CHAPTER III.

The Spanish-American war, just or unjust, confirmed Washington's letter to Congress of September 24, 1776, in which he expressed his estimation of militia and vol

unteers:

"To place any dependence upon militia is assuredly resting upon a broken staff. Men just dragged from the tender scenes of domestic life, unaccustomed to the din of arms, totally unacquainted with every kind of military skill (which is followed by want of confidence in themselves when opposed by troops regularly trained, disciplined, and appointed, superior in knowledge and superior in arms), are timid and ready to fly from their own shadows.

"Besides the sudden change in their manner of living, particularly in their lodging, brings on sickness in many, impatience in all, and such an unconquerable desire of returning to their respective homes, that it not only produces shameful and scandalous desertions among themselves, but infuses a like spirit in others. Again, men accustomed to unbounded freedom and no control, cannot brook the restraint which is indispensibly necessary to the good order and government of an army, without which licentiousness and every kind of disorder triumphantly reign. To bring men to a proper degree of subordination is not the work of a day or a month, or even a year. Certain I am that it would be cheaper to keep fifty thousand or one hundred thousand in constant pay than to depend upon half the number

and supply the other half occasionally by militia. The time the latter are in pay before and after they are in camp, assembling and marching, the waste of ammunition, the consumption of stores, which, in spite of every resolution or requisition of Congress, they must be furnished with or sent home, added to other incidental expenses consequent upon their coming and conduct in camp, surpass all idea and destroy every kind of regularity and economy which you could establish among fixed and settled troops, and will, in my opinion, prove, if the scheme is adhered to, the ruin of our cause.'

The strength of the United States army during the war of 1898 was about 170,000. The number admitted to hospital during the five months, April to September, 1898, was over 158,000, or 90 per cent. of the force. In April, May and June of that year, these men had passed severe medical examinations for fitness. Of this army only 38,000 participated in the war, and the actual casualties in the field, including the Philippines, Puerto Rico and Cuba, amounted to 293 and 1032 from disease. In United States camps (Chicamaugua and Key West) the deaths from disease were 2649.

The Japanese surgeon-general (reserve) to the Imperial Japanese Navy, Baron Takaki, reports relative to the Russo-Japanese war: "Four deaths from bullets to one from disease."

In the Spanish war (1898) the United States lost four from bullets to 56 from disease.

Japan had 1,500,000 men in the field during their last war. From this host, their loss was only 4073 deaths from typhoid and 1804 from dysentery.

The discipline of the American Volunteers at the time of the Spanish war was in keeping with the splendid spirit of individual American freedom and independence

and quite consistent with the teaching of the constitution. One national guard state regiment, when called upon for active service by the Federal government, declined to serve. They would not and did not serve and that settled it. The assigned cause was that the men declined to serve under efficient United States (Federal) Army officers. They preferred their own untrained civilian officers.

It is true, however, that some men of this regiment volunteered to other state regiments that went to the front and who were not so particular.

Similar incidents have happened at the time of great strikes, when State regiments, after having been called out by the State government, have thrown down their arms and returned peacefully to their homes, when their officers commanded them to fire on riotous, incendiary and murderous mobs composed mostly of aliens.

Yet these men have been permitted by the individual State to retain their arms and their uniforms. So even after a hundred years, Washington's judgment is proved sound.

The landing of troops in 1898 at Siboney, on the south coast of Cuba, was attended by confusion. Ammunition, commissary supplies and equipment remained on the beach without organized military system, only some sixteen miles from Santiago where the main force of the Spanish army was centered. During that period of organization, the Spanish could have descended from the foot hills of the south mountain range they occupied immediately above and commanding the United States army's position, and driven the entire United States forces into the Carribean. The fleet lying off Siboney could not protect them, as their fire would have been as dangerous to United States troops as to the enemy during an attack.

This condition existed for many days and was keenly realized by many officers of the invading army.

One very prominent volunteer cavalry officer said in the hearing of a sentry at the time, referring to a general who was abnormally stout: "If we had a little more brains and a little less 'guts' we should not be in this position." Someone said he would rather be right than be President. Probably the cavalry officer was not of the same opinion.

However, the Spanish did not take advantage of the position. The naval engagement followed, resulting in the entire destruction of the Spanish fleet. This subsequently resulted in a formal investigation of the United States Admiral (Schley) commanding the action.

The charge developed in this way: The United States fleet had for weeks, under Admiral Samson, blockaded and unsuccessfully bombarded the Morro and Cabanas forts at Havana and the Spanish ship Reina Christina had escaped from that harbor with some forty million dollars.

Following this the United States fleet concentrated off Santiago harbor, therein "bottling up" Admiral Cervera's fleet.

The "American" operations were in command of Admiral Samson with Admiral Schley second in command. The Admiral in command (Samson) on the "New York" left the fleet and proceeded to a point some twelve miles to the east off Siboney. During his absence the Spanish fleet emerged from the harbor and a running fight ensued in a westerly direction under Admiral Schley. Admiral Samson was necessarily left behind. Had Admiral Cervera's fleet steered east instead of west the flagship "New York" could have been the focus of Cervera's concentrated fire. As the Spanish fleet came out of the har

bor, Schley, to avoid being rammed and in order to make his fire more effective, executed his famous "loop" which manœuver probably saved his ship. This evolution was enlarged upon in a derogatory way at the Court of Inquiry and his tactics questioned despite his decisive victory.

His endeavor to immediately communicate the victory to his government, in the absence of Admiral Samson, was also a cause of great factional official dissatisfaction. To a great extent, politics, press criticism and prize. money entered into the distasteful incident. The indignity to which he was subjected was unjust.

"Put not your trust in Princes" is a saying trite with truth, but the ingratitude of a republic was never on any occasion demonstrated in a higher degree.

The public exploitation of the incident was not conducive to good feeling, nor did it accomplish anything.

If the Maine had anything to do with United States intervention in Cuba, it may also be accepted that the Navy precipitated reprisals in Mexico, another LatinAmerican country. It occupied Vera Cruz, admittedly not to protect foreign lives and interests, but to sustain its dignity, also to prevent the landing of French and German war material about to arrive there on the Hamburg-American steamer "Ypiranga."

This German ship carried guns and ammunition consigned to the Mexican Government and this government had been recognized by European and other Courts. The United States Navy prohibited the landing of this cargo, although at this time the Administration at Washington was loud in its protestations that no condition of war existed against the Mexican people. Simultaneously with this action, arms and war material were passing to the insurrectionists from the United States, across the Texas