Opinion of the Court. the act of March 3, 1887, related only to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts of the United States, and did not confer upon this court jurisdiction over a writ of error from a judgment remanding a cause to a State court, when the suit was begun and removed before the act of 1887, but not remanded until afterwards. In Sherman v. Grinnell, 123 U. S. 679, the order to remand was made while the act of March 3, 1875, was in force, but the writ of error was not brought until after the passage of the act of March 3, 1887, and it was held that this court could not take jurisdiction. The general rule was applied in these cases that if a law conferring jurisdiction is repealed without any reservation as to pending cases, all such cases fall with the law. Railroad Co. v. Grant, 98 U. S. 398, 401. The opinions in all of them were delivered by Mr. Chief Justice Waite, and they are decisive upon the disposition of the case before us. This case was commenced and removed into the Circuit Court before the act of 1887 went into effect, but the suit was remanded afterwards. In this respect the situation is the same as in Wilkinson v. Nebraska, supra. By the act of February 25, 1889, (25 Stat. 693, c. 236,) it was provided that in all cases where a final judgment or decree should be rendered in a Circuit Court of the United States in which there was a question involving the jurisdiction of the court, the party against whom the judgment or decree was rendered should be entitled to an appeal or writ of error to this court, without reference to the amount of such judgment or decree, but where it did not exceed the sum of $5000, the question of jurisdiction should alone be reviewable. In Richmond & Danville Railroad v. Thouron, 134 U. S. 45, we held that a remanding order was not a final judgment or decree, within the terms of that act, and that this court had no jurisdiction to review it. It is contended, however, that the order of the Circuit Court here was such a final judgment, because the Circuit Court sustained the demurrer in remanding the cause, but the position is untenable. The demurrer brought into consideration the contention that the plaintiffs could not maintain their Opinion of the Court. action because the court by law had no jurisdiction of their case, and thereupon the cause was remanded; and, having been remanded, this writ of error cannot be maintained, and is therefore Dismissed. THE STEAMSHIP HAVERTON. APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA. No. 60. Argued and submitted November 7, 1890.- Decided November 17, 1890. In a collision case in admiralty the valuation of the sunken vessel and effects was $6057, for which amount the District Court gave judgment. The Circuit Court, on appeal, awarded one-half the valuation, viz.: $3028.50. Held, that this court had no jurisdiction on appeal. The Hesper, 122 U. S. 126; and The Alaska, 130 U. S. 201, distinguished. THE case, as stated by the court, was as follows: This was a libel filed to recover the value of the pilot-boat Mary and Catherine, sunk in a collision, and also of certain personal effects on board of her at the time. The value of the pilot-boat was determined by the Circuit Court to have been $5025, and of the personal effects, all of which were a total loss, to have been $1032. This made a total valuation, according to the findings, of $6057. For this amount a decree had been entered by the District Court, but on appeal the Circuit Court awarded the sum of $3028.50, one-half the valuation. From that decree an appeal was taken to this court by the libellants. Mr. James Parker for libellants and appellants. Mr. J. McConnell, for appellees, submitted on his brief. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the court. VOL. CXXXVII-10 Opinion of the Court. Assuming, as we must do, the total value to have been $6057, the matter in dispute in this court is the difference between that value and the decree, namely, $3028.50. We have, therefore, no jurisdiction. Dows v. Johnson, 110 U. S. 223. On the argument it was urged with much earnestness on behalf of appellants, that it is within our power, upon the facts as found, to declare the Mary and Catherine entirely and solely in fault, and take away from the libellants what the Circuit Court awarded them, and that jurisdiction can be maintained by adding the amount the Circuit Court did not allow to the amount that it is suggested libellants might thus be deprived of. But as the claimants did not appeal, and as, if they had, the worst that could happen to libellants through our action on such cross appeal, would be the taking away of less than $5000, the suggestion is entitled to no consideration. There is nothing in the cases of The Hesper, 122 U. S. 256, or The Alaska, 130 U. S. 201, to the contrary. In the former, the District Court awarded $8000, while the Circuit Court gave only $4200, but that was a case of salvage, in which the value of the property saved was over $100,000, and compensation was sought for the salvage in such sum proportioned to the value as the court might deem meet and reasonable. There was no finding of the Circuit Court that bound us, and in case of reversal a much larger sum than the jurisdictional amount might have been awarded, in addition to the sum which was. The difference between the judgments of the two courts in no respect represented the amount in dispute. Moreover, that case involved only the power of the Circuit Court on appeal, and not that of this court. In the latter case, the stipulation given to release the vessel libelled was for the sum of $25,000, for the benefit of five parties, each of whose claim for damages was $10,000, and some of whom might recover more than $5000, so that the amount involved in each case, on the question of jurisdiction, was $10,000, which was, of course sufficient. This appeal must be dismissed, and it is so ordered. Argument for Appellee. In re GRIMLEY, Petitioner. APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS. No. 761. Submitted October 21, 1890.- Decided November 17, 1890. Civil Courts may inquire, under a writ of habeas corpus, into the jurisdiction of the court over the party condemned, but cannot inquire into or correct errors in its proceedings. An enlistment is a contract between the soldier and the government which involves, like marriage, a change in his status which cannot be thrown off by him at his will, although he may violate his contract. An enlisted soldier cannot avoid a charge of desertion by showing that, at the time when he voluntarily enlisted, he had passed the age at which the law allows enlisting officers to enlist recruits. A recruit who voluntarily goes before a recruiting officer, expresses his desire to enlist, undergoes a physical examination, is accepted by the officer, takes the oath of allegiance before him, signs the clothing rolls, and is placed in charge of a sergeant, has thereby enlisted and has become a soldier, in the army of the United States, although the articles of war have not been read to him. Tyler v. Pomeroy, 8 Allen, 480, distinguished from this case. HABEAS CORPUS. The prisoner, a recruit in the army of the United States, being discharged, the United States took this appeal. The objections to the validity of the enlistment are stated in the report of the argument of the appellee's counsel. The statutes regulating enlistments will be found in the opinion of the court. Mr. Solicitor General for the United States, appellants. Mr. Henry W. Putnam and M. William H. Brown for the petitioner, appellee. I. Grimley's alleged enlistment, on February 18, 1888, was void. He was, at the time, over forty years of age, and therefore above the maximum age for enlistment. Seavey v. Seymour, 3 Cliff. 439, 445, 447; In re McDonald, 1 Lowell, 100; In re Davison, 21 Fed. Rep. 618; In re Hearn, 32 Fed. Rep. Argument for Appellee. 141; In re Lawler, 40 Fed. Rep. 233, 235; Goodson v. Cald well, 2 Winston (N. C.) 135. The reasons for holding void an enlistment, like the present, above the maximum age are even stronger than in the case of one below the minimum; for the latter is a defect which time would speedily remedy, while time would only aggravate the former, by rendering the recruit constantly less "effective" and less "able-bodied." The reason and importance of the rule as to the maximum age are emphasized by the exception in sect. 1116, that "this limitation as to the age shall not apply to soldiers reënlisting,” —thus negatively, as well as affirmatively, forbidding the enlistment of new men over thirty-five; and also by the fact that while the minimum age has been reduced to sixteen, even in time of peace, and the minimum height of five feet six inches is abolished (Stat. 1838, c. 162, § 30), the maximum age has never been raised above thirty-five, except temporarily in the War of 1812, when it was raised first to forty-five, and then to fifty, and was promptly restored in 1815 to thirty-five years, where it has remained since. The declaration of the petitioner at the rendezvous as to his age is not conclusive as against the actual fact, and is immaterial if he is not in fact within the statutory age. He cannot by any declarations of his own make himself a soldier if the law says he cannot be one. In re McDonald, 1 Lowell, 100; Seavey v. Seymour, 3 Cliff. 439, 447. An oath as to age is not, and never has been, made by statute conclusive that a man is within the maximum. The military authorities cannot waive the statutory maximum established by Congress, either on account of the recruit's perjury as to his age or for any other reason whatever. The legislative department, or officers expressly thereunto authorized by statute, can alone do that. Winthrop's Military Law, 769, 770. The remark of the court in United States v. Wingall, 5 Hill, 16, that an illegality can be waived by the Government is obiter dictum, the enlistment in that case being held not to be illegal. Even if the government officers can waive the maximum of |