uses the property of his employer and the services of other employés
to develop and put in practicable form his invention, and explicitly
assents to the use by his employer of such invention, a jury, or a court
trying the facts, is warranted in finding that he has so far recognized
the obligations of service flowing from his employment and the bene-
fits resulting from his use of the property, and the assistance of the
coemployés, of his employer, as to have given to such employer an
irrevocable license to use such invention. Ib.

18. Letters patent No. 25,662, granted to Edwin May, October 4, 1859, for
an "improvement in the construction of prisons," are invalid. Fond
du Lac County v. May, 395.

19. The novel idea set forth in the patent was to interpose a grating be-
tween the jailer and the prisoners at every stage of opening and shut-
ting a door. The mechanism of the patent, except the grating, was
old. Ib.

20. As to claim 1, the angle door being old, its combination with a lock or
bolt was not new or patentable. Ib.

21. As to claims 3 and 4, the mechanical devices were old, and operated in
the same way, either with or without the grating. Ib.

22. Introducing the grating did not make a patentable combination, but
only an aggregation. Ib.

23. The decision in County of Fond du Lac v. May, 137 U. S. 395, as to the
invalidity of letters patent No. 25,662, granted to Edwin May, Octo-
ber 4, 1859, for an "improvement in the construction of prisons,"
affirmed. May v. Juneau County, 408.

24. Want of patentability is a defence to a suit for the infringement of a
patent, though not set up in an answer or plea. Ib.

25. Letters patent No. 238,303, granted to William Orcutt, March 1, 1881,
for improvements in rotary cutters for trimming the edges of boot and
shoe soles, although the patented claim shows great industry on the
part of the patentee in acquiring a thorough knowledge of what others
had done in the attempt to trim shoe soles in a rapid and improved
mode, by the various devices perfected by patents for that purpose, good
judgment in selecting and combining the best of them, with no little
mechanical skill in their application, are nevertheless invalid for want
of patentable invention, as the claim presents no discoverable trace of
the exercise of original thought, and is only an improvement in degree
upon previous cutters, and therefore not patentable. Busell Trimmer
Co. v. Stevens, 423.

26. There is no substantial difference between the improved cutter for
cutting the teeth of gear wheels, etc., patented to Joseph Brown by
letters patent No. 45,294, dated November 29, 1864, and the patent in
controversy in this suit, except in the configuration of their molded
surfaces, and this is not a patentable difference, even though the
Brown cutter was used in the metal art and the Orcutt cutter in the
leather art. lb.

27. The first claim in letters patent No. 11,208, granted May 27, 1879, to
the New York Belting and Packing Company for a new and useful
design for rubber mats, viz.: "1. A design for a rubber mat, con-
sisting of corrugations, depressions or ridges in parallel lines, com-
bined or arranged relatively, substantially as described, to produce
variegated, kaleidoscopic, moire, stereoscopic or similar effects, sub-
stantially as set forth," covers things which were then well known and
were not new; and is therefore too broad to be sustained. New York
Belting Co. v. New Jersey Car Spring and Rubber Co., 445.
28. Claims 2 and 3 in those letters patent, viz.: "2. A design for a
rubber mat, consisting of a series of parallel corrugations, depressions,
or ridges, the lines of the said corrugations being deflected at one or
more points, substantially as set forth: 3. A design for a rubber mat,
consisting of a series of parallel corrugations, depressions or ridges
arranged in sections, the general line of direction of the corrugations
in one section making angles with or being deflected to meet those of
the corrugations in the contiguous or other sections, substantially as
described:" may fairly be regarded as confining the patentee to the
specific design exhibited in his patent and shown in the drawing. 1b.

PENNSYLVANIA.

See JURISDICTION, B, 14.

PLEADING.

See CORPORATION, 6, 7.

POLYGAMY.

The several acts of Congress respecting polygamy considered. Cope v.
Cope, 682.

See EVIDENCE, 3;
LOCAL LAW, 9.

PRACTICE.

1. In regard to motions for new trial and bills of exceptions, courts of the
United States are independent. of any statute or practice prevailing
in the courts of the State in which the trial was had. Fishburn v.
Chicago, Milwaukee &c. Railway Co., 60.

2. The overruling of a motion for a new trial is not a subject of excep
tion, according to the practice of the courts of the United States. Ib.
3. The court dismisses without costs to either party an appeal, the subject
matter of which has been settled elsewhere, leaving only the disposi-
tion of costs involved. Washington Market Co. v. District of Columbia,
62.

4. Motion papers should contain enough of the record to enable the
court to act understandingly: but when they are deficient in that

respect, the court may, if it pleases, examine the record. Texas Land
and Cattle Co. v. Scott, 436.

5. When a trial by jury in a Circuit Court is waived by agreement, and
the case is tried by the court, no questions are open for revision here,
unless the record shows a finding of facts in accordance with the pro-
visions of Rev. Stats. § 649, 700; and in such case, when brought
here, the judgment of the Circuit Court will be presumed to be right
and will be affirmed, if it appears that that court had jurisdiction of
the subject matter and of the parties. Lloyd v. McWilliams, 576.
6. The day of the entry of judgment or decree must be excluded in com-
puting the time for taking an appeal or bringing a writ of error to
review it. Smith v. Yale, 577.

7. In this case, on a motion to dismiss a writ of error, for want of juris-
diction in this court, or to affirm the judgment, it was held that,
though this court had jurisdiction, there was sufficient color for the
motion to dismiss to warrant this court in considering the motion to
affirm, and that the latter motion must be granted. Sire v. Ellithorpe
Air Brake Co., 579.

8. The case having been tried by the court without a jury, it was held
that the facts found justified the conclusion of law. Ib.

9. The transcript of the record of the court below may be filed at any
day during the term succeeding the taking the appeal or bringing the
writ of error, if the appellee or defendant in error has not in the
meantime had the cause docketed and dismissed; but this cannot be
done after the expiration of that term, except on application to the
court where a remedy may be found if the applicant was prevented
from obtaining the transcript by fraud or contumacy, and is not guilty
of laches. Green v. Elbert, 615.

10. When a return is made and the transcript deposited seasonably in the
clerk's office, jurisdiction is not lost by not docketing the case before
the lapse of the term; but it may still be docketed if in the judgment
of the court it is a case to justify it in exercising its discretion to that
effect. Ib.

11. The judgment in the court below in this case was entered July 27,
1887. The writ of error was dated October 3, 1887. It was filed that
day in the court below, and was returnable here to October term, 1887,
which closed May 14, 1888. The transcript reached the clerk May 10,
1888, but the fee required by the rules was not-paid to the clerk. On
January 13, 1890, the fee being paid, the transcript was filed and the
cause was docketed, and the appearance of the plaintiff in error, who
was a member of the bar of this court was entered. On the 17th of
November, 1890, the defendant in error moved to dismiss the writ of
error on the ground of failure to file the transcript or docket the
cause within the prescribed period, and notified the plaintiff in error
that it would be submitted December 15. Held, (1) That the defend-
ant in error was not bound to have the case docketed and dismissed

if he did not choose to do so; (2) That the motion to dismiss for this
cause could be made at any time before hearing, or the court could
avail itself of the objection sua sponte; (3) That, as the plaintiff in
error was a member of this bar, and notified the clerk in transmitting
the transcript, that the case was one of his own, the appearance was
properly entered; (4) That the plaintiff in error, being such a mem-
ber, was bound to know the rules of this court with regard to giving
security or making a deposit with the clerk as a condition precedent
to the filing of the record and docketing of the case; (5) That the
laches of the plaintiff in error were too gross to be passed over, and
that the writ of error must be dismissed. Ib.

12. It is the duty of this court to keep its records clean and free from
scandal; and in accordance therewith the court orders the brief of the
plaintiff in error to be stricken from the files. Ib.

1. Officers, stockholders and employés of a private corporation formed a
scheme whereby they made entries in their individual names but really
for the benefit of such corporation, of vacant coal lands of the United
States. The scheme was carried out, and patents were issued to such
individuals, who immediately conveyed the legal title to the corpora-
tion, which bore all the expenses and cost of obtaining the lands, and
some of the members of which had previously taken the benefit of the
statute relating to the disposal of the public coal lands: Held, (1) That
such a transaction was in violation of sections 2347, 2348 and 2350 of
the Revised Statutes; (2) That it was not necessary to the right of
the United States to maintain a suit to set aside such patents as void,
that the government should offer to refund to the corporation the
moneys advanced by it to the patentees in order to obtain the lands,
and which the latter paid to the officers of the United States; (3) That
the rule that a suitor, asking equity, must do equity, should not be
enforced in such a case as this; (4) That if the corporation be entitled,
upon a cancellation of the patents so obtained, to a return of such
moneys, it must be assumed that Congress will make an appropriation
for that purpose when it becomes necessary to do so; (5) That a private
corporation is an association of persons within the meaning of those
sections. United States v. Trinidad Coal and Coking Co., 160.
2. The grant of lands to the Territory of Minnesota by the act of March
3, 1857, 11 Stat. 195, c. 99, and the grant to the State of Minnesota by
the act of March 3, 1865, 13 Stat. 526, c. 105, were grants in præsenti,

and took effect by relation upon the sections of land as of the date of
the grant, when the railroads were definitely located, both as to so
much of the grants as was found within the limits of the State of
Minnesota as defined by the act admitting it as a State, and as to
so much thereof as was within the limits of the Territory of Min-
nesota under the territorial organization of 1857, but was not within
the limits of the State when admitted as a State. St. Paul, Min-
neapolis &c. Railway Co. v. Phelps, 528.

3. It cannot be safely asserted that it has been the general policy of the
United States government to restrain a grant of land made to a State

in aid of railways, to lands within such State, when a part of the line
of road extends into one of the Territories. Ib.

4. The various land grant statutes reviewed and shown to be in harmony
with the decision of the court in this case. Ib.

5. Lands within Indian Territory, covered by the grant of March 3, 1857,
passed on the extinguishment of the Indian title. Ib.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 21;
HOT SPRINGS LITIGATION;

LOCAL LAW, 6, 7, 8;

RAILROAD.

RIPARIAN Owners;
SURVEY, 2.

1. When a mortgage of a railroad provides that the principal shall become
due for the purposes of foreclosure upon a default in interest continu-
ing for sixty days, the trustees in the mortgage may proceed for the
collection of the whole amount of principal and interest by bill in
equity, without a formal declaration of the maturity of such principal.
Morgan's Co. v. Texas Central Railway Co., 171.

2. If a mortgage contains a power of sale by advertisement at public auc-
tion for cash upon the request of the holder or holders of seventy-five
per cent in the amount of the bonds secured thereby, that remedy is
cumulative, and the restriction does not operate upon the right to
foreclose by bill in equity, especially when in a separate clause it is
provided that nothing in the mortgage contained shall be held or con-
strued to prevent or interfere with the foreclosure of the instrument
by any court of competent jurisdiction. Ib.

3. The mere fact that money loaned to a railroad corporation was ex-
pended in payment of interest on its first mortgage bonds or of oper-
ating expenses, does not entitle the lender to preference over the first
mortgage bonds by way of subrogation, or on the ground of superior
equities. Ib.

4. Although advances may have enabled a railroad company to maintain
itself as a going concern, that fact alone does not give such advances
priority over first mortgage bonds upon the theory that the inter-
ests of the public and of the bondholders were subserved by such ad-
vances. Ib.

5. Section 1307 of the Code of Iowa of 1873 in regard to the liability of a