planation, certain it is that although there was a great deal of suffering in the capital, there is no indication that at the end of the war it was, as a military position, much nearer to surrender on account of starvation than at the beginning of hostilities. Nevertheless, with the theory then prevalent as to the desperate condition of the city whose fall meant the end of Spanish rule in Cuba, the American blockade closed tightly over Havana, and in the opening days of the war Spanish vessels and steamships plying to the blockaded port fell rapidly into the hands of the Americans, until this commerce was practically stopped or destroyed.

Blockading and prize-taking were not, however, the sole duties of the American fleet. It was obvious that any attempt to get into the harbor of Havana through its narrow channel crammed with mines would be at once mad and useless. But it was at the same time very desirable to keep open and unprotected, so far as possible, the other harbors, because at that moment the theory was that we should either land a large army to proceed against Havana, or important expeditions to co-operate with the insurgents in a movement to cut off the capital from the interior. This theory, whether strongly or lightly held, was soon set aside by events and never acted upon-a very fortunate thing, for it rested upon a gross underestimate of the strength of Havana and of the Spanish forces, and upon an equally gross over-estimate of the numbers and efficiency of the insurgents. In the early days of the war, however, it had sufficient strength to affect the naval operations near Havana, but very luckily led, practically, only to work which it would have been well to do in any event.

The first affair growing out of these conditions, and the first action of the war, occurred at Matanzas. It was discovered that the Spaniards were establishing batteries and raising new fortifications at that port, and on April 27 Admiral Sampson's flagship, the New York, supported by the monitor Puritan and the unarmored cruiser Cincinnati bombarded the defences. The Spanish shooting was very bad, only three shots coming near the New York, and none hitting the Cincinnati, which was much exposed. The American shooting, on the other hand, was good, from the guns of the Puritan to the rapid-fires of the Cincinnati. The Spanish batteries and earth-works were badly shattered and broken up, and many guns dismounted. As the Captain-General of Cuba announced that only one mule was killed, we may conclude with almost absolute certainty that there must have been a very considerable loss of life among the troops exposed to the American fire. Except as a warning to the Spaniards, and as a test of American marksmanship, the affair of April 27 at Matanzas was of trifling importance, although great attention was given to it at the moment because it was the first action of the war by land or sea. But while the fleet was thus carrying out its orders by its vigorous blockade, by opening a bombardment on the lesser ports, and by harassing the coast batteries and garrisons, events were occurring elsewhere which determined the future course of the

war.

On April 23 the President called for 125,000 volun'teers, and on April 25 Congress adopted a formal declaration of war, which stated that war had existed since.

April 21-an unquestioned truth. On the 26th the President announced that the United States, although not a signatory, would adhere to the agreement of Paris, and permit no privateers. The wisdom of this prompt and righteous declaration was seen at once in the approval which it received abroad, and in the embarrassment which it caused to Spain, where hopes were entertained that, all social and national efficiency being dead, something might still be done by legalized piracy. International opinion was still further conciliated by our giving thirty days to all Spanish ships to leave our ports. Thus, while Congress was voting money and preparing a bill for war revenue, while the call for volunteers was going through the land, while camps were being formed, men mustered in, the regulars brought together from all parts of the country and mobilized at Tampa, we were settling rapidly and judiciously our relations with the other powers of the earth. There was never a moment when any European power could or would have dared to interfere with us, although columns of speculations, predictions, and mysterious warnings filled the newspapers on this subject. And as there was no danger that any one power would interfere, so after Manila there was no peril to be apprehended from any combination of powers. That was the crisis, and when England refused to join the concert of Europe in interfering with us in the Philippines-an act not to be forgotten by Americans-all possible danger of interference from any quarter was at an end. Nevertheless, as we adjusted our relations to the rest of the world wisely and quickly, when we caught Spain by the throat,