railway corporation for damages to its employés in consequence of the
neglect of their coemployés, in connection with the use and operation
of the railway, construed. Chicago, Milwaukee &c. Railway Co. v.
Artery, 507.

6. The decisions of the Supreme Court of Iowa as to the statute, reviewed.
Ib.

7. An injury sustained by an employé while riding on a car propelled by
hand power, through the negligence of a coemployé riding on the same
car, is one sustained in connection with the use and operation of the
railway, within section 1307. Ib.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 21;
EVIDENCE, 1, 2;

PUBLIC LAND, 2.

REMOVAL OF CAUSES.

1. In a petition for the removal of a cause from a state court on the
ground of diverse citizenship, the failure to state the existence of such
citizenship at the commencement of the suit as well as when the re-
moval was asked is a fatal defect. La Confiance Compagnie d'Assur-
ance v. Hall, 61.

2. The power which this court had before the passage of the act of March
3, 1887, 24 Stat. 552, c. 373, (reënacted August 13, 1888, 25 Stat. 433,
c. 866,) to afford a remedy by mandamus when a cause, removed from
a state court is improperly remanded to the state court, was taken
away by those acts. In re Pennsylvania Co., 451.

3. Under the act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 552, c. 373, and the act of
August 13, 1888, 25 Stat. 433, c. 866, the matter in dispute in a case
removed from a state court on the ground of prejudice or local influ-
ence must exceed the sum of two thousand dollars in order that the
Circuit Court may take jurisdiction. Ib.

4. Since the passage of those statutes, when a cause is removed from a
state court on the ground of prejudice or local influence, the Cir-
cuit Court must be legally satisfied, by proof suitable to the nature of
the case, of the truth of the allegation that by reason of those causes
the defendant will not be able to obtain justice in the state court; the
amount and manner of such proof being left, in each case, to the dis-
cretion of the court.

Ib.

RIPARIAN OWNERS.

1. The undoubted rule of the common law that the title of owners of land
bordering on navigable rivers above the ebb and flow of the tide ex-
tends to the middle of the stream, having been adopted in some of the
States, and not being recognized in other States, Federal courts must
construe grants of the general government without reference to the
rules of construction adopted by the States for such grants by them.
Packer v. Bird, 661.

2. Whatever incidents or rights attach to the ownership of property con-

veyed by the United States bordering on navigable streams, will be
determined by the States in which it is situated subject to the limita-
tion that their rules do not impair the efficacy of the grant, or the use
and enjoyment of the property by the grantee. Ib.

3. The legislation of Congress for the survey of the public lands recognizes
the general rule as to the public interest in waters of navigable streams,
without reference to the existence or absence of tides in them. Ib.
4. The highest court of California having decided that the Sacramento
River, being navigable in fact, a title upon it extends no farther than
to the edge of the stream, this court accepts that decision as express-
ing the law of the State. Ib.

5. The plaintiff claimed land in California under a Mexican grant which
was confirmed by a decree of the District Court of the United States
for the Northern District of California, in which the land was de-
scribed as follows: "Commencing at the northerly boundary of said
rancho, at a point on the Sacramento River just two leagues northerly
from the rancheria called Lojot, and running southerly on the margin
of said river to a point," etc. The survey under that decree was incor-
porated into the patent, and described the eastern boundary of the
tract as commencing at a certain oak post "on the right bank of the
Sacramento River," and thence " traversing the right bank of the Sac-
ramento River down stream" certain courses and distances. Held,
that the title under this patent did not extend beyond the edge of the
stream, and that it did not include an island opposite the tract, and
separated from it by a channel of the river which lay between it and
the principal channel. Ib.

1. The provisions of a statute cannot be regarded as inconsistent with a
subsequent statute merely because the latter reenacts or repeats those
provisions. Holden v. Minnesota, 483.

2. Where the language of a series of statutes is dubious, and open to dif-
ferent interpretations, the construction put upon them by the Execu-
tive Department charged with their execution, has great and generally
controlling force with this court: but where a statute is free from all
ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded in favor of a pre-
sumption as to the policy of the government, even though it may be

the settled practice of the department. St. Paul, Minneapolis &c. Rail-
way Co. v. Phelps, 528.

3. A construction of a doubtful or ambiguous statute by the Executive
Department charged with its execution, in order to be binding upon
the courts, must be long continued and unbroken. Merritt v. Cameron,
542.

4. Annulments of statutes by implication, like repeals by implication, are
not favored by the courts. Cope v. Cope, 682.

See JURISDICTION, A;
LOCAL LAW, 5.

B. STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES.

See ADMIRALTY, 4;

ARMY OF THE United StaTES, 4;

CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED

STATES, 1, 2 3, 4;

CUSTOMS DUTIES, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8;
DOWER.

JURISDICTION, C, 6;
LOCAL LAW, 9;

CONSTITUTIONAL Law, 2, 7, 8, 9, PATENT FOR INVENTION, 4;

1. In seeking to trace a survey on the ground, the corner called for in the
grant as the "beginning" corner does not control more than any other
corner equally well ascertained, and it is not necessary to follow the
calls of the grant in the order in which they stand in the field notes;
but they may be reversed, and should be when by doing it the land
embraced would most nearly harmonize all the calls and objects of
the grant. Ayers v. Watson, 584.

2. If an insurmountable difficulty is met with in running the lines of a sur-

vey of public land in one direction, and all the known calls of the sur-
vey are obviated by running them in the reverse direction, it is only a
dictate of common sense to follow the latter course.

See LOCAL LAW, 6, 7, 8.

TAX AND TAXATION.

See INTERNAL REVENUE;
LOCAL LAW, 4;
MANDAMUS, 2.

TEXAS.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1, 31;
LOCAL LAW, 6, 7, 8.

UNITED STATES.

See PATENT FOR INVENTION, 15, 16.

UTAH.

See LOCAL LAW, 1, 2, 3, 9.

WILL.

Ib.

A testator bequeathed to four daughters the sum of $20,000 apiece, to be
invested in public securities and held in trust by his executors for his
said daughters respectively, and the income, as it accrued, applied to
their several use and benefit; and directed that "from and after the
intermarriage of any of them," the executors should hold the securi-
ties "belonging to the said daughter so marrying, in trust for the
following purposes," namely, for the maintenance of her and her hus-
band and the survivor of them for life, and after the death of both
“for such issue as she may leave at the time of her death; and in
case she shall die without leaving such issue," then for her surviving
sisters and the issue of any deceased sister; and declared his intention
that both principal and income should be free from the control of any
husband; "and the better to secure the payment of these my daugh-
ters' fortunes," directed that, if a fund appropriated to the payment
of debts and legacies should be insufficient, his whole estate should be
charged "to make up the deficiency to my said daughters." Held, that
the principal of the sum bequeathed to, a daughter, who never married,
vested in her absolutely, and passed by her will. Wellford v. Snyder,
521.

WITNESS.

See EVIDENCE, 3.

WRIT OF ERROR.

See JURISDICTION, B, 3, 11;

PRACTICE, 6.

ERRATA.

After this volume was printed the following changes were made in the record, and corresponding corrections should be made here.

Page 615. At the end of Preston v. Prather insert the words: MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER did not sit in this case or take any part in its decision."

Page 712, line 8.

For "re-served" read "served."

I avail myself of the opportunity to make the following corrections, which escaped the eye in proof-reading:

Page 624, line 11 from bottom. For "adjudictions" read "adjudications."

Page 636, line 3 from bottom, and page 740, line 6 from bottom. For "discharge" read "direct.”