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Opinion of the Court.

old. It will be seen that the petitioner was within the ages prescribed by section 1116 of the Revised Statutes, to wit, sixteen and thirty-five years. Section 1117 provides that "no person under the age of twenty-one years shall be enlisted or mustered into the military service of the United States without the written consent of his parents or guardians: Provided, That such minor has such parents or guardians entitled to his custody and control." But this provision is for the benefit of the parent or guardian. It means simply that the government will not disturb the control of parent or guardian over his or her child without consent. It gives the right to such parent or guardian to invoke the aid of the court and secure the restoration of a minor to his or her control; but it gives no privilege to the minor.

The age at which an infant shall be competent to do any acts or perform any duties, military or civil, depends wholly upon the legislature. United States v. Bainbridge, 1 Mason, 71; Wassum v. Feeney, 121 Mass. 93, 95. Congress has declared that minors over the age of sixteen are capable of entering the military service, and undertaking and performing its duties.

An enlistment is not a contract only, but effects a change of status. Grimley's Case, ante, 147. It is not, therefore, like an ordinary contract, voidable by the infant. At common law an enlistment was not voidable either by the infant or by his parents or guardians. The King v. The Inhabitants of Rotherford Greys, 2 Dow. & Ryl. 628, 634; S. C. 1 B. & C. 345, 350; The King v. The Inhabitants of Lytchet Matravers, 1 Man. & Ryl. 25, 31; S. C. 7 B. & C. 226, 231; Commonwealth v. Gamble, 11 S. & R. 93; United States v. Blakeney, 3 Grattan, 405, 411-413.

In this case the parent never insisted upon her right of custody and control; and the fact that he had a mother living at the time is, therefore, immaterial. The contract of enlistment was good so far as the petitioner is concerned. He was not only de facto, but de jure, a soldier - amenable to military jurisdiction. His mother not interfering, he was bound to remain in the service. His desertion and concealment for five

Statement of the Case.

years did not relieve him from his obligations as a soldier, or his liability to military control. The order of the Circuit Court remanding him to the custody of the appellee was correct and must be

Affirmed.

UNITED STATES v. TRINIDAD COAL AND COKING

COMPANY.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO.

No. 774. Argued October 29, 30, 1890. Decided November 17, 1890.

Officers, stockholders and employés of a private corporation formed a scheme whereby they made entries in their individual names, but really for the benefit of such corporation, of vacant coal lands of the United States. The scheme was carried out, and patents were issued to such individuals, who immediately conveyed the legal title to the corporation, which bore all the expenses and cost of obtaining the lands, and some of the members of which had previously taken the benefit of the statute relating to the disposal of the public coal lands: Held,

(1) That such a transaction was in violation of sections 2347, 2348 and 2350 of the Revised Statutes;

(2) That it was not necessary to the right of the United States to maintain a suit to set aside such patents as void, that the government should offer to refund to the corporation the moneys advanced by it to the patentees in order to obtain the lands, and which the latter paid to the officers of the United States;

(3) That the rule that a suitor, asking equity, must do equity, should not be enforced in such a case as this;

(4) That if the corporation be entitled, upon a cancellation of the patents so obtained, to a return of such moneys, it must be assumed that Congress will make an appropriation for that purpose when it becomes necessary to do so.

A private corporation is an association of persons within the meaning of those sections.

THIS was a suit in equity by the United States against the Trinidad Coal and Coking Company, a corporation created under the laws of Colorado and engaged in the business of mining coal. The defendant held the legal title to six tracts of coal land within the Pueblo Land District, in the county of

Statement of the Case.

Las Animas, in that State, containing in the aggregate 954 and 34-100 acres, under conveyances executed to it by various individuals to be presently named, and to whom, respectively, patents were issued.

The relief sought by the government was a decree setting aside these patents, and declaring them void and of no effect as against the United States. The defendant demurred to the bill upon the ground that it did not make a case for relief in a court of equity, nor allege that any of the entries were fraudulent or in contravention of law. The demurrer was sustained and the bill dismissed, the opinion of the court being reported in 37 Fed. Rep. 180. The sole question was whether the United States was entitled upon the showing made by the bill to the relief it asked.

Taking the allegations of the bill to be true, the case made by the government was as follows:

On or about the 4th of June, 1883, T. J. Peter and Robert Savage were officers and stockholders, and William H. Leffingwell, Milford N. Wells, Alexander Craigmyle, Charles F. Schuman and Thomas Winsheimer; were employés of the defendant corporation. Peter, Savage, and certain other officers and members of that corporation, whose names are unknown to the government, together with Leffingwell, Wells, Craigmyle, Schuman and Winsheimer, formed a scheme to procure patents for these lands "for the benefit and on behalf of said defendant corporation, and for the purpose of enabling said corporation to fraudulently obtain titles" from the United States for its "coal lands in excess of 320 acres, contrary to the statutes of the United States in such cases made and provided." In furtherance of that scheme the persons just named, and those associated with them, or some one of them, or some one acting for them and in their behalf, on or about the day above named, wrote and prepared, or caused to be written and prepared, certain affidavits, one of which was in substance and to the effect that "no portion of the tract of land described as the northeast quarter of section six, township thirty-four south, of range sixty-three, west of the sixth principal merid. ian, and containing one hundred and fifty-two and 53-100ths

VOL. CXXXVII-11

Statement of the Case.

acres, was in the possession of any other party; that said Robert Savage was twenty-one years of age, a citizen of the United States, and had never held nor purchased, as an individual or as a member of any association, lands under the laws of the United States relating to the sale of coal lands of the United States; that he, the said Savage, was well acquainted with the character of said land and with every legal subdivision thereof, and had frequently passed over the same; that his knowledge of said land was such as to enable him to testify understandingly in regard thereto; that said land contained large deposits of coal, and was chiefly valuable therefor; that there was not, to his knowledge, within the limits thereof, any vein, or lode of quartz or other rock in place, bearing gold, silver or copper; and that there was not within the limits of said land, to his knowledge, any valuable deposits of gold, silver or copper." This affidavit was subscribed and sworn to by Savage on the 4th of June, 1883, before the register of the Land Office at Pueblo. The other affidavit, subscribed and sworn to before the same officer by Leffingwell and Wells, set forth in substance the same facts as being within their knowledge.

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The conspirators, or some one or more of them, or some one acting for them, on or about the same date, filed these affidavits in the Land Office at Pueblo, and made application, in the name and on behalf of Savage, to enter and purchase, under the Statutes of the United States, this tract of one hundred and fifty-two and 5 acres, as vacant coal land; and at the same time there was paid to the receiver of public moneys at that office the sum of three thousand and fifty and dollars as the purchase price of the tract at twenty dollars per acre. Thereupon the register issued in duplicate a certificate to the effect that Savage had on that day purchased this land from that officer at the price stated; that the payment of the price had been made in full as required by law; and that, on the presentation of the certificate to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, he would be entitled to receive a patent for the land. Upon the payment of this money and the issuing of the certificate, the receiver delivered to Savage, or to the conspirators, or to some one of them, or to some one for

Statement of the Case.

them, in duplicate, a receipt which in effect acknowledged that he had paid the above sum as and for the price of the land at twenty dollars per acre. This being done, the register and receiver forwarded the papers, affidavits, applications, and one of the certificates and receipts to the General Land Office at Washington, delivering the other duplicate certificate to the conspirators, or to some one of them, or to some one acting for them, "such delivery purporting to be for and on behalf of the said Robert Savage."

Similar applications and affidavits were prepared and filed, at the instance of the same persons, in behalf of Leffingwell, Wells, Craigmyle, Schuman, and Winsheimer, respectively, in reference to the remaining tracts, and they severally procured patents to be issued, as follows: To Savage for 152 and 5 acres; to Leffingwell, Craigmyle, Schuman and Winsheimer, each, for 160 acres; and to Wells for 161 and acres. The government, relying upon such affidavits and certificates, believing that the lands were legally entered by each individual for his own use and benefit, and in ignorance of the conspiracy and its objects, issued patents for the several tracts, purporting thereby to convey all its rights, title, interest and estate therein to the parties, respectively, in whose names the entries were made. The patents were subsequently delivered to the patentees or to some one representing them and acting in their

name.

It, also, appeared from the bill that Savage, Leffingwell, Wells, Craigmyle, Schuman and Winsheimer did not enter the lands for their own use and benefit, nor for the use and benefit of any of them, but for the direct use and benefit of the Trinidad Coal and Coking Company; that its officers procured the entrymen to go in a body to the city of Pueblo to file the above papers, as stated; that the papers and affidavits were drawn and prepared by its officers; that the expenses of the conspirators in going to that city to make the entries were paid by its officers, acting for it and in its behalf; that the entire purchase money for all the tracts and all land-office fees, costs and expenses were paid by the company; that immediately after the filing of the affidavits in the land office,

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