one or the other country has not for either party the effect of citizenship legally acquired.' "This clause follows the provision in the same article that change of allegiance shall be effected by a 5 years' residence and naturalization. "The Department is therefore of the opinion that the certificate should not be issued to Mr. Gylling." Mr. Blaine, Sec. of State, to Mr. Hicks, min. to Peru, Feb. 26, 1890, For. See, to the same effect, Mr. Blaine, Sec. of State, to Mr. Thomas, June 4, "The naturalization laws of the United States are framed upon the theory that there is some connection between residence in a country and the acquisition of a right to its protection. Hence they provide a probationary period during which the applicant, by residence in the land of intended adoption, by acquiring interests therein, by good moral conduct, and by familiarizing himself with, and attaching himself to, its constitutional methods, shall fit himself for a faithful and loyal assumption of the duties of citizenship, and thus, as a member of our free society, support the Government whose protection is in return extended to him. Accordingly, it is required that he shall first make a declaration of intention to become a citizen and afterwards undergo a probation, not only to prepare him for naturalization, but also to test the quality and steadfastness of his purpose before his admission to citizenship. zens. other "The object of the law was to make citizenship a substantial thing, and to require the performance of acts indicative of true faith and allegiance as the condition of its acquisition. The law is so clear on this subject that there does not appear to be room for controversy. And, in further execution of this purpose, it is provided that passports shall not be granted or issued to, or verified for, any persons than citizens of the United States (Rev. Stats., sec. 4076). It is not easy to discover, therefore, the grounds upon which the privileges of citizenship can be claimed by persons who are not citiThe conditions of the acquisition of citizenship being clearly stated in the law, the reason by which a person can claim the right of citizenship when he has deliberately omitted to perform the conditions is by no means apparent. Nor is it less difficult to perceive upon what theory a Government can be held bound to protect persons who are not only not its citizens, but who have not exhibited a willingness to live long enough within its jurisdiction to acquire its citizenship. Where a person after making a declaration of intention, instead of remaining in the United States and becoming duly naturalized, abandons the country and remains abroad, it must be inferred that he has also abandoned his intention. Take, for example, the case of Gylling, out of which the present correspondence has grown. The precise duration of his residence in the United States is not known, but it was evidently short. He made his declaration of intention in 1881, and not long afterwards appears to have left the United States. Almost twice the probationary period required for admission to citizenship after the date of first arrival in the United States has elapsed since he made his declaration; but he has never performed the conditions of naturalization, and consequently has never been admitted as a citizen. Indeed, by going and remaining abroad he continuously disables himself from fulfilling those conditions. To say that such a person is entitled to the protection of the United States is merely to set aside the statutes and discard citizenship altogether as a test of the right to claim protection. Those who refuse to attach themselves to the United States can not complain if this Government does not consider itself bound to exert its power in their behalf. Professions of allegiance, however ardent, have, it is proper to say, little weight where the conduct of the individual refutes them. The Department is at a loss to understand why persons in the position of Mr. Gylling 'naturally look,' as you observe, to the American legation for a recognition of their citizenship,' when the piece of paper they carry discloses that they are not American citizens and their conduct shows that they are not endeavoring to become such. "It is not deemed necessary to enter into the discussion of questions of domicil, or of the rights which may pertain to that status. The present observations are confined to the general class to which your dispatch relates." Mr. Blaine, Sec. of State, to Mr. Hicks, min. to Peru, May 8, 1890, A declaration of intention "has no international value whatever in the event of the declarant returning, as he appears to have done, to his native country." Mr. Olney, Sec. of State, to Mr. Breckinridge, min. to Russia, No. 169, See, to the same effect, Mr. Gresham, Sec. of State, to Mr. Berkowitz, Mr. Olney, Sec. of State, to Mr. Hargreaver, Sept. 17, 1895, 204 MS. Dom. Mr. Moore, Act. Sec. of State, to Mr. Pashayan, Sept. 9, 1898, 231 MS. Dom. Let. 292; Mr. Adee, Second Assist. Sec. of State, to Mr. Karayannopoulos, Aug. 9, 1897, 220 id. 157. Cases of Italians. Under the act of June 8, 1896, making appropriations for deficiencies of the fiscal year, the sum of $10,000 was paid to the Italian Government, out of humane consideration, and without reference to the question of liability therefor, as "full indemnity to the heirs of three of its subjects who were riotously killed, and to two others who were injured," by lynchers in Colorado. Of the three who were killed, two had declared their intention to become citizens of the United States, but had not completed their naturalization. For. Rel. 1895, II. 944-945, 949; For. Rel. 1896, 426. August 8, 1896, three Italian subjects, named Lorenzo Salardino, Salvatore Arena, and Giuseppe Venturella, were lynched in the jail at Hahnville, Louisiana, while in the custody of the authorities of the law. They were charged with committing or with being concerned in the commission of two murders. On their first incarceration the sheriff, in view of the prevailing excitement, placed an extra guard around the jail, but later, believing that the excitement had subsided, removed the extra guard and left the jail as usual in charge of the jailer. Subsequently, on the night of the 8th of August, an armed mob broke into the jail and committed the lynching. Three other Italians, who were confined in the prison, were not molested. The persons who composed the mob were unknown. November 27, 1896, Mr. Olney, as Secretary of State, communicated certain facts to the Italian ambassador, with an expression of belief that they would lead to a decided change in the attitude which his Government had previously been disposed to assume. were to the effect that Salardino had lived for 12 years in Louisiana, These facts and had taken part in the civil affairs of the State by voting at elections; that, while measures were taken after his arrest to protect him, the murder which he had committed was peculiarly atrocious and was clearly proved; that Venturella and Arena had also resided in Louisiana for several years and voted at elections, Arena having, as was shown, declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States; that the crime with which they were charged was also peculiarly atrocious and well established; that the attack on the jail was unexpected, and that its success was not due to any negligence or connivance on the part of the authorities; and that although the lynching had been investigated by a grand jury, it had been impossible to obtain information which could lead to the discovery and punishment of the guilty parties. On these grounds it was contended by the United States that the Italians in question were slain not because of their nationality, but because of their apparent participation in atrocious crimes; that there had been no willful denial of justice in the case, and that there was no reason to suppose that the incident or its result would have been different had the supposed criminals been citizens of the United States. Special stress was, however, laid upon the point that the victims of the lynching were "not Italians temporarily residing in the United States;" that, while they were performing no duties as subjects of Italy and "were successfully evading the burdens of her military service," they were apparently intending to remain in the United States and adopt it as the place of their permanent domicil; that, although a declaration of intention had been found only in the case of Arena, it had doubtless been made by the others, since they could not have voted without proof of oaths to the same effect; and that, "by qualifying and acting as electors they had, according to the constitution and laws of Louisiana, as interpreted by its supreme court, become citizens of that State and eligible to hold office." Under these circumstances the United States, while reserving for the moment its decision in the matter, suggested for the consideration of the Italian Government whether it had "any right or duty of reclamation" as against the United States on account of the persons in question. Pursuing this question further, Mr. Olney said: "In obtaining indemnity for injuries inflicted upon a citizen the Government presenting the claim is in truth that citizen's agent, and any legal or equitable defense good as against the citizen himself is equally good as against his representative. But an individual who participates in making the laws and electing the officers of one Government must in every just view be held to estop himself from complaining of that Government to any other. In point of principle he is not distinguishable from, but is to be identified with the body politic of which he becomes a member; he may not approve of a particular act of that body, but he contributes to the power which enables it to do any or all acts. As a matter of fact, indeed, his vote may have brought about the very legislation or elected the very officer responsible for the injury of which he complains. The soundness of the position, therefore, that an international reclamation will not lie against a Government when the beneficiary of the claim by taking part in the organization and administration of that Government has in effect given his assent to its proceedings, seems to be supported by every consideration of justice and equity. These considerations, which go to the duty of the Italian Government in the premises, are reenforced by the absence of any real interest on its part. The wrongs done at Hahnville, on account of which its intercession is asked, were to persons who had abandoned Italian soils and had ceased to be part of the population of the kingdom, and who added nothing to its productive capacity or to its military strength. To intercede as asked, therefore, is to use the credit and prestige and 1 power of the Italian Government on behalf of persons, or the representatives of persons, whose fate and fortunes were at the time of the infliction of the wrongs complained of no real concern to that Government. "In bringing the Hahnville cases to the notice of the State Department your excellency has evidently been under the impression that they resemble in all substantial particulars the cases of certain Italians lynched in New Orleans in 1891, and of certain others lynched at Walsenburg, Colo., in 1894. But in the last-named cases there was neither allegation nor proof that the persons killed had ever taken part in the political affairs of a State or of the United States by qualifying as voters and actually voting at elections. In the New Orleans cases, out of the eleven persons of Italian extraction who were lynched, two were American citizens; five had declared their intent to become United States citizens and had voted; of the remaining four, three had neither voted nor declared their intent to become United States citizens, while one had declared such intent, but had not voted. To the four persons last mentioned the representations of your Government and its demands upon the United States through you were expressly limited, as appears by reference to the correspondence on the subject between yourself and the State Department. It is true that the Italian consul at New Orleans, in a note to the district attorney, argued that the Italian Government could rightfully intervene on behalf of the five persons who had declared their intent to become United States citizens and had voted, and that the district attorney in a note to the Attorney-General controverted that view. But no position of the Italian consul, though brought to your notice, was ever adopted by you-it was never discussed between the two Governments. The note announcing your departure from Washington by order of your Government specifies only four Italian subjects on account of whom demands had been made upon this Government, and the incident, when settled, was settled by the payment of a lump sum, the application of which was left wholly to the Italian Government. The result is that the subject to which the attention of the Italian Government is now invited is one upon which the two Governments in their relations to each other stand wholly uncommitted. It is not, therefore, permissible to doubt that the question will be examined and passed upon by each in an enlightened spirit and with a sincere purpose not only to dispose of the particular matter in hand, but to ascertain and fix a just and proper rule for the determination of all like questions hereafter arising." Baron Fava, the Italian ambassador, in reply maintained that neither the position and responsibility of the persons murdered, nor |