in at them. But to arrive at the evidence of reason and faith requires the exercise of thought; because these proofs lie more out of the common road, and are not to be had without being sought for. This is a just account of the reason why most men act by the evidence of sense, and follow the things of this world, while so few pursue with any heart or zeal the invisible things of another. Not that the former are in themselves more real; but

because men are sure of them, not being able to exclude the impressions of them, but are dubious respecting the things of futurity, not being able to attend to their proofs. How well this becomes men of education, let any one judge: how they will account for their neglect in not even proving and trying the things which make for their salvation, is hard to say. If it had been intended that we should be directed merely by our eyes, God need not have given us the power of reflection; and he will not excuse us for resigning ourselves to sense, which was given, not to rule, but to serve man. Concluding observations.

PART II.

Second subject of inquiry-whether the value of things not seen be so great that we ought in prudence to forego the enjoyment of the things that are present with us. There can be no ground to persuade men to renounce the pleasures of life, and expose themselves to troubles, which are often the companions of virtue, in hopes of future glory, unless this glory be great enough to recompense them for the losses and sufferings sustained in its pursuit. If the rewards of Heaven be infinitely preferable to the things of this world, then it is the part of wisdom to choose the greatest, though not the present good, and to prefer the severe duties of religion to the soft allurements of pleasure; since our present afflictions are but momentary, and will work for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory. On this principle the Apostle argues in the text, and justifies his own practice and behavior: he suffered persecution gladly for the sake of Christ and his truth: he suffered on the prospect of future glory; and though not dead to the sense of nature, or void of feeling, yet knowing the value of the rewards for which he labored, he made this choice. The Apostle's argument is founded on the different duration of the things of this world and of the other. It must be allowed that we have the same evidence for the uncertain, and, at best, for the short duration of the things of this life, as for their existence; that is, the evidence of sense: this point enlarged on. Let us then examine what are the conclusions of reason from this head, that the things which are seen are temporal. To estimate the happiness of man, we must take into account the nature of his desires and inclinations, and that of the objects which he pursues if there be such a due proportion between them, that the object is capable of satisfying the desire, then the object obtained is capable of making a man happy: uneasiness, and the want of something which we have not, cannot do so; which must always be the case when our desires are fixed on objects which do not answer to them, and afford not such a pleasure as may fill and content the mind. There are

different passions and desires incident to man; not the same in all, but varying according to temper, habits, age, and the like: these, being so uncertain, enter not into this inquiry, which is after man's natural happiness: this must be estimated by his natural and con

PART II.

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