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a provision upon this subject, nor, so far as I am aware, has there been any judicial decision in regard to it."

Mr. Marcy, Sec. of State, to Mr. Mason, June 6, 1854, MS. Inst. France,

XV. 196.
As to the status of free men of color, see opinion of Mr. Marcy, in Moore,

Int. Arbitrations, III. 2461-2462.

Children born in the United States of alien parents, who have never been naturalized, are native citizens of the United States.

Bates, At. Gen., 1862, 10 Op. 321. See United States v. Rhodes, 1 Abb.

U. S. 28; Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sandt. Ch. 584; Black, At. Gen., 1859,

9 Op. 373. See comment in Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Mr. de Bounder, Belg. min.,

April 2, 1888, For. Rel. I. 48.

By Article III. of the convention with Great Britain of 1818 it was agreed that the Oregon territory should“ be free and open ” “ to the vessels, citizens, and subjects of the two powers; " and this convention was continued in force until 1846. It has been held that, during the period of joint occupation, the country, as to British subjects therein, was British soil, and subject to the jurisdiction of the King of Great Britain; that, as to citizens of the United States, it was American soil, and subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; and that a child born in the territory in 1823 of British subjects, was born in the allegiance of the King of Great Britain, and not in that of the United States.

McKay v. Campbell, 2 Sawyer, 118.

“All persons born in the United States and not subject to any

foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are Civil Rights Act.

declared to be citizens of the United States." Rey. Stats., $ 1992; sec. 1, Civil Rights Act, April 9, 1866, 14 Stat. 27. As to persons of African descent, previously, see Mr. Marcy, Sec. of State,

to Mr. Barry, consul at Matamoras, Jan. 8, 1855, 20 MS. Desp. to consuls, 109; 2 MS. Op. Mex. (om. (1868) 293, case of Matthieu.

"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject Fourteenth amend- to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United

States and of the State wherein they reside."
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, pro-
Adams, 1 Dillon, 344; Ex parte Reynolds, 18 Alb. L. J. 8; 15 Am.
Law Rev. 21; Jackson 1. United States, 34 Ct. Cl. 41; O'Brien v.

ment.

posed to the States June 16, 1866, declared ratified by concurrent resolution of July 21, 1868, promulgated July 20 and July 28, 1868. (Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Mr. de Bounder, Belg. min., April 2,

1888, For. Rel. 1888, I. 48.) See Polit. Science Quarterly, V. 104; Doc. Hist. Constit. II. 783, 788. That American Indians, living in tribal relations, are not “subject to

the jurisdiction " of the United States, in the sense of the 14th amendment, see McKay v. Campbell, 2 Sawyer, 119; Karrahoo v.

Bugbee, 46 Kan. 1; Elk 1. Wilkins, 112 U. S. 94.
As to who are Indians, see In re Camille, 6 Sawyer, 541; Alberty v.

United States, 102 C. S. 199; United States v. Ward, 42 Fed. Rep.

320; Hilgers v. Quinney, 51 Wis. 62. As to the status of the Alaskan Indians under the modus vivendi of Oct.

20, 1899, see Mr. Adee, Act. Sec. of State, to Mr. French, Aug. 27,

1900, 247 MS. Dom. Let. 355. For the modus vivendi, see supra, $ 107. See an article on Natural-born citizens of the United States, and

Eligibility for the office of President, by Alex. Porter Morse, in 66
Albany Law Journal (April, 1904) 99.

“ It results from inquiry that John Peter Harboro was born in

Philadelphia, November 17, 1852, and that his father Variant construc

was not naturalized until November 6, 1860. The tions.

14th amendment to the Constitution declares that 'all persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States.'

“ This is simply an affirmance of the common law of England and of this country, so far as it asserts the status of citizenship to be fixed by the place of nativity, irrespective of parentage. The qualification, ' and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,' was probably intended to exclude the children of foreign ministers, and of other persons who may be within our territory with rights of extraterritoriality. It is, indeed, possible to read the language as meaning while or when they are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, but this would denationalize all citizens, native or naturalized, the moment they entered a foreign jurisdiction. A contemporaneous exposition of this amendment was given by the 3d section of the act of Congress of July 27, 1868 (15 Stat. 224)."

Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Mr. Marsh, May 19, 1871, MS. Inst. Italy, I. 350.
See, to the same effect, Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Mr. Ellis, April 14,

1873, 98 MS. Dom. Let. 385; to Mr. Van Horn, June 13, 1873, 102 MS.

Dom. Let. 437.
See, however, Mr. Evarts, Sec. of State, to Mr. Willins, March 14, 1879,

127 MS. Dom. Let. 178, and Mr. F. W. Seward, Act. Sec. of State, to
Mr. Fish, Aug. 20, 1878, MS. Inst. Switz. I. 439, in both of which
uncertainty is indicated as to the construction to be given to the
meaning of the phrase " subject to the jurisdiction thereof."

Ludwig IIausding was born in the United States, but during infancy was removed by his father, who was a Saxon subject, to Saxony, where he ever afterwards remained. The father subsequently became a citizen of the United States by naturalization. In 1884 Ludwig applied to the American legation in Berlin for a passport, but the legation refused to grant it on the ground that he was born of Saxon subjects, who were only temporarily in the United States, and was never " dwelling in the United States," either at the time of or since his parents naturalization, and was not naturalized by force of section 2172, Revised Statutes. With reference to this decision the Department of State said: “ Not being naturalized by force of the statute, Ludwig Hausding could only assert citizenship on the ground of birth in the United States; but this claim would, if presented, be untenable, for by section 1992, Revised Statutes, it is made a condition of citizenship by birth that the person be not subject to any foreign power. . . . Sections 1992 and 1993 of the Revised Statutes clearly show the extent of existing legislation: That the fact of birth, under circumstances implying alien subjection, establishes of itself no right of citizenship; and that the citizenship of a person so born is to be acquired in some legitimate manner through the operation of statute.”

Mr. Frelinghuysen, Sec. of State, to Mr. Kasson, min. to Germany, Jan. 15,

1885, For. Rel. 1885, 394.

A youth applied to the American legation in Berne, Switzerland, in 1885, for a passport as a citizen of the United States. He was born in New York September 7, 1866, and was described as the illegitimate son of a widow originally from Switzerland, who appeared to have been residing in New York at the time of his birth. Whether her late husband was a citizen of the United States was uncertain, but when she returned to Switzerland, four years after her illegitimate son's birth, she obtained a passport from the American legation as a citizen of the United States. She resided in Switzerland till her death, and her son had also continued to live there up to the time of his application for a passport. The Department of State said that he was so far a citizen of the United States ” that he might, on reaching his majority, “ elect which nationality he will adhere to, the United States or Switzerland," and that he was meanwhile to be considered as an American citizen residing in Switzerland, entitled to the protection of the United States and consequently to a passport.

Mr. Frelinghuysen, Sec. of State, to Mr. Cramer, min. to Switzerland,

Feb. 13, 1885, For. Rel. 188.), 794.
No inquiry seems to have been made in this case as to whether this ille-

gitimate child, born in the United States, was, under the circum-
stances stated, in any sense a citizen of Switzerland under the laws
of that country.

Richard Greisser was born in the United States in 1869. His father, a German subject, came to America in 1867, and in 1868 married there a Swiss lady, but in 1870, without having become a citizen of the United States or declared his intention to do so, returned to Germany, taking with him his wife and child. The Department of State said: “Richard Greisser was no doubt born in the United States, but he was on his birth 'subject to a foreign power' and 'not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.' He was not, therefore, under the statute [act of 1866, R. S. § 1992] and the Constitution [XIVth Amendment] a citizen of the United States by birth; and it is not pretended that he has any other title to citizenship.”

Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Mr. Winchester, min. to Switzerland,

Nov. 28, 1885, For. Rel. 1885, 814, 815. See, also, p. 813.

A child born in the United States, whose parents, though of Chi

nese descent and subjects of the Emperor of China, Decision of Supreme

are domiciled in the United States, is a citizen of the

United States by birth, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Court.

United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898), 169 U. S. 649.
For a review of the prior judicial dicta, to the effect that the phrase

" subject to the jurisdiction thereof” included not only the
children of diplomatic agents, but also children who bore a foreign
allegiance jure sanguinis, see Moore's Am. Notes, Dicey's Conflict
of Laws, 201. In the case of In re Look. Tin Sing, 21 Fed. Rep.
905, however, it was held that a child born in the United States to
alien Chinese parents, who could not themselves become naturalized,
was nevertheless a citizen by birth; and, if this were so, the child
born of parents who were subject to no disability would a fortiori
be a citizen. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
Wong Kim Ark, affirming the principle laid down in the case of
Look Tín Sing, authoritatively settles the question as to the children

of domiciled aliens.
See, also, Gee Fonk Sing 1. United States, 49 Fed. Rep. 146; Benny v.

O'Brien (N. J.), 32 Atl. 696 ; Ex parte ('hing King, 35 Fed. Rep. 354;
Mr. Wharton, Act. Sec. of State, to Mr. Johnson, July 24, 1891, 182
MS. Dom. Let. 583; Mr. Gresham, Sec. of State, to Mr. Runyon,
amb. to Germany, April 19, 1895, For. Rel. 1895, I. 536; Mr. Day,
Sec. of State, to Mr. Denby, min. to China, May 26, 1898, For. Rel.

1898, 203.
The laws restricting the immigration of Chinese are inapplicable to

persons of Chinese descent who are, by birth in the United States, citizens thereof. (86 Fed. Rep. 553.) See, however, infra, $ 570.

In a memorandum of April 16, 1901, the Imperial German embassy drew attention to a decision of the Treasury Department of February 28, 1899, which seemed to be in conflict with the previous determinations of the Department of State, of the Attorney-General, and of the Supreme Court. By this decision it was held that a child born in the United States of unnaturalized aliens and taken abroad by its father should, upon his return to the United States, be considered an alien immigrant. In a memorandum of May 27, 1901, the Department of State replied that the decision of the Treasury Department had been overruled by the district court of the United States for the southern district of New York, which decided that the two American-born children of certain Italians were, as citizens of the United States, entitled to admission into the country. It was added that the Secretary of the Treasury had accepted the decision of the court as binding upon his Department.

For. Rel., 1901, 175, citing 93 Fed. Rep. 659. For the Treasury Depart

ment's prior opinion see decision No. 20747, Feb. 28, 1899.

Jules Michot applied to the legation of the United States at Berne

for a passport. While it was declared in his appliCase of a found

cation that he was a native citizen of the United ling.

States, born in the city of Philadelphia, it was also stated that he knew nothing of his origin except what was set forth in the petition presented by his adopted mother, Rosalia Michot, to the court of common pleas No. 3, in Philadelphia, for his adoption, which was duly granted. The petitioner swore that the child was left with her near Philadelphia when it was about three months old, and that she knew nothing of its parentage or place of birth. Michot thought that the woman was really his mother, but of this there was no evidence, except that of filial association with her. But on the strength of “the presumption that the child was born in the country where its existence first became known," it was held that upon the circumstances set forth the applicant was entitled to be treated as a native citizen of the United States and to receive a passport accordingly.

Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, to Mr. Leishman, min. to Switzerland, July 12,

1899, For. Rel. 1899, 760.

matic officers.

“ The complainants are both citizens of France. The fact that

one of them was born in Peking, China, does not Children of diplo- change his citizenship. His father was a Frenchman,

and by the law of France a child of a Frenchman, though born in a foreign country, retains the citizenship of his father. In this case, also, his father was engaged, at the time of the son's birth, in the diplomatic service of France, being its minister plenipotentiary to China, and by public law the children of ambassadors and ministers accredited to another country retain the citizenship of their father.”

Geofroy v. Riggs (1890), 133 U. S. 258, 264.

Mr. Mazel was born in the United States Sept. 17, 1869. His father was then Dutch minister at Washington and had married an

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