Mr. Baring's report.

demned, in a despatch addressed by Lord Russell to

6

Sir Henry Bulwer, in September 1860. The object,' he says, 'of Russia seems to be always the same, though, to use the phrase of Mr. Burke, "she varies her means to preserve the consistency of her end." From the time of the Empress Catherine to the commencement of the Crimean war, Russia endeavoured to influence the Christian subjects of the Sultan through the Government of the Sultan. Since the peace of 1856, she has endeavoured to influence the Government of the Sultan through the subjects of the Sultan. For more than a century the object of Russia has not varied; and that object has been to rule indirectly in a country where the jealousies of Europe have prevented her from ruling directly.'

Again, in 1863, Lord Russell denounced the intriguing policy of Russia in the following passage, which occurs in another despatch to Sir Henry Bulwer.

'There are two parties in Russia, equally unfriendly to the Porte, but not equally bent on producing a catastrophe. The one party wishes to bring about, with all possible speed, the dismemberment of Turkey, but the other, with more caution and more craft, seeks to keep Turkey in a perpetual state of uneasiness; raising internal conspiracies, causing large expenses, fomenting perpetual intrigues, and thus keeping the Ottoman Empire in a state of weakness.'

Mr. Baring's report on the massacres in Bulgaria gives a brief outline of the origin and outbreak of the insurrection. About fourteen years ago, a Bulgarian

committee was established at Bucharest, for the purpose of fomenting insurrection in Bulgaria, and of wresting that rich province from the hands of the Turks, in order to add it to the great South Slavic Empire, which schemers in Moscow had dreamed of building up on the ruins of the Austrian and Turkish Empires. He tells us how religion has been resorted to by Russian emissaries as a means of creating a longing for independence. A national church was set up, independent of the Greek Patriarchate at Constantinople; and the schoolmasters, supplied from a training-school established at Odessa, at the expense of the Russian Government, were active in promoting disaffection. Nothing, in short, was omitted which was calculated to arouse the people. The Bulgarians, however, were a well-to-do and a contented race, and the attempted agitation failed.

It was not until 1867, during the Cretan insurrection, that the Bucharest Committee thought the time had arrived for renewed action. But again the Bulgarians made no response to the appeals that were addressed to them. The Slave propaganda was nevertheless diligently carried on, and at length, in 1875, the insurrection in Herzegovina afforded another opportunity for agitation in Bulgaria. In February 1876, Russian emissaries appeared in the districts adjacent to the Balkans. They incited the people to demand impossible concessions. Great quantities of weapons were introduced, and an extensive insurrection was planned. When the news of the rising in

The Czar.

Prince

Gortschakow.

4

The Eastern Question and

Bulgaria first reached Constantinople, General Ignatieff -a veteran intriguer-made light of it, and did what he could to prevent the Turkish Government from taking prompt measures to nip the mischief in the bud. Sir Henry Elliot, however, was at no pains to conceal his belief that his Russian colleague, if not actually concerned in stirring up the insurrection, was glad to see an additional difficulty created for the Porte.

It cannot be doubted that the Czar was personally averse to war. He knows that barren conquests in Central Asia are a source of weakness, rather than strength, to his unwieldy empire, and that the power of concentration diminishes in proportion to the increase of territory. He was doubtless sincere when he assured Lord Augustus Loftus that he had no wish to be possessed of Constantinople. Intentions,' he continued, are attributed to Russia of a future conquest of India. Can anything be more absurd?' He could not understand why there should not be a perfect understanding between England and Russia.

The Czar and his ministers have uniformly held the same language with reference to the advances of Russia in Central Asia. In his circular of 1864, Prince Gortschakow observed that the position of Russia in Central Asia was that of all civilised states which are brought into contact with half-savage nomad populations. To put a stop to the incursions of hostile tribes, fortified posts are established. Soon, beyond this line, other tribes threaten the country with attack; and in order to protect itself the civilised power is

compelled to plunge deeper and deeper into barbarous countries, where the difficulties and expense are increased with every step in advance.'

On July 26, 1869, the Czar declared, in the course of an interview with Sir Alexander Buchanan, that 'he had no ambitious views, and that he had been drawn by circumstances further than he had wished into Central Asia.'

At an interview with Mr. Forsyth, in the same year, the Czar repeated the assurance that there was no intention of extending the Russian dominions; but added that it was well known in the East that it was impossible to stop when and where one wished.'

of Lord

The experiences of the Russian Government no Warnings doubt fully justified the warnings addressed by Lord Clarendon. Clarendon to Baron Brunnow, on March 27, 1869.

I am sure,' he said, 'judging from our Indian experiences, that Russia will find the same difficulty that England has encountered in controlling its own power when exercised at so great a distance from the seat of government. Unless stringent precautions are adopted, it will be found, before long, that an aspiring Russian general has entered into communication with some restless or malcontent Indian prince, and that intrigues are rife.' The circumstances which led to the expedition to Khiva, as detailed by Captain Burnaby, afford ample evidence that Lord Clarendon's anticipations were not unfounded.

His protestations may have been sincere; but Weakness the Czar, unhappily for himself, is a despot, and not potism.

of a des

Slav move

ment in

Austria.

a constitutional ruler. Political intelligence and edu-
cation may not be very widely diffused in Russia.
Yet, even in Russia, it is impossible to destroy
completely the desire for liberal institutions. Being
denied the privilege of participating in the admini-
stration of the government at home, the attention
of the people has been diverted to schemes of ambi-
tion abroad, and Panslavism has been the ruling idea
of the politicians of Moscow. It is probable that
the Czar and his confidential advisers were not sorry
that the energies of a party, not particularly well-
affected to their rule, should be directed to the dis-
memberment of Turkey rather than to reforms in the
government of Russia. When, however, the spirit of
a nation has been aroused, it may soon gain an impetus
beyond control. The difficulty of the situation is
intensified in a country without representative as-
semblies, where the state of public opinion must be
gauged, not by the speeches of rival politicians, but
through the reports of a secret police. Thus it hap-
pened in the case of the Slav movement in Russia.
Afraid of being overwhelmed if he did not promptly
launch forth into the swelling stream, the Czar, by his
rash speech at Moscow, committed himself to an
aggressive policy, which has culminated in war.

The Slav movement in Turkey, though chiefly
fostered by the Slavonic committee at Moscow, has of
late received very powerful support from the Slav
subjects of the Austrian empire. The Slavs in Hun-
gary have, until recently, been both hated and despised