from insurgents; but hostilities began there again," and culminated in the fierce fight of Lieutenant Febiger with fourteen hundred Filipinos on the 24th of October.

In the opinion of the army officer last quoted above," the insurrection is stronger now than it was a year ago-not in the number of organized insurgents, but by virtue of the fact that the leaders have learned their power, and found that it is possible to collect taxes. It may end suddenly, but it is apt to be long drawn out." In a subsequent letter, dated December 6, the same officer writes: "A great deal was expected from the Commission when they first arrived, but lately they do not seem to occupy so important a place. They are bound to be handicapped, through inexperience, living in Manila, and regarding the Manilenos as typical Filipinos. They are not; and one cause of complaint put forth against the Spaniards was that, even when Spain sent out officers of high rank, who were able and willing to correct abuses, they, through ignorance, failed to do so; that they lived in Manila and knew nothing of the provinces. . . . Under the most favorable circumstances, it is not an easy task to govern seven or eight millions of new people. Under present conditions existing here it is an enormous task; and yet, with it all, I do not consider these people as being very hard to govern."

An unusually capable and intelligent officer of volunteers, who left the island of Luzon in December on account of ill health, and whose services have been warmly commended by Generals Wheaton, Bates, and MacArthur, said to me a few days ago: "I am of opinion that the resistance to our rule is general throughout the archipelago. When I left the field there did not seem to me to be any material change in the situation. At times there would be a lull for a week or two, and then the attacks, surprises, ambuscades, and general disturbance would begin again. My own opinion is that resistance to our authority is likely to continue for an indefinite length of time; and this, I may add, is the opinion of all the officers in the Philippines whom I know. I think it may fairly be said that we hold in the islands only the ground that we command with our rifles."

An officer of the regular army—a gradu

ate of West Point-who at the outbreak of the Spanish-American war was professor of military science in a well-known American university, writes from the Philippines to the president of that university as follows: "The greatest obstacle in the way of our success is the lack of confidence which the natives have in us. This is not surprising, as they have no definite and positive knowledge of the intentions of the Government of the United States as to what is to be done with them. It would be of the greatest benefit to all concerned if there could be some declaration, not by the President, not by a Commission, not by army officers, but by Congress, as to exactly what the Government intends to allow the Filipinos to do. I see no reason to believe that the war, as now carried on, will be ended for years. The Filipinos have killed and captured more of our men in the last eight months than in the preceding year. Every town has from ten to twenty-five prisoners, and commissions and provost courts are busy. All the penitentiaries are full, and every Friday many are hung. If we are to conquer, it will be necessary to give the natives some assurances, or to adopt measures similar to those of General Weyler. It is a hard business, and the sooner the United States gets out of the present conditions the better. I believe we ought to say to these people that in a certain number of years we intend to turn the islands over to the Filipinos, and at that time they must try to work out their own salvation. In the meantime give them every assistance. The government set up by the natives would not be perfect, but it would answer their purposes very well, and would cer tainly be as stable as any of the South American governments. When all is known of the Filipinos, and our work in the past two years, there will be much of which we cannot be proud. I hope the army will be reorganized, and increased sufficiently to give force enough to do the work which the Government has set for us here; and I most sincerely hope that the Government will make some authoritative declaration which will make it impossible for the natives to say that they do not know what to count upon. It seems to me that it is not unreasonable to say that there should be a force her

sufficient to enable officers who have been here two years or more to go home to their families, for a time at least. The hopelessness of ever getting home is distressing officers and men, and is having its effect on all of us."

Nearly all the evidence that I have been able to get directly from the field supports the opinions expressed in the letters from army officers above quoted; and high officials of the Government in Washington, who have better means than I of ascertaining the facts, regard the situation very much in the same way. Said one such official to me: "I am personally of opinion that our position in the Philippines is still serious and threatening, and that we have before us an extremely difficult task. My own correspondence indicates that there has been as yet little permanent gain."

That this opinion is shared by many well-informed Congressmen appears from the recent debate in the Senate on the army reorganization bill. Senator Hale, for example, declared that he would vote for the bill only because, if it were not passed, there would be in the Philippines, after July next, only about twenty thousand American soldiers. Pressed by Filipino forces, they might be hemmed in at Manila, and would be lucky if they were not driven into the sea. "Without this bill," he said, "an almost immeasurable disaster might befall our army."

If conditions in the Philippines were rapidly improving, and if we were likely to encounter there only the resistance that might be offered by a few skulking bands of guerrillas, this declaration would have been received with laughter and derision, but the Senate evidently did not regard it as a proper subject for such treatment.

The testimony on the other side of this question that is, the evidence which goes to show that we are making substantial progress in the Philippines-is mainly contained in the first detailed report of the Taft Commission, and in letters and telegrams of later date from its President. It is entitled to serious consideration.

In a letter to the Secretary of War dated Manila, December 14, Judge Taft says: "Since writing you, about three thousand insurgents in Ilocos Norte have surrendered, and ten thousand persons who were not well affected toward us in Panay

have taken the oath of allegiance. I have already received two papers from native priests, eighteen in number, and I am told that there will be a great many other papers signed by a great many more native priests, tendering their allegiance to the United States, and promising fidelity without reserve. The native priests are those who have held out longest in favor of the insurgents and against the Americans, and I deem this action as of great importance.”

In a telegram dated January 9, Judge Taft adds: "Conditions are rapidly improving. Rifles, besides officers and privates, are being captured or surrendered daily, in considerable numbers, in northern and southern Luzon. The same conditions prevail in Panay, where more than 35,000 have taken the oath of allegiance. The insurgent forces are completely scattered, and their leader, Delgado, is negotiating for surrender. Work in Samar is slower because of an insurgent band's long uncontested occupation of the interior, and the swollen streams early in the campaign. The campaign in Samar has driven bands into Leyte, producing disturbance, but information is that conditions there are favorable."

About the middle of January, General Grant reported to General MacArthur that his district had been fairly pacified, and that the province of Pampanga (Luzon) was ready for civil government. At the same time General MacArthur telegraphed the Adjutant-General as follows:

'Delgado, Commander-in-Chief Iloilo province, Panay, surrendered, January 11, to Robert P. Hughes, Brigadier-General of Volunteers, with four officers, twentyone men, fourteen rifles. His command much scattered. Other surrenders expected during the next few days. Important; signifies end of organized armed resistance Iloilo province, Panay."

It appears, however, from a telegram dated Iloilo, January 17, that the insurgent Generals Pulion, Dicena, and Quintin Sala were still holding strong positions in the mountains of Capiz, on the island of Panay, and that Battery G, of the Sixth Light Artillery, with a considerable force of infantry, was endeavoring to dislodge them and compel them to fight an open engagement.

General Young reports that in his

Upon these reports of pacification and surrender the Taft Commission, apparently, bases its assertion that "conditions are rapidly improving."

It would be easier to give implicit credence to optimistic statements from Manila if experience had not shown that judgments formed there are apt to be colored by the wishes and hopes of commissions and commanders. The Schurman Commission reported in 1899 that when they left Manila the disintegration of the enemy's forces was steadily progressing" and that "the hope of assistance from outside sources seemed to be all that held them together."

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General Otis said in his report dated May 14, 1900: "I am convinced, from observation, investigation, and the expressed opinion of the educated men of the islands, that the declared guerrilla warfare will cease within a few months." In an article published later in "Leslie's Weekly" he declared that "there will be no more real fighting in the Philippines. Peace is practically restored all through the islands."

Even the Taft Commission, in its report of August 20, 1900, asserted positively that "if the election confirms the present policy, the insurrection will disappear within sixty days."

Is there any good reason to believe that the optimistic statements which come from Manila now are more trustworthy than the reports of the Schurman Commission in 1899, of General Otis in May, 1900, and of the Taft Commission in August last? I sincerely hope that there is, but I am afraid there is not.

Upon a careful review of all the evidence that I have been able to gather, I am forced to the conclusion that, while the military situation in the Philippines is better than it was a year ago, it is still serious enough to justify anxiety and apprehension. The island of Negros and perhaps half a dozen provinces in

there is a fairly strong peace party in Manila; and a large body of natives in the provinces are tired of the war and would submit to any government capable of restoring order and protecting property and life. On the other hand, most of the islands and a large majority of the provinces still maintain an attitude of hostility; bands of guerrillas still harass our armies in the field, and are concealed, aided, and supported by the nominally peaceful and friendly population; we are unable to give security to life or protection to property in any territory not occupied by our troops; and we hold in secure and undisputed possession only the ground that may be swept by the fire of 60,000 soldiers in 430 garrisoned posts. If this seems too pessimistic a view of the situation, I can only say that it is the view taken by the army officers whose statements and letters I have quoted, and whose opportunities for observation have been better, perhaps, than those even of the Taft Commission.

I am glad to turn from this aspect of the Philippine question to a consideration of the civil and political situation, which offers much more that is encouraging and satisfactory. The extremely able and businesslike report of the Taft Commission, and the good judgment and clearheaded sagacity shown by it in all its dealings with civil and political problems, give us every reason to hope and believe that if Congress and the President see fit to endow it with plenary powers, and if the Filipinos recognize its authority and give it their loyal support and co-operation, it will set up a government in the Philippines of which we shall have no reason to be ashamed. Although hampared and embarrassed to some extent by the military arm, and restricted in its operations both by its own limited legislative powers and by the passive or active hostility of the people, it has set about the reorganization of the courts; prepared a new code of civil and judicial procedure; adopted a comprehensive and rigid system of civil service rules; investigated thoroughly the question of the friars and their lands; devised a new and greatly improved scheme of taxation; and increased the revenues of the islands to such an extent as to make possible the

immediate expenditure of $1,000,000 for public roads, $1,000,000 for harbor improvements, and $1,500,000 for public education. With the aid and co-operation of the army, it has opened about one thousand schools, has set up municipal governments in about three hundred pueblos or townships, and is now preparing to organize higher forms of administrative control in all provinces where the natives are quiet or submissive enough to render such action possible.

The Commission has also succeeded in winning the confidence of a part of the Filipino people, including a number of Aguinaldo's former leaders, and in October last, with the encouragement and approval of the Commission, there was organized in Manila a pro-American native party, which has since become known as "the Federals." I have no means of ascertaining the strength of this party or of estimating the value of its professions of loyalty; but I find in the files of the War Department an appeal made by its leaders to the people of the United States, which has never been published, and which seems to me to be interesting and significant. It is embodied in the following despatch from Judge Taft: [BY CABLE]

Manila, November 4, 1900. To the Secretary of War:

I am urgently requested by Buencamino, the insurgent Secretary of State; Artacho, the Secretary of Commerce; Macabulos and Droma, prominent insurgent Generals; Yangco, the chief financial supporter of the insurgent cause; and seven other prominent Filipino merchants and former insurgents, representing many others, to forward the following signed statement to the American people:

[STATEMENT]

"We hear reports from America that all the Filipino leaders, and the Filipino people, desire to change the actual government for the government of Aguinaldo and his followers. We positively deny this affirmation, and declare, in the name of the majority of the people, and especially in the name of the intelligent and wealthy classes, that to hand over the government of the islands to Aguinaldo and his followers would be to hand over the government to the robbers, assassins, and abductors of the honest, peaceable people. We affirm that the war should be quickly terminated and American sovereignty established in all the archipelago. We will aid in this event, to the extreme of organizing a counterrevolution, if desirable. We offer our operation in this, because we are convinced that America will give us a liberal, just, and

CO

This telegram reached the Secretary of War on the eve of the Presidential election, but it was not given to the press, for the reason, I understand, that, in the judgment of the President and his advisers, it might be regarded as an attempt to influence public opinion, at the eleventh hour, in favor of the Administration and its Philippine policy. I do not think, myself, that the American people, even in the last hours of an exciting political campaign, would have regarded Judge Taft as capable of lending his name to such a scheme, or the President as willing to profit by it; but, be that as it may, the publication of the statement was thought to be inopportune at that time, and the despatch was laid aside and finally buried in the files of the War Department. It would be interesting to know the history of this document at the Manila end of the line; but I see no reason to doubt the sincerity and good faith of the signers. The proposition to organize a counter-revolution is a characteristic Cuban and Filipino method of restoring peace to a distracted and wartorn country!

Since the date of this statement, the Federal party seems to have gained greatly in strength and influence, and a few days ago (January 28) Mr. Frye, as presiding officer of the Senate, laid before that body a telegram from a number of Federal leaders asserting that the party was receiving accessions by the thousands in all parts of the archipelago, and that its efforts to bring about peace would soon be crowned with success if Congress would give the President authority to establish a purely civil government in the Philippines at the earliest opportune

moment.

Upon a review of the civil and political situation in the Philippines, I can see nothing that deserves hostile criticism, and much that is hopeful and encouraging. The Taft Commission is doing its work thoroughly, efficiently, and intelligently, and if it only had plenary power from Congress and the full confidence and unanimous support of the Filipino people, it would give the latter in the words of the Federal leaders-" a liberal, just, and honest government."