may, therefore, react to a given situation without much conscious deliberation; however, this may indicate that he has acquired some moral skill by reflection on similar situations in his past life. In other words, he has educated his will, and therefore has what we call character. A voluntary act, then, may be defined as one which manifests character. We do not judge all voluntary acts from the moral standpoint, neither are all things good and bad judged as voluntary. We speak of a good machine or bad money, or of "making it good." We also speak of a good watchdog or a bad saddle horse. There are also acts judged on the basis of value of results which are not judged as moral. We may open a window to air the room or we may put on our overcoat when the weather is cold.

In order to introduce the discussion of the moral factor we quote from Spencer:

"As already said, a large part of the ordinary conduct is indifferent. Shall I walk to the waterfall to-day? or, shall I ramble along the sea shore? Here the ends are ethically indifferent. If I go to the waterfall, shall I go over the moor or take the path through the wood? Here the means are ethically indifferent. But if a friend who is with me has explored the sea shore, but has not seen the waterfall, the choice of one or other end is no longer ethically indifferent. Again, if a probable result of making the one excursion rather than the other is that I shall not be back in time to keep an appointment, or if taking the longer route entails this risk while the shorter does not, the decision in favor of one end or means acquires in another way an ethical character."

As long as it makes little difference as to the value of one route as opposed to another the end may be æsthetic, intellectual, hygienic, et cetera, but just as soon as the value of one route conflicts with that of another to the point of being really incompatible, and to the point of appealing to a different kind of interest and choice, we have a moral situation-for example, we often desire to indulge ourselves by spending our money to satisfy our appetites when we should save it for the purpose of educating our children. The problem, then, resolves itself into

After

the question of choosing that which is really valuable. conscious evaluation of competing ends, the agent makes a choice which is moral. Moral conduct, then, may be defined as, "Activity called forth and directed by ideas of value or worth, where the values concerned are so mutually incompatible as to require consideration and selection before an overt action is entered upon." Voluntary activity and incompatibility are, therefore, the earmarks of the moral situation. Voluntary activity manifests itself in character by deliberation, choice, conclusion,

et cetera.

We are now face to face with the problem of moral theory. For many people this is the parting of the ways. There are so many pitfalls arising in the consideration of this problem that many thinkers have deviated from the true and logical line of reasoning to such an extent that in some cases they have followed false gods; in others, they have emphasized one phase to the exclusion of the other, and they have developed a point of view that is one-sided. All of this, however, has had a good effect on the philosophy of morals because viewpoints have often become so antagonistic that it has become necessary for philosophers to question and to begin to endeavor to discover the real good or the true end. Some of the problems arising are: (1) What is the good? (2) How is this good known? (3) When the good is known, how is it acknowledged? (4) What is the place of selfhood in the moral process?

Many schools of thought have always existed in philosophy because of these problems. All of these problems soon resolve themselves into a two-fold division: (1) the inner, (2) the outer. This division manifested itself in fixing attention upon appetites, desires and impulses on the one hand, and on political laws and institutions on the other hand. This led to a breach between the inner or spiritual, and the outer or physical. We can readily understand from this condition how extreme individualism arose. The question further resolves itself into the consideration of the relation of the individual to the social.

An arbitrary division of moral theories may be made as follows: (1) Teleological and jural. The teleological is the outer, and is concerned with ends; the jural is the inner, and is concerned with obligations. (2) Individual and institutional. Here the individual is the inner, and the institutional is the outer. (3) Empirical and intuitional. Here the empirical is the outer and the intuitional is the inner. The intuitional deals with attitudes, and the impirical with consequences. We have now come to the point in our study where we may define the "inner" as the "how," and the "outer" as the "what" of moral activity. The author holds that these two viewpoints while capable of intellectual distinction, are incapable of real distinction. The writer of this paper inclines to the view of the author and he will now undertake to substantiate this view.

Those advocating the outer or consequence view are known as utilitarian, and are led by Bentham who contends that the "what" is significant, and that the "what" consists only of the pleasures it produces. He contends also that the "how" is unimportant except as it incidentally affects the resulting feelings. Kant, on the other hand, leads the transcendentalists in contending that the moral core of every act is the "how," or the attitude, and that the law of reason is the only right motive. The "what" as an end is irrelevant. Kant, therefore, takes his stand on the actuating source of the act while Bentham takes his stand on the outcome. The following grounds are presented in favor of the consequence theory:

(1) It makes morality really important. There would be no use or sense in moral acts if they did not promote welfare. The identification of goodness with mere motive would nullify morality.

(2) It makes morality a definite, concrete thing. Results are objective. Different individuals can measure themselves by the results. The consequence theory is progressive. The attitude theory is non-progressive because no amount of experience can be utilized.

(3) The consequence theory not only puts morality itself upon a basis of facts but also puts the theory of morality upon a solid basis. Morality is then considered on the basis of results; concrete ends can be set up, and rules made by which to measure them. If the other theory is accepted, everything must be subjective and no objective observation is possible.

Somewhat similar arguments can be presented for the attitude theory:

(1) It and it alone places morality in the high and authoritative place which by right characterizes it. This idea holds that morality is not a means to an end but an end in itself.

(2) The morally good must be within the power of the individual to achieve. Only the beginning of an act lies with man; its consequences rest with the gods. Only consequences within are of moral significance.

(3) Motives furnish a settled and workable criterion by which to measure the rightness or wrongness of specific acts. The same act may turn out in many different ways by accident. If the individual had to calculate the consequences before entering upon an action so many possibilities would arise that he would only be confused.

The author holds that since practically the same arguments can be presented for both theories, and that in life under certain conditions, we recognize both as correct, some misapprehension must underlie the controversy between the two schools of thought. He holds that their fundamental error lies in trying to split a voluntary act which is single and entire into two unrelated parts -the "inner" and the "outer"; the one called "motive," the other "end." Motive by itself can not do anything. A merely good man is of no consequence in society, he must be good for something; hence, there is not a voluntary act in mere goodness. A result which is an accident or which is not intended is no part of a voluntary act. "Motive" and "end" are not parallel lines but they are the beginning and the end of the same line. If one

starts with the ends in a moral situation he can not arrive at a true conclusion until he thinks back through the motive. The same is true if you start with the motive. The writer agrees with author when he says, "The former alone ('motive') is mere passing sentimentality or reverie; the latter alone ('end') is mere accident or luck."

In tracing the evolution of morality we have seen how the moral process has evolved from some to one to all. The realization of its application to all is the comfortable concept in the whole process. We can see how disastrous immorality as a standard would be to society. For instance, if everybody made a practice of lying a man could not be believed when he told the truth. In realizing that morality must have both a purpose and an end; in realizing that there can not be true progress in morality without reflection, and in understanding that the moral situation consists of voluntary activity and incompatibility, we can see how every man can do his best for society because he does not have to be measured by an arbitrary objective standard but by the standard of his own ability. Since we react to situations because of what we are we may conclude that the moral criterion is character manifested through endeavor.

F. M. Alexander.