it's advantages and pleasures, which render us sincerely attached to it and unwilling to part with it, except for another life, in which this mortal existence may for ever be absorbed.

From the preceding elucidation of the apostle's language, I shall take occasion to consider in what the value of human life consists, and on what principles we may desire to have it' terminated.

I am first to consist in what the value of human life consists.

It's value, then, may be said to arise from it's being a season of enjoyment. Who can deny, that life has many comforts, who only considers what men derive from the grosser appetites, which are furnished with objects of gratification every day, but especially if he take into his account the satisfaction which men feel in social and domestic relations, pleasures of a more refined nature and within the reach of all-what they receive from the works of nature and art, a high relish for which depends upon the culti vation of the mind, but which is enjoyed in some degree by all-from the knowledge and contemplation of important truths respecting the natural world, civil government, or the common business of life, and especially respecting religion? Nor ought we to leave out of our consideration the pleasures, which arise from the contemplation of moral excel. lence either in ourselves or others, and particularly in the supreme Being? Who is there, I say, that considers these various sources of delight, that can think.

human life is destitute of comfort, and that the con tinuance of it is not desirable on that account?

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Pleasure meets us at our first entrance upon life, at the earliest period ofit, and accompanies us at every step in one form or another from the first hour to the last. In general too it is increasing as life advances, being greater in every new period than in the preceding, at least till men are advanced very far in years. pleasures of infancy and childhood are exchanged for those of manhood, and the pleasures of our manly years for the more refined and enlarged enjoyments of middle life. At every period the mind can enjoy more of the past and anticipate more of the future: at every succeeding period it's pleasures are refined and purified, and partake less of the gross pleasures of sense. If evils be felt, time enables us to correct them; if any thing desirable be wanting, by our own industry and exertion we may supply the defect. the mean time whether successful or not, hope animates our pursuit and lessens the weight of our troubles, or increases the sum of our enjoyments. If the pleasures of life, then, be at all times considerable and generally increasing, who can wonder, that men are strongly attached to it, and unwilling to depart from it, unless compelled by inexorable necessity?

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Secondly, Life is also valuable as a season of improvement.

The whole doctrine of the Christian revelation concurs in teaching us to conceive of a future life as a state of exact retribution, where each will receive

a reward suited to his character, or to that degree of piety and virtue, which he had attained in the present life; he who had made great progress receiving much happiness, while he, who had made but little, proportionally less. Hence appears the value of the present life; for the longer it is continued, the better opportunities will men enjoy for improving and -perfecting their characters, and the higher will be their station in Heaven, when they depart from it. On the contrary, those, who die at an early period, before their virtue has attained any degree of maturity, are only qualified for an inferiour station. A good man, therefore, will wish for the continuance of life, not merely on account of the additional pleasures, which it will enable him to enjoy here, but on account of the influence it will have upon whole of his future existence, by enabling him, when he enters on it, to commence his career of happiness in proportionally better circumstances.

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Let it be observed, however, that this can only be true upon the supposition, that all men enter upon happiness at the same time, the period of the resurrection; for, in that case, no one can enjoy any advantage above another, except what he derives from a greater degree of previous preparation. But if the soul of man quit the body as soon as death takes place, and, instead of lying with it in the grave, enter immediately upon a state of improvement, he, who dies soon, may have made between death and the resurrection as great and even greater profici

ency, than he, who dies later in life; and consequently there can be no motive on this supposition to wish for the continuance of life, since he will rank, at the day of judgment, above those, who shall have died long after him. For it cannot be supposed, that this world affords the same advantages for making religious acquirements as the next, and that ten years spent among frail mortals incumbered with such bodies as ours, can be equal in this respect to ten years spent in Heaven and in the society of the blessed.

Thirdly, There is another reason, for which life is thought valuable, and that is the opportunity it affords of doing good.

It may perhaps be thought, that this consideration might have been classed under one or other of the preceding heads; since doing good is certainly one of the most valuable pleasures of life, and he, who performs good works most frequently, makes the best preparation for a future life, and is likely to hold the highest rank in it.

But there are some, who do good from motives of pure benevolence, and without regard to any advantage resulting to themselves from it either in this world or the next. To them the continuance of life is highly desirable for the sake of those kind services, which they intend to perform for mankind at large or for their relatives and friends, and which they see no probability of being effected in any other way. A few years, they may imagine, will

enable them to accomplish the design they have in view. For this time, at least, they earnestly wish to live, and cannot bear the thought of being premamaturely carried away from life, and laid silent and useless in the grave. For such purposes as these, to desire the continuance of life is not only innocent, but rational and commendable.

We are now, Secondly, to consider in what cases it may be allowable to wish life were termimated.

On this subject it may be observed in general, that it is the duty of a creature to be wholly resigned to the will of it's creator, to be pleased with whatever he determines, and to submit without murmuring to what he appoints, in short, to have no will but his. This is no more than the just deference, which is due to the great wisdom and perfect goodness of the supreme Being. It is also recommended to us by an example of the highest authority, no less than that of our master, who, when distressed at the prospect of a violent death, could say, Father, not my will, but thine be done." To wish to depart from life, then, in any manner, when God does not require such a sacrifice in order to obey his will, can be no proof of excellence of character, nor be properly held up to our imitation as a duty. The utmost that can be said of it is, that it is a weakness, which the distresses of mankind may in certain circumstances render excusable, but which ought to be avoided as far as possible.

We are now to consider what those circumstances are, in which it may be excused,