"Section 11. Nothing in this article shall be so construed as to affect existing consular jurisdiction over all questions arising between masters and seamen of their respective national vessels; nor shall the court take any ex post facto or retroactive jurisdiction over crimes or offences committed prior to the organization of the court."

ARTICLE IV.

"A declaration respecting titles to land in Samoa and restraining the disposition thereof by natives, and providing for the investigation of claims thereto, and for the registration of valid titles."

ARTICLE V.

"A declaration respecting the municipal district of Apia, providing a local administration therefor, and defining the jurisdiction of the municipal magistrate."

ARTICLE VI.

"A declaration respecting taxation and revenue in Samoa."

ARTICLE VII.

"A declaration respecting arms and ammunition, and intoxicating liquors, restraining their sale and use."

ARTICLE VIII.

"General dispositions."

"Section 1. The provisions of this act shall continue in force until changed by consent of the three powers. Upon the request of either power after three years from the signature thereof, the powers shall consider by common accord what ameliorations, if any, may be introduced into the provisions of this general act. In the meantime any special amendment may be adopted by the consent of the three powers with the adherence of Samoa."

66 PROCLAMATION OF CONSULS."

"We, the undersigned representatives of the Governments of Germany, Great Britain, and the United States, hereby make known to the people of Samoa that our governments, with a view to the prompt restoration of peace and good order in the Samoan Islands, and in view of the difficulties which would surround an election in the present disordered condition of their government,

have by common accord declared that Malietoa Laupepa, who was formerly made and appointed King on the 12th of July, 1881, and was so recognized by the three powers, shall again be so recognized hereafter in the exercise of such authority.

"We at the same time invite the people of Samoa to take without delay such measures as according to Samoan custom are necessary to reinstate the High Chief Laupepa as King of Samoa.

"DR. STUEBEL,

"H. I. G. M. Consul-General. "H. DE COETLOGON,

"H. B. M. Consul.

"W. BLACKLOCK,

"U. S. Vice-Consul.

66

'APIA, November 8, 1890."

At a meeting of the Samoan rulers on December 4, 1889, it was decided that Malietoa should be King, and even Tamasese acquiesced in this arrangement as the best settlement of the question.1

REMARKS ON THE MONROE DOCTRINE,

THE declaration of President Monroe, in 1823, had a definite purpose; namely, to defeat the machinations of the so-called "Holy Alliance," which, having suppressed by force of arms all popular demonstrations in Europe, proposed to transfer its activity to this continent, to restore the monarchical authority in the Spanish American republics, and, perhaps, to attack the United States. The declaration was, therefore, a defensive measure. The European Alliance had announced a policy which was thought to be dangerous to the interests and peace of the United States, but the particular circumstances which called forth that declaration have passed away forever. Since that time, Europe itself has become to a great degree, democratic;

1 The correspondence with reference to Samoa may be found in Ex. Doc. No. 238, H. R. 50th Congress, First Session: Ex. Doc. No. 31, Senate, 50th Congress, Second Session; Ex. Doc. No. 58, Senate, 50th Congress, Second Session; Ex. Doc. No. 118, H. R., 50th Congress, Second Session; Ex. Doc. No. 102, Senate, 50th Congress, Second Session; Mis. Doc. No. 81, Senate, 15st Congress, First Session.

and with this change, the spirit of monarchical propagandism has ceased to exist.

The danger of European aggression has been lessened, too, by the fact that the Spanish American States, still struggling for their independence in 1823, are now recognized republics of seventy years' standing. And this is well understood in South America. The Minister of Foreign affairs of the Argentine Confederation said, in 1881, that "happily the day has gone by in which political combinations on this continent had for their principal object the preserving of their independence against foreign aggression and machinations. Europe no longer harbors any thought of conquest or chimerical vindications."

It must be admitted, however, that there is a tendency on the part of several leading European States to extend their dominion in the interest of their navigation and trade. At present this tendency shows itself in the inordinate desire to plant colonies in all places not yet occupied by civilized societies; and it is by no means improbable that, did a favorable opportunity offer itself, they would attempt to gain vantageground on the continents or islands of this hemisphere. It ought not to be expected that the United States will be an indifferent spectator of these movements, at least, where their interests are at stake, whether it be a question of the American continents or of islands in the Atlantic or Pacific. But it is not necessary to attempt to stretch the Monroe doctrine so as to include every possible case, nor to exclude other cases from its effect; we have outgrown the Monroe doctrine, and ought to be able to have a foreign policy entirely independent of it. The United States are large in extent of territory, and strong in material resources, and stronger still in their defensive position between two oceans; and there is no longer any occasion as there was in the early part of the century, to fear those "entangling alliances" with European powers, in regard either to European or American affairs. It was not contemplated by Washington, when he so earnestly enjoined upon his countrymen a policy of isolation, that we should always hold aloof from the rest of the world. The danger, as he saw it, would pass away so soon as the infant State should have arrived at the vigor of manhood: there would come a time, he said, when the United States could choose war or peace at their pleasure.

What, then, is the sense of adhering, in the strict letter, to a policy adopted, of necessity, in the early period of our history, but the reason for which no longer exists? In this age of steam and electricity, the different countries of the world have been brought wonderfully near to one another, in comparison with fifty years ago. The United States have interests in all parts of the world, and there may come a time when they could properly exert an influence for good; certainly it is not a time when we should adhere to a Chinese policy of exclusion in respect of the American continents.

Yet on the other hand, are we to cast aside wholly our conservative foreign policy of the past, and enter upon a career of aggression and conquest? In the view of some of our statesmen, the exclusive control of the proposed isthmian canal is but one part of a greater scheme, which includes the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands, of Cuba, and, perhaps, of Mexico. The United States are thus to control the commerce of the Pacific Ocean, as well as that of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. The Latin American States are to be forced, willing or unwilling, into a commercial union by which their trade is to be mainly with the United States. As the United States delegates to the International American Conference intimated, the "Home Market" theory was to be extended to all the States of the Western Hemisphere.

To carry out this plan requires, of course, the aid of a powerful navy; and indeed that is an important feature of the proposed system; and all this is to be done in the name of the Monroe doctrine.

Perhaps it would be well to take time to consider to what result this policy will inevitably lead us. Is there not danger indeed that we shall change the Monroe doctrine from a defensive into an aggressive policy; that we shall not only keep European powers away from the American continents, but that we shall revive their methods, in extending our boundaries and dominion, or, perhaps, set up an American "Holy Alliance?" When we speak of making the proposed canal our southern coast line, we go far in that direction. We should then be doing, in the supposed interests of trade, what was, in an earlier period of our history, done in the interests of slavery. In adopting such a policy, we should, moreover, ali

enate the sympathies of the Spanish American States, with their forty-five millions of inhabitants, and force them into the arms of Europe; indeed there have been indications of such a result. Spanish Americans are not slow in detecting signs of aggression on our part. A Central American newspaper declared, on August 4, 1881, that "we should suffer an undeception, if the Government of the United States, representing a great people, ruled by exemplary institutions, should adopt, with the other nations of America, before the world, which looks on with lively interest, a policy, troublesome, radically egotistical, that would sacrifice the sacred principles of justice to the spirit of mercantilism, overpowering and dangerously developed."

A very intelligent South American, Mr. Sarmiento, then Argentine Minister in Washington, said, in 1886, "The Federal system is the most admirable combination which chance ever suggested to the genius of man. . . But it is dangerous to convert the Federal system into an invading republic, swallowing ever, without being able to digest. The experiment has never succeeded... The Monroe Doctrine must be purified of all the stains by which the hand of man has dimmed its lustre. . . The United States ought to say that it is the country which lies between two oceans and two treaties; and the day after it has said so, the Monroe Doctrine will be accepted by the international law of Europe, thus removing the greatest source of present peril."

Now, as to the much-maligned Clayton-Bulwer treaty, what have been and what are its dangers or disadvantages for us? In the first place its restrictive clauses have effected all that the makers of the treaty expected of them; they have kept Central America from falling under the dominion of England,

a fact of the first importance. Having gained this great object, it would seem hardly just to say to England now: "We have no longer any need of the treaty; we can look after the canal ourselves." England might very well reply, as in 1857, that, in that case, she should insist upon being placed in the same position in Central America which she occupied before the treaty was made. But, aside from this consideration, the Clayton-Bulwer treaty probably offers the best possible solution of the canal question, namely, in the clause which con