Opinion of the Court. LAWRENCE v. RECTOR. APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS. No. 56. Argued November 6, 7, 1890.- Decided November 17, 1890. The court adheres to the views of the law expressed in its opinion delivered at the former trial of this case, (Rector v. Gibbon, 111 U. S. 276,) and finds that the decree below was made in accordance with them. Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, having reference to the doubt as to title, and to the evident good faith of the parties, the true measure of liability is the actual receipts from the property, and not its rental value; and in that respect the decree below is held to have been erroneous. IN EQUITY. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Henry A. Gardner (with whom was Mr. Robert D. McFadon on the brief) and Mr. Samuel W. Williams (with whom was Mr. S. F. Clark on the brief) for appellants. Mr. U. M. Rose and Mr. Augustus H. Garland (with whom were Mr. F. W. Compton and Mr. G. B. Rose on the brief) for appellee. MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the court. . It This is the second time this case has been to this court. came first on demurrer to the bill, and the decision is reported in 111 U. S. 276. The demurrer, which had been sustained in the Circuit Court, was overruled by this, and the case remanded with instructions to permit answer and proceed to proof. Obediently thereto answer was filed in the Circuit Court, and the case proceeded to proof and hearing. The history of the "Hot Springs" litigation, of which this is but a fragment, has been so often referred to in the opinions of this court, particularly in the case in 111 U. S. supra, that reference thereto now is superfluous; and in reference to the principal matter in controversy here, the title to the lots, it is enough to say that every material fact alleged in the bill was proved, and that nothing was developed in answer or testimony to disturb the conclusions of law heretofore reached by Opinion of the Court. this court. The matter of title was established by the decree of the Circuit Court in accordance with the views of the law entertained and announced by this court, and there is nothing in the testimony to withdraw the case from the scope of that conclusion. The Circuit Court entered a decree for title also directed an accounting. That accounting, as finally settled, credited the defendant with the amount of taxes and assessments paid by him the amount of purchase-money paid to the United States for the lots and the expenses incurred in obtaining the patent- and the amount due for improvements, on the basis of the lease which established the rights of the parties, and charged him with the money received on certificates from the government for buildings condemned and destroyed, and also the rental value of the premises from the time of the award of the commissioners to the date of the decree. We are of opinion that the rental value ought not to have been charged; that, under the peculiar circumstances of this case, having reference to the doubt that must have arisen as to the matter of title, to the prima facie effect of the award given by the commissioners, and to the evident good faith of all the parties in reference thereto; the true measure of liability is not the rental value, but the actual receipts. This account, as stated by the Circuit Court, was as follows: By amount of taxes and assessments paid, $2,306 98 112 35 8,666 67 $12,614 00 $12,614 00 $7,665 52 Statement of the Case. This account should be modified so as to charge defendant with amount received on certificates for condemned buildings, $10,737.86, and other amounts actually received from the property, $5659.07; total $16,396.93. From which, deducting the credits allowed, there remains a balance of $3782.93. The decree of the Circuit Court will therefore be modified and the case Remanded with instructions to enter a final decree, as heretofore, establishing the title of the complainant and decreeing to him possession, and adjudging that he recover of the defendants the sum of $3782.93, with interest from the 11th day of November, 1886, the time of the final decree. GURNEE v. PATRICK COUNTY. ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA. No. 57. Argued and submitted November 7, 1890.- Decided November 17, 1890. If a law conferring jurisdiction is repealed without any reservation as to pending cases, all such cases fall with the law. Morey v. Lockhart, 123 U. S. 56; v. Grinnell, 123 U. S. 679; affirmed. Wilson v. Nebraska, 123 U. S. 286; Sherman and Railroad Co. v. Grant, 98 U. S. 398, Richmond & Danville Railroad Co. v. Thouron, 134 U. S. 45, affirmed. A judgment in a Circuit Court of the United States on a general demurrer to the declaration in an action removed from a State Court, that the demurrer be sustained, and, as the record showed that the court had no jurisdiction, that the cause be remanded to the State Court, is not a judgment to which a writ of error from this court can be maintained. THIS case was called when reached in the regular order upon the calendar, and argument was commenced. The court, however, on examining the record, declined to hear further argument, but granted to counsel leave to file briefs on the question of jurisdiction. The case, as stated by the court, was as follows: Plaintiffs in error are citizens of the State of New York, and the owners and holders of certain bonds of the county of Statement of the Case. Patrick in the State of Virginia. The record shows that at a meeting of the board of supervisors for the county of Patrick, on April 7, 1884, "the Norfolk and Great Western Railroad Company, for the use and benefit of Walter S. Gurnee, Jun'r, and Augustus C. Gurnee, and Walter S. Gurnee, Jr., and Augustus C. Gurnee, assignees thereof," presented to the board "seventeen bonds of $1000 each, executed by the county aforesaid to said railroad company and numbered, respectively, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 23, 24, 25, 29 and 30, and demanded payment of the interest due thereon to the first November, 1883, or a levy for said interest, and filed the following account for said interest, viz.: (Here follows account.) Which account said board of supervisors disallowed and refuse to levy for in whole or in part." On the same day notice of appeal to the county court of Patrick County from the decision of the board was given by the railroad company for the use and benefit of plaintiffs in error, and by plaintiffs in error as "assignees of said bonds," and the appeal perfected. On May 6, 1884, the case was removed by plaintiffs in error into the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Virginia, and on the 1st of July they filed their declaration in that court against the county. The defendant demurred, and on the 3d of May, 1887, the following order was entered: "This day came the parties, by their attorneys, and in pursuance of an agreement by counsel submitted in vacation to the judges of this court for their decision, the demurrer filed by the defendant to the plaintiffs' declaration and to each count thereof and the said defendant's demurrer to the plaintiffs' declaration and each count thereof being argued, and because it seems to the court that the plaintiffs' declaration and each and every count thereof are insufficient in law, it is considered by the court that the demurrer aforesaid be sustained, and, the record showing that this court has not jurisdiction in this case, it is ordered that the same be remanded to the County Court of Patrick County, Virginia." On the next day it was further ordered: "It being suggested to the court that it is the purpose of the plaintiffs to ask for a writ of error to the final order entered on yesterday remanding this Opinion of the Court. case to the County Court of Patrick County on the ground that this court has no jurisdiction thereof, on the motion of the plaintiffs the order herein entered on yesterday, the 3d of May, 1887, be suspended for ninety days from the rising of this court." The pending writ of error was subsequently allowed. Mr. A. T. Britton, Mr. A. B. Browne and Mr. Henry Wise Garnett for plaintiffs in error. Mr. John W. Daniel for defendant in error. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the court. Prior to the act of March 3, 1875, there could be no appeal or writ of error from an order of a Circuit Court remanding a suit which had been removed, because such an order was not a final judgment or decree in the sense which authorized an appeal or writ of error. Railroad Co. v. Wiswall, 23 Wall. 507. But it was provided by that act that the order of a Circuit Court dismissing or remanding a cause to a State court, should be reviewable by the Supreme Court on writ of error or appeal as the case might be. 18 Stat. 471, c. 137, § 5. By section 6 of the act of March 3, 1887, (24 Stat. 552, 555, c. 373,) as corrected by the act of August 13, 1888, (25 Stat. 433, c. 866,) the provision to that effect was repealed, and it was also provided by the act that "no appeal or writ of error from the decision of the Circuit Court so remanding such cause shall be allowed." Section 6 was accompanied by the proviso "that this act shall not affect the jurisdiction over or disposition of any suit removed from a court of any State, or suit commenced in any court of the United States, before the passage hereof except as otherwise expressly provided in this act." In Morey v. Lockhart, 123 U. S. 56, it was held that this court had no power to review on appeal or writ of error an order of the Circuit Court remanding a cause to a State court, when it was commenced, removed and remanded after the act of March 3, 1887, went into effect. In Wilkinson v. Nebraska, 123 U. S. 286, it was decided that the proviso in section six of |