Opinion of the Court.

1868, and an extract from the same publication of July, 1871, with a design showing a crocheted suspender-end united at the inner edges just above the button-hole and attached to a crocheted attaching piece.

Mr. E. N. Dickerson for appellant.

Mr. William A. Jenner for appellees.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after stating the case as above reported, delivered the opinion of the court.

The suspender-end of the appellant's patent is a button-loop of flat cord or strip of fibrous material "bent edgewise upon itself and sewed together at the meeting edges, leaving an opening for the button-hole at the bend," as described in the instance of cloak-button loops made of flat braid. It appears from the specification, stipulation or proofs that suspenderends of round cord, with the ends turned back and fastened to form loops, were known when this patent was procured, as were also suspender-ends of flat material and with the inner edges united by stitching, or by a clamp, just above the button-hole, so as to form it. The prior patents and the crocheted towel loops and suspender-ends also illustrate the common practice of uniting the suspender-ends to attaching pieces of leather or cloth.

We agree with the learned judge holding the Circuit Court, that it did not involve invention "to make a suspender-end of flat cord in substantially the same way that suspender-ends of round cord had been made, and in substantially the same way in which flat button ends had been made for the purpose of fastening or securing other articles of wearing apparel than trousers." The connection of the end to the attaching piece gave no patentable character to the loop and was old, as was the attachment to the buckle, nor was any new mode of operation produced by the combination of the devices in this article.

The decree of the Circuit Court is

Affirmed.

Opinion of the Court.

FISHBURN v. CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE AND ST. PAUL RAILWAY COMPANY.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN.

No. 42. Argued October 31, 1890.- Decided November 3, 1890.

In regard to motions for new trial and bills of exceptions courts of the United States are independent of any statute or practice prevailing in the courts of the state in which the trial was had.

The overruling of a motion for a new trial is not a subject of exception, according to the practice of the courts of the United States.

THIS was an action to recover damages for an alleged wrongful ejectment from a railway train. The record contained a bill of exceptions in which were set forth at length (1) the pleadings; (2) the evidence at the trial with the objections to its admissibility or competency taken at the time; (3) the charge of the court, to which no exception was taken before verdict; (4) the verdict of the jury for the defendant; (5) a motion for a new trial for alleged errors in the charge set forth specifically; (6) the overruling of the motion and entry of judgment; (7) the exception to such overruling.

The court interrupted the counsel for the plaintiff in error in his opening, calling attention to the fact that the only exceptions in the record were those taken to the overruling of the motion for a new trial, and that the record raised no other question. The counsel stated that the proceedings were had in accordance with the practice prevailing in the State in which the trial was had; but the court declined to hear further argument.

FULLER, C. J. This is an action for damages brought by plaintiff in error against defendant in error for wrongfully ejecting her from one of its passenger trains, and resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of defendant in error.

In regard to motions for new trial and bills of exceptions, courts of the United States are independent of any statute or

Statement of the Case.

practice prevailing in the courts of the State in which the trial is had. Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Chicago & Alton Railroad Co., 132 U. S. 191.

The only exception in respect to which plaintiff assigns error here was to the overruling of her motion for a new trial, which is not the subject of exception, according to the practice of the courts of the United States.

Various objections to the charge of the court were set out as grounds for the motion for new trial, but it nowhere appears that exceptions were taken to any of these matters, save as involved in the overruling of that motion, nor does the record show that the action of the Circuit Court was invoked upon the ground that there was no evidence to sustain the verdict. Our right of review is limited to questions of law appearing on the face of the record, and we find none such presented here.

The judgment must therefore be

Affirmed.

Mr. B. F. Dunwiddie (with whom were Mr. I. C. Sloane and Mr. B. Dunwiddie on the brief) for plaintiff in error.

Mr. John W. Cary and Mr. Burton Hanson for defendant in error.

LA CONFIANCE COMPAGNIE ANONYME D'ASSURANCE v. HALL.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI.

No. 11. Argued and submitted October 21, 1890.- Decided November 3, 1890.

In a petition for the removal of a cause from a State court on the ground of diverse citizenship, the failure to state the existence of such citizenship at the commencement of the suit as well as when the removal was asked is a fatal defect.

THE case is stated in the opinion.

Statement of the Case.

Mr. Charles B. Alexander (with whom was Mr. John J. McCook on the brief) for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Given Campbell for defendant in error.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the court.

This action was commenced by plaintiff in error in a State court, and removed to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri upon petition of the defendant, on the ground that the plaintiff was an alien and citizen of France and the defendant a citizen of Missouri. The existence of such diverse citizenship at the commencement of the suit, as well as when the removal was asked, did not appear affirmatively in the petition for removal or in the record when that was filed.

We are compelled to reverse the judgment, with costs, and remit the cause to the Circuit Court, with a direction to remand to the State Court. Stevens v. Nichols, 130 U. S. 230; Crehore v. Ohio and Mississippi Railway Co., 131 U. S. 240; Jackson v. Allen, 132 U. S. 27.

Reversed and ordered accordingly.

WASHINGTON MARKET COMPANY V. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

No. 10. Submitted October 21, 1890.- Decided October 27, 1890.

The court dismisses without costs to either party an appeal, the subject matter of which has been settled elsewhere, leaving only the disposition of costs involved.

IN EQUITY. The case is stated in the opinion.

PER CURIAM: This is an appeal from the decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia dismissing the bill of

Statement of the Case.

complaint filed by appellant therein, the object of the bill having been to restrain the defendants from selling, or attempting to sell, certain property of complainant, on account of certain assessments for street improvements, and also to cancel and annul two tax lien certificates therein named; and counsel for appellant having stated in open court that such assessments and lien certificates have been, pending this appeal, quashed and annulled at law by the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, and that only the disposition of costs is involved herein, it is ordered that said appeal be

Dismissed without costs to either party.

Mr. William Birney for appellant.

Mr. George C. Hazelton and Mr. S. T. Thomas for appellee.

IN RE HUNTINGTON, Petitioner.

ORIGINAL.

Not numbered. Submitted October 27, 1890. Decided November 3, 1890.

On the authority of Ex parte Mirzan, 119 U. S. 584, the court denies a petition for leave to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

THIS was a petition for leave to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petition sought to be filed set forth the issue of a writ of dedimus potestatem by the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Colorado, to take the evidence of the petitioner, a resident of New York, to be used in a suit pending in that court; the execution of the writ by the commissioner named in it; the refusal of the witness to answer some of the questions propounded by the commissioner; an order of the court that he appear before the commissioner within thirty days and answer the unanswered questions, or otherwise be deemed in contempt, and stand committed till he should answer; his appearance and continued refusal to