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health. Separate the medicine from that further end, and it is esteemed good for nothing; nor is it at all desired.
An ultimate end is that which the agent seeks in what he does, for its own sake: That he has respect to, as what he loves, values and takes pleasure in on its own - account, and not merely as a means of a further end. As 'when a man loves the taste of some particular sort of fruit, and is at pains and cost to obtain it, for the sake of the pleasure of that taste, which he values upon its own account, as he loves his own pleasure ; and not merely for the sake of any other good, which he supposes his enjoying that pleasure will be the means of.
Some ends are subordinate ends, not only as they are subordinated to an ultimate end, but also to another end that is itself but a subordinate and : Yea, there may be a succession or chain of many subordinate ends, one dependent on another....one sought for another : The first for the next, and that for the sake of the next to that, and so on in a long series before you come to any thing, that the agent aims at and seeks for its own sake : As when a man sells a garment to get money....to buy tools....to till his land....to obtain a crop....to supply him with food....to gratify the appetite. And he seeks to gratify his appetite, on its own account, as what is grateful in itself. Here the end of his selling his garment, is to get money ; but getting money is only a subordinate end : It is not only subordinate to the last end, his gratifying his appetite ; but to a nearer end, viz. his buying husbandry tools; and his obtaining these, is only a subordinate end, being only for the sake of tilling land; And the tillage of land is an end not sought on its own account, but for the sake of the crop to be produced ; and the crop produced is not an ultimate end, or an end sought for itself, but only for the sake of making bread; and the having bread, is not sought on its own account, but for the sake of gratifying the appetite.
Here the gratifying the appetite, is called the ultimate end because it is the last in the chain, where a man's aim and pursuit stops and rests, obtaining in that, the thing finally
aimed at. So whenever a man comes to that in which liis desire terminates and rests, it being something valued on its own account, then he comes to an ultimate end, let the chain be longer or shorter ; yea, if there be but one link or one step that he takes before he comes to this end. As when a man that loves honey puts it into his mouth, for the sakė of the pleasure of the taste, without aiming at any thing further. So that an end which an agent has in view, may be both his immediate and his ultimate end; his next and his last end. That end which is sought for the sake of itself, and not for the sake of a further end, is an ultimate end ; it is ultimate or last, as it has no other beyond it, for whose sake it is, it being for the sake of itself: So that here the aim of the agent stops and rests (without going further) being come to the good which he esteems a recompense of its pursuit for its own value.
Here it is to be noted that a thing sought, may have the nature of an ultimate, and also of a subordinate end ; as it may be sought partly on its own account, and partly for the sake of a further end. Thus a man in what he does, may seek the love and respect of a particular person, partly on its own account, because it is in itself agreeable to men to be the objects of others' esteem and love : And partly, because he hopes, through the friendship of that person to have his assistance in other affairs ; and so to be put under advantage for the obtaining further ends.
A chief end or highest end, which is opposite not properly to a subordinate end, but to an inferior end, is something diverse from an ultimate end. The chief end is an end that is most valued ; and therefore most sought after by the agent in what he does.
It is evident, that to be an end more valued than another end, is not exactly the same thing as to be an end valued ultimately, or for its own sake. This will appear, if it be considered.
1. That two different ends may be both ultimate ends, and yet not be chief ends. They may be both valued for their own sake, and both sought in the same work or acts, and yet one valued more highly and sought more than anoth,
er: Thus a man may go a journey to obtain two different benefits or enjoyments, both which may be agreeable to him in themselves considered, and so both may be what he values on their own account and seeks for their own sake; and yet one may be much more agreeable than the other, and so be what he sets his heart chiefly upon, and seeks most after in his going a journey. Thus a man may go a journey partly to obtain the possession and enjoyment of a bride that is very dear to him, and partly to gratify his curiosity in looking in a telescope, or some new invented and extraordinary optic glass : Both may be ends he seeks in his journey, and the one not properly subordinate or in order to another.' One may not depend on another, and therefore both may be ultimate ends; but yet the obtaining his beloved bride may be his chief end, and the benefit of the optic glass, his inferior end. The former may be what he sets his heart vastly, most upon, and so be properly the chief end of his journey.
2. An ultimate end is not always the chief end, because some subordinate ends may be more valued and sought after than some ultimate ends. Thus for instance, a map may aim at these two things in his going a journey ; one may be to visit his friends, and another to receive a great estate, or a large sum of money that lies ready for him at the place to which he is going. The latter, viz. his receiving the sum of money may be but a subordinate end : He may not value the silver and gold on their own account, but only for the pleasure, gratifications and honor ; that is the ultimate end, and not the money which is valued only as a means of the other. But yet the obtaining the money, may be what is more valued, and so an higher end of his journey, than the pleasure of see. : ing his friends; though the latter is what is valued on its own account, and so is an ultimate end.
But here several things may be noted :
First, That when it is said, that some subordinate ends may be more valued than some ultinate ends, it is not supposed that ever a subordinate end is more valued than that ultimate epd or ends to which ii is subordinate ; because a subordinate end has no value, but what it derives from its ultimate end;
For that reason it is called a subordinate end, because it is val. yed and sought, not for its own sake, or its own valuę, byt only in subordination to a further end, or for the sake of the ultimate end, that it is in order to. But yet a subordipate end may be valued more than some other ultimate end that it is pof subordinate to, but iş independent of it, and does not be. long to that series, or chain of ends. Thus for instance : If ạ man goes a journey to receive a sum of money, not at all as an ultimate end, or because he has any value for the silver and gold for their own sake, but only for the value of the pleasure and honor that the money may be a means of. Įn this case it is impossible that the subordinate end, viz. his having the money should be more valued by him than the pleasure and hon, or, for which he values it. It would be absurd to suppose that he values the means more than the end, when he has no value for the means but for the sake of the end, of which it is the means : But yet he may value the money, though but a subordinate end, more than some other ultimate end, to which it is not subordinate, and with which it has no connexion. For instance, more than the comfort of a friendly visit ; which was one end of his journey.
Şecondly, Not only is a subordinate end never superior to that ultimate end, to which it is subordinate ; but the ultimate end is always (not only equal but) superior to its subordinate end, and more valued by the agent ; unless it be when the ultimate end entirely depends on the subordinate: So that he has no other means by wbich to obtain his last end, apd also is looked upon as certainly connected with it....then the subordinate end may be as much valued as the last end ; because the last end, in such a case, does altogether depend upon, and is wholly and certainly conveyed by it. As for instance, if a pregnant woman has a peculiar appetite to a certain rare fruit that is to be found odly in the garden of a particular friend of ber's, at a distance ; and she goes a journey to go to her friend's house or garden, to obtain that fruit....the ultimate end of her journey, is to gratify that strong appetite: The obtaining that fruit, is the subordinate end of it. If she looks upon it, that the appetite can be gratified by no other means than the obtaining that fruit; and that it will certainly be gratified if she obtains it, then she will value the fruit as much as she values the gratification of her appetite. But otherwise, it will not be so : If she be doubtful whether that fruit will satisfy hér craving, then she will not value it equally with the gratification of her appetite itself; or if there be some other fruit that she knows of, that will gratify her desire, at least in part; which she can obtain without such inconvenience or trouble as shall countervail the gratification ; which is in effect, frustrating her of her last end, because her last end is the pleasure of gratifying her appetite, without any trouble that shall countervail, and in effect destroy it. Or if it be so, that her appetite cannot be gratified without this fruit, nor yet with it alone, without something else to be compounded with it....then her value for her last end will be divided be. tween these several ingredients as so many subordinate, and no one alone will be equally valued with the last end.
Hence it rarely happens among mankind, that a subordi. nate end is equally valued with its last end; because the obtaining of a last end rarely depends on one single, uncompounded means, and is infallibly connected with that means : Therefore, men's last ends are commonly their highest ends.
Thirdly, If any being has but one ultimate end, in all that he does, and there be a great variety of operations, his last end may justly be looked upon as his supreme end: For in such a case, every other end but that one, is an end to that end; and therefore no other end can be superior to it. Because, as was observed before, a subordinate end is never more val, ued, than the end to which it is subordinate.
Moreover, the subordinate effects, events, or things brought to pass, which all are means of this end, all uniting to contribute their share towards the obtaining the one last end, are very various; and therefore, by what has been now observed, the ultimate end of all must be valued, more than any one of the particular' means. This seems to be the case with the works of God, as may more fully appear in the sequel.
From what has been said, to explain what is intended by an ultimate end, the following things may be observed concerning ultimate ends in the sense explained,