the plaintiff for $1,520. Thereafter the court granted the defendant's motion for a new trial "on the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict rendered herein." From this order the plaintiff has appealed. Being an action of quantum meruit, the amount to be recovered depended upon the testimony of witnesses as to the value of the services, and on this point there was a marked conflict in the testimony. In his complaint the plaintiff alleged their value to be two hundred and fifty dollars per month, and at the trial there was testimony on his behalf placing their value at different sums from two hundred and fifty to three hundred dollars per month, while on the part of the defendant witnesses placed their value at from sixty-five to one hundred and fifty dollars per month. There was also testimony tending to show that the plaintiff had been paid a large portion, if not all, of the amount that he was entitled to under testimony on behalf of the defendant. The court was therefore fully authorized to grant a new trial.

The appellant urges that the court erred in granting the motion for the reason that the statement of the case, upon which the motion was made, was not presented to the plaintiff within the time allowed by law therefor; and that therefore it was improperly settled by the judge and should not have been considered by him. The following are the facts relied upon in support of this position, viz. :— The verdict of the jury was rendered December 9, 1901. The defendant gave notice of its intention to move for a new trial December 19, 1901. At the close of the statement to be settled is the following:

"The defendant proposes the foregoing as his statement on motion for a new trial.

"Dated March 25, 1902.

"WALTER E. DORN,

"Attorney for Defendant."

Directly underneath is the following:

"The foregoing statement is correct and may be settied and allowed subject to the right to object as heretofore reserved as not prepared and presented in time.

"Dated March 25, 1902.

"F. W. SAWYER,

"Attorney for Plaintiff."

This is followed by the following certificate of settlement:"The foregoing statement is correct, and is hereby settled and allowed.

"Dated April 2, 1902.

"JOHN HUNT,

"Judge of Superior Court."

It does not appear from the record whether the plaintiff was present or absent at the time of the settlement of the statement. His admission of its correctness and consent that it be settled was a waiver of his right to propose amendments thereto, and authorized the defendant to present it to the judge for settlement without any notice to him. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 659, subd. 3.) If there were any facts or reasons in support of the objection now urged he could have reserved the right in his stipulation to be present at the settlement, and he should have then appeared and presented them to the judge and obtained a ruling upon their sufficiency; and if such ruling was adverse, should have taken an exception thereto. The matters so presented, together with the ruling and his exception, should have been incorporated into the statement, and made a part of the record, and they could then be considered by the court in hearing the motion, and also upon an appeal therefrom. When the statement was presented to the judge for settlement he was not required to enter upon a personal investigation of the sufficiency of the objection which the plaintiff had "reserved the right" to make, but was at liberty to assume that as he had failed to specify any fact or reason in support of such objection, and did not appear to make the objection, it was without foundation. If, however, it be assumed that the plaintiff was present at the settlement it does not appear that he made any objection thereto; but if it be further assumed that he made the objection which he had reserved the right to make, and that it was overruled by the court, the record does not show that he took any exception to such ruling. Section 647 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not include such ruling within those which are deemed excepted to.

In Cole v. Wilcox, 99 Cal. 549, [34 Pac. 114], the defendant objected to the settlement of the statement upon the ground that the same was not served in time, in reference to which the court said: "A mere objection to the settlement of the

statement without pointing out the basis or the grounds of the objection, or presenting the facts upon which it was made, was not fair to either the judge or the opposite party, and even if an exception had been taken to the ruling of the judge upon such objection the party taking the exception would not have the right to its consideration upon appeal. When the motion for a new trial came on to be heard the court in its action thereon was limited to considering the matters contained in the statement, and was not at liberty to go outside of the statement for the purpose of determining whether the new trial should have been granted or refused."

The order is affirmed.

Cooper, J., and Hall, J., concurred.

[Crim. No. 8. Third Appellate District.-September 21, 1905.1 THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. SAM PELTIN, alias VICTOR PETERSON, Appellant.

CRIMINAL LAW-GRAND LARCENY SUFFICIENCY OF INFORMATIONDESCRIPTION OF MONEY STOLEN GROUNDS OF DEMURRER NOT SHOWN. An information for grand larceny which describes the property stolen as "about" eighty dollars lawful money of the United States, shows with sufficient definiteness and certainty that more than fifty dollars were stolen, as against a general demurrer. or where the record does not disclose whether the demurrer was general or special.

D.-USE OF WORD "ABOUT''-COMMON UNDERSTANDING.-The word "about" is frequently used as a synonym for the word "nearly" or "approximately." When a person of common understanding would readily know what is meant, and no substantial right is infringed, the information must be upheld.

ID.-EVIDENCE MONEY STOLEN FROM CASH REGISTER MARKED,

MUTILATED, AND COUNTERFEIT PIECE-POSSESSION OF DEFENDANT. -Where the money was taken from the plaintiff's cash register, which contained a marked and mutilated half-dollar piece, assuming it to be counterfeit, evidence is admissible to show the possession thereof by the defendant when arrested, as tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense charged.

ID-MONEY ON PERSON OF DEFENDANT EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CONDITION. -Where money was found on the person of the defendant when

arrested, evidence is admissible to show that he had no money just before the crime was committed.

ID. CREDIT OF DEFENDANT.-It was not error to exclude evidence that the credit of the defendant was good and that he could have borrowed money, in the absence of any showing that he did in fact borrow it.

JD.-PRESUMPTION FROM POSSESSION-GOOD CHARACTER-REFUSAL OF REQUESTED INSTRUCTION.-It was proper to refuse a requested instruction that the presumption arising from possession alone of stolen property is removed by evidence of good character, as tending to invade the province of the jury, where the evidence of good character was not general, and was partially neutralized by circumstances in proof, such as masquerading by the defendant under an assumed name.

ID. INSTRUCTIONS BASED ON EVIDENCE OF RECENT POSSESSION-CONSTRUCTION OF INSTRUCTIONS.-An instruction as to recent possession of stolen property, based on evidence that when arrested defendant had upon his person the exact number of five and twenty dollar pieces taken from the cash register, is to be taken in connection with other instructions given, which make the instructions bearing on that question a full and correct statement of the law.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tuolumne County and from an order denying a new trial. G. W. Nicol, Judge.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

E. W. Holland, for Appellant.

U. S. Webb, Attorney-General, and J. C. Daly, Deputy Attorney-General, for Respondent.

MCLAUGHLIN, J.-The defendant was convicted of grand larceny, and appeals from the judgment and from the order denying his motion for a new trial.

The first contention of appellant is that the information is indefinite and uncertain, because the property stolen is described as being "about eighty dollars lawful money of the United States of America." This contention cannot be sustained. The word "about" is frequently used as a synonym for the word "nearly" or "approximately," and such use is sanctioned by definitions found in the various standard dictionaries. Understood in this sense, it cannot be said that the information in the case at bar fails to charge the larceny

of more than fifty dollars, or that there is any material uncertainty as to the value of the property stolen. The use of qualifying words is not commended, for the value of the property taken should be clearly and definitely stated in an information for grand larceny. But when a person of common understanding would readily know what is intended, and no substantial right of a defendant is infringed, the information must be upheld. (Pen. Code, secs. 957, 959, 960.) We are not informed as to the grounds upon which the demurrer is based, and therefore cannot know whether it was general or special, and it has been held that in the absence of a special demurrer such a statement as to value is sufficient. (People v. Richards, 136 Cal. 128, [68 Pac. 477].)

A marked and mutilated half-dollar piece which was in the looted cash register was found on the person of the defendant when he was arrested a short time after the crime was committed. Evidence to this effect was received and the coin was admitted as an exhibit in the case against defendant's objection. It is now urged that such rulings were erroneous, because the coin was counterfeit, and proof of its theft could not sustain the charge made. True, the defendant was charged with stealing lawful money, but conceding the proposition of law relied upon, and also assuming that the coin was counterfeit and not merely mutilated, it does not follow that it was error to admit the evidence complained of. This coin was clearly identified as an article taken from the cash register at the time the crime was committed, and the evidence objected to was admissible for the same reason that would make a knife, chain, or other article proper evidence under similar circumstances. It connected defendant with the commission of the offense, and tended strongly to show that he was the person who opened the cash register and abstracted its contents.

It was not error to admit evidence showing that the defendant had no money just before the crime was committed. (People v. Kelley, 132 Cal. 430, [64 Pac. 563]; People v. Sullivan, 144 Cal. 471, [77 Pac. 1000].) Nor was it error to exclude evidence to prove that defendant's credit was good and that he could have borrowed money. If he did in fact borrow money, evidence to that effect would be admissible, but his ability to do so could have no bearing on the case, and