as they would apply if he had never left that country. A different view of the duties of this Government would be an invasion of the independence of nations, and could not fail to be productive of discord; it might, moreover, prove detrimental to the interests of the States of this Union." Mr. Marcy, Sec. of State, to Mr. Daniel, min. to Sardinia, Nov. 10, 1855, See, also, Mr. Marcy, Sec. of State, to Mr. Meyer, May 16, 1853, 41 MS. In 1856 the Department of State submitted to Mr. Cushing, as Attorney-General, the following question propounded by the Bavarian minister at Berlin: "Whether, according to the laws of the United States of America, a citizen thereof, when he desires to expatriate himself, needs to ask either from the Government of the United States, or of the State of which he is the immediate citizen, permission to emigrate; and if so, what are the penalties of contravention of the law?" Mr. Cushing, after adverting to the fact that the National Government had not undertaken to formalize any general law either of citizenship or of emigration, referred to the laws of Virginia, which required, he said, as conditions of the relinquishment of citizenship, (1) a solemn declaration of intention to emigrate, with actual emigration, and (2) the assumption in good faith of a foreign allegiance, but declared (3) that the act of expatriation should have no effect if done while the State or the United States was at war with a foreign power; nor could a citizen of Virginia by emigration discharge himself from any obligation to the State, the nonperformance of which involved by its laws any penal consequence. Kentucky, said Mr. Cushing, had substantially similar laws; but no other State, so far as his observation went, had attempted to solve such questions by express legislation. The constitutions of Pennsylvania and Indiana declared that emigration from those States should not be prohibited, but it was undoubtedly the case, said Mr. Cushing, that military desertion could not be covered up under the cloak of emigration. Mr. Cushing thought that the Federal Government recognized the same principle, and cited to that effect the letter of Mr. Jefferson to Mr. Morris, August 16, 1793, supra, § 434, to the effect that the laws" do not admit that the bare commission of a crime amounts, of itself, to a divestment of the character of citizen, and withdraws the criminal from their coercion." Mr. Cushing then examined several decisions of the Federal and State courts, the results of which he summarized thus: "Expatriation a general right, subject to regulation of time and circumstance according to public interests; and the requisite consent of the State presumed where not negatived by standing prohibitions." In conclusion, he expressed the opinion that, subject to "the conditions thus indicated," and to "such others as the public interest might seem to Congress to require to be imposed,” “ the right of expatriation exists, and may be freely exercised by the citizens of the United States." 66 Mr. Cushing, At.-Gen., Oct. 31, 1856, 8 Op. 139. In the course of his opinion, at p. 163, Mr. Cushing said: "In truth, (4) REASSERTION OF UNQUALIFIED RIGHT, 1857-1861. § 437. In notes of October 23, 1858, and March 16, 1859, Mr. Schleiden, the representative of Bremen at Washington, solicited the views of the Department of State concerning the possible surrender by his Government to other German States, under treaties with the latter, of persons from whom, as natives of such States, military service might be claimed, although they had been naturalized in the United States. The Department of State, in reply, took the ground that the question involved was political in its nature, and as such should be left to the determination of the parties concerned, and should not be decided by a third state, such as Bremen, by the delivery up of the person demanded. In the course of its reply, the Department of State said: "It is undoubtedly true that this Government has acquiesced in the opinion expressed by Mr. Wheaton that, when a citizen who has been liable to military duty leaves his own country without permission, and without having performed this duty, and is naturalized in another country, he may be held to discharge his liability whenever he is found again in his native state. This opinion, however, is regarded by this Government as applying not to cases of inchoate liability, but to cases only where the liability has become complete. To speak of a minor as liable to military service simply because, if he should live long enough in the country, he might become so, could not be fairly regarded as either appropriate or just. It is unnecessary, however, to discuss this distinction with reference to your letter, because your inquiry refers to a case of admitted liability." Mr. Cass, Sec. of State, to Mr. Schleiden, April 9, 1859, S. Ex. Doc. 38, 36 See, also, Mr. Schleiden to Mr. Cass, Nov. 28, 1859; Mr. Cass to Mr. "The position of the United States, as communicated to the minister at Berlin for the information of the Prussian Government, is that native-born Prussians naturalized in the United States and returning to the country of their birth are not liable to any duties or penalties, except such as were existing at the period of their emigration. If at that time they were in the army or actually called into it, such emigration and naturalization do not exempt them from the legal penalty which they incurred by their desertion, but this penalty may be enforced against them whenever they shall voluntarily place themselves within the local jurisdiction of their native country, and shall be proceeded against according to law. But when no present liabilities exist against them at the period of their emigration, the law of nations, in the opinion of this Government, gives no right to any country to interfere with naturalized American citizens, and the attempt to do so would be considered an act unjust in itself and unfriendly towards the United States. This question can not, of course, arise in the case of a naturalized citizen who remains in the United States. It is only when he voluntarily returns to his native country that its local laws can be enforced against him." Mr. Cass, Sec. of State, to Mr. Hofer, June 14, 1859, 50 MS. Dom. Let. 389. In an instruction to the American minister at Berlin, to which the foregoing letter refers, Mr. Cass said: "If the future liability to do military duty creates a perpetual obligation wherever the party may be, and whatever other responsibilities he may have incurred, the same principle will enable a Government to prevent its subjects or citi zens from ever leaving its dominions or changing their home. It would be a practical denial of all right of expatriation, and a full assertion of the doctrine of perpetual allegiance." (Mr. Cass, Sec. of State, to Mr. Wright, min. to Prussia, May 12, 1859, MS. Inst. Prussia XIV. 274.) With reference to his letter to Mr. Hofer of the 14th of June, Mr. Cass See, also, Mr. Cass, Sec. of State, to Mr. Cushing, June 16, 1859; to Mr. Case of Christian Christian Ernst, a native of Hanover, emigrated to the United States in 1851, when nineteen years of age. In February, 1859, he was naturalized, and in the folErnst. lowing month procured a passport and went back to Hanover on a visit. After arriving in his native village he was arrested and forced into the Hanoverian army. President Buchanan submitted the case to Attorney-General Black for an opinion. Attorney-General Black advised (1) that the course to be taken must depend upon the law of our own country, as controlled and modified by the law of nations;" (2) that it was the "natural right of every free person, who owes no debts and is not guilty of any crime, to leave the country of his birth in good faith and for an honest purpose," and to throw off his natural allegiance and substitute another in its place; (3) that, although the common law of England denied this right, and "some of our own courts, misled by British authority, have expressed, though not very decis ively, the same opinion," this was not to be taken as settling the question; (4) that "natural reason and justice," "writers of known wisdom," and "the practice of civilized nations" were all "opposed to the doctrine of perpetual allegiance," and that the United States was pledged to the right of expatriation and could not without perfidy repudiate it; (5) that expatriation "includes not only emigration out of one's native country, but naturalization in the country adopted as a future residence;" (6) that “naturalization does ipso facto place the native and the adopted citizen in precisely the same relations with the government under which they live, except in so far as the express and positive law of the country has made a distinction in favor of one or the other;" (7) that, with regard to the protection of American citizens in their rights at home and abroad, there was no law that divided them into classes or made any difference whatever between them; (8) that the opinion held by "persons of very high reputation" that a naturalized citizen ought to be protected everywhere except in the country of his birth had "no founda 66 tion to rest upon except the dogma which denies altogether the right of expatriation without the consent of his native country;" (9) that the naturalization laws were opposed to this view "in their whole spirit as well as in their express words," and that the states of Europe were also practically committed against it;" (10) that. assuming that Hanover had a municipal regulation by which the right of expatriation was denied to those of her subjects who failed to comply with certain conditions, and assuming that this regulation was violated by Mr. Ernst when he came away, the unlawfulness of his emigration would not make his naturalization void as against the King of Hanover; (11) that, if the laws of the two countries were in conflict, the law of nations must decide the question upon principles and rules of its own, and that "by the public law of the world we have the undoubted right to naturalize a foreigner, whether his natural sovereign consented to his emigration or not;" and, finally, (12) that the Hanoverian Government could justify the arrest of Mr. Ernst only by proving that the original right of expatriation depended on the consent of the natural sovereign-a proposition which, said Mr. Black, "I am sure no man can establish." Black, At. Gen., July 4, 1859, 9 Op. 356. The views of the President in relation to the case of Christian Ernst and analogous cases were communicated to the American minister at Berlin, July 8, 1859. In this communication the position was maintained that the right of expatriation could not be doubted or denied in the United States; that the Constitution recognized it by conferring on Congress the power to establish a uniform rule for naturalization; that Congress had uniformly acted upon the principle since the commencement of the Federal Government, and that there was no country in Europe whose laws did not authorize the naturalization of foreigners in some form. What right, then, it was asked, did the laws of the United States confer upon a foreigner by granting him naturalization? The answer was, all the rights, privileges. and immunities which belonged to a native citizen, except that of eligibility to the office of President. With this exception," it was affirmed," the naturalized citizen, from and after the date of his naturalization, both at home and abroad, is placed upon the very same footing with the native citizen. He is neither in a better nor a worse condition. . The moment a foreigner becomes naturalized his allegiance to his native country is severed forever. He experiences a new political birth. A broad and impassable line separates him from his native country. He is no more responsible for anything he may say or do, or omit to say or do, after assuming his new character. than if he had been born in the United States. Should he return to |