On the transfer of territory by one sovereign to another, it has never been held that the relations of the inhabitants with each other undergo any change. Their relations with their former sovereign are dissolved, and new relations are created between them and the Government which has acquired their territory. The same act which transfers their country transfers the allegiance of those who remain. in it, and while the law which may be denominated political is necessarily changed, that which regulates the intercourse and general conduct of individuals remains in force until altered by the newlycreated power of the state. American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511, 542; United States v. Repentigny, 5 Wall. 211. As to the annexation of territory, see supra, § 83 et seq. See, also, Morse, Status of Inhabitants of Territory acquired by Discovery, By a principle of international law, on a transfer of territory by one nation to another, the political relations between the inhabitants of the ceded country and the former Government are changed, and new ones arise between them and the new Government. The manner in which this is to be effected is ordinarily the subject of treaty. The contracting parties have the right to contract to transfer and receive, respectively, the allegiance of all the native-born citizens; but the naturalized citizens, who owe allegiance purely statutory, are, when released therefrom, remitted to their original status. Tobin v. Walkinshaw, McAllister, 186. "In truth, we must divide the people of the United States into two classes: those in the full enjoyment of all the rights of citizenship, and those deprived of some or all of those rights; and then we must distinguish between such of the inhabitants of the country as are citizens, and such as are subjects only, and whether capable or not of becoming citizens, yet not so at the present time. I allude, in the latter case, to the Indians, who, in some of the States, are the subjects of the State in which they exist, but who are in general subjects of the United States; and to the Africans or persons of African descent, who, being mostly of servile condition, are of course not citizens, but subjects, in reference as well to the respective States in which they reside as to the United States." Cushing. At. Gen., Oct. 31, 1856, 8 Op. 139, 142. Many illustrations "from the practice and legislation of Great Britain and other foreign countries might be adduced to show that the status of the islanders as nationals, but not as citizens, has in it nothing anomalous, and that it is far more logical, as well as more just and expedient, to consider them as such rather than to treat them as aliens. The Attorney-General of the United States in his argument in the Insular Cases suggested and ably maintained that the islanders were American subjects. That term, however, is one which is foreign to our legal system and alien to our trend of political thought. The term 'national' fits the case more accurately and bears with it no unpleasant inference of political inferiority or servitude to an individual." (Frederic R. Coudert, jr., Our New Peoples: Citizens, Subjects, Nationals, or Aliens; Columbia Law Review, January, 1903.) On the admission of a State into the Union, as has been done in various cases," a collective naturalization may be effected in accordance with the intention of Congress and the people applying for admission." Opinion of Fuller, C. J., concurred in by Justices Blatchford, Lamar, and Brewer, Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U. S. 135, 170, citing Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 167. See also State v. Boyd, 31 Neb. 682. As to the annexation and admission of Texas, see infra, § 103. Inhabitants of the Territory of Nebraska at the time of its admission as a State into the Union, who had previously declared their intention to become citizens of the United States, were by the enabling act admitted to such citizenship. Bahuaud v. Bize (1901), 105 Fed. Rep. 485, citing Boyd v. Thayer, 143 66 By Art. III. of the treaty of April 30, 1803, by which France ceded Louisiana to the United States, it was stipuLouisiana cession. lated that "the inhabitants of the ceded territory should be incorporated in the Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the United States." By this stipulation, citizenship of the United States was conferred on the inhabitants of the territory. Opinion of Fuller, C. J., concurred in by Justices Blatchford, Lamar, and Brewer, Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U. S. 135, 164, citing Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393, 525; Desbois' Case, 2 Martin, 185; United States v. Laverty, 3 Martin, 733. As to the annexation of Louisiana, see supra, § 101. All persons, inhabitants of the Territory of Orleans, at the time of its admission as a State into the Union, became thereby citizens of Louisiana and of the United States. Desbois' Case, 2 Martin, 185; United States v. Laverty, 3 Martin, 733. Hennen's La. Dig., ed. 1861, I. 246. "This form relates only to those born in some foreign country who claim to be citizens solely by virtue of a residence in Louisiana at the time of the cession, or at the period when the Constitution was adopted, leaving the cases of citizenship by nativity in the United States, in Louisiana, before the cession, with residence afterwards, and by naturalization, to be proved in such other manner as may be legal and satisfactory to the public agent whose protection is required." Mr. Livingston, Sec. of State, to Mr. Robertson, consul at Tampico, June 29, 1831, enclosing a notice in regard to the issuance of evidences of citizenship. (3 MS. Desp. to Consuls, 341.) By Art. VI. of the treaty of Feb. 22, 1819, by which certain cessions of territory were made by Spain to the United States, Florida treaty. it was stipulated that the "inhabitants" of the ceded territories should be “ incorporated in the Union of the United States, as soon as may be consistent with the principles of the Federal Constitution, and admitted to the enjoyment of all the privileges, rights, and immunities of the citizens of the United States." See, as to the effect of this stipulation, Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511; Contested Elections, 1834, 1835, 38 Cong. 2 sess. 41; Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U. S. 135, 168. As to the annexation under the treaty of 1819, see supra, § 102. All persons who were citizens of Texas at the date of annexation, viz, December 29, 1845, became citizens of the United States by virtue of the collective naturalization effected by the act of that date. Annexation of Akerman, At. Gen., 1871, 13 Op. 397. As to the annexation of Texas, see supra, § 103. A person born in Texas and removing therefrom before the separation from Mexico remains a citizen of Mexico, though a minor when the separation took place. Jones . McMasters, 20 How. 8. Inhabitants of Texas who, at the time of the annexation, were not citizens thereof, could thereafter become citizens of the United States only by the usual process of naturalization. This rule was held to apply to a minor alien, a German subject, residing in Texas at the time of the annexation, who, although he was separated from his parents, had not become a citizen of the State; and, as it did not appear that he was afterwards naturalized as a citizen of the United States, it was held that he could not assert a claim in that character. Contzen . United States (1900), 179 U. S. 191, affirming the judgment of the court below. The constitution of Texas provides that "all persons (Africans, the descendants of Africans, and Indians excepted) who were residing in Texas on the day of the declaration of independence shall be considered citizens of the republic." The date of the declaration of independence was March 2, 1836. Held, that an alien who became a resident in 1845, a few months before the annexation of Texas to the United States, did not thereby become a citizen of the United States. (Contzen v. United States, 33 Ct. Cl. 475.) By section 4 of the act of Congress of April 30, 1900, " to provide a government for the Territory of Hawaii," "all persons who were citizens of the Republic of Hawaii on Annexation of Hawaii. August 12, 1898," the day of the formal transfer of sovereignty to the United States, were "declared to be citizens of the United States and citizens of the Territory of Hawaii;" and it was further provided that "all citizens of the United States resident in the Hawaiian Islands who were resident there on or since August 12, 1898, and all the citizens of the United States who shall hereafter reside in the Territory of Hawaii for one year, shall be citizens of the Territory of Hawaii.” 31 Stat. 141. By section 100 of the same act, the naturalization laws of the United Under sec. 4 of the act of April 30, 1900, Chinese persons born or naturalized in the Hawaiian Islands previously to Aug. 12, 1898, and who have not since lost their citizenship, are citizens of the United States; and the wife and children of such persons are entitled to enter the United States by virtue of the citizenship of the husband and father. Griggs, At. Gen., Jan. 16, 1901, 23 Op. 345; Griggs, At. Gen., Jan. 16, 1901, This opinion is followed in Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, to Mr. Conger, min. to By Art. IX. Porto Rico and the Philippines. of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain of Dec. 10, 1898, it was provided that "the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress." Pending legislation by Congress on the subject, it was held that native inhabitants of Porto Rico temporarily sojourning abroad might be registered as such in the legations and consulates of the United States, and were when so registered entitled to "official protection" "in all matters where a citizen of the United States similarly situated would be entitled thereto," care being taken to have it appear that they were "protected as native inhabitants of Porto Rico and not as citizens of the United States." Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, to the diplomatic and consular officers of the See Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, to Mr. Miranda, June 10, 1899, 237 MS. Dom. Under this circular, native inhabitants of Porto Rico were entitled to the The circular of May 2, 1899, was applicable to Spain. (Mr. Hay, Sec. of While Porto Rico, after annexation, and pending legislation by Congress, was under military government, it seemed to be unobjectionable, so far as international relations were concerned, for the military commander to offer to foreign residents, identified by domicil or business with local interests, an opportunity to vote at municipal elections; but until Congress should have determined, pursuant to the treaty of peace, the political status of the native inhabitants of the island, and have provided in substance and form for their acquisition of citizenship, it did not appear to be within his province to establish any formality, directly or indirectly, contemplating the future naturalization of foreigners residing there. Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, to Sec. of War, Jan. 27, 1900, 242 MS. Dom. Let. 430. See, also, Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, to Mr. Cambon, French amb., April 10, 1900, No. 294, MS. Notes to French Leg. XI. 33. "This Department concurs in the view expressed in the communication of the Secretary of State and Government of Cuba that, under international law and the treaty of peace with Spain [of Dec. 10, 1898], the native inhabitants of Puerto Rico ceased to be Spanish subjects upon the ratification of the treaty." Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, to See, of War, Jan. 29, 1900, 242 MS. Dom, Let. 443. The treaty of Dec. 10, 1898, did not make the inhabitants of the ceded territory citizens of the United States. Goetze v. United States, 103 Fed. Rep. 72. But they ceased to be aliens," in the sense of the immigration. laws. Gonzales . Williams (1904), 192 U. S. 1, reversing In re Gonzales, 118 |