XLIII. Austrian treaty contained a promise of enlargement of CHAP. territory, which could only point to the Prussian province of Silesia. Already in 1811 the French armies poured once more into Prussia, which became their manoeuvring and recruiting ground; and considerable drafts took place from the French troops in the Peninsula. The war in Spain and Portugal had in the meantime been marked by chequered fortune and important events which, viewed in different lights, encouraged both Napoleon and Alexander in their projects, the one of invasion the other of defence. In the spring of 1809, Sir Arthur Wellesley landed once more with an army in Lisbon. After seeing the English embark at Corunna, Soult had marched south and occupied Oporto. The Spanish generals made efforts to maintain themselves in the central provinces; but they were beaten in successive battles, and King Joseph was once more enthroned at Madrid. The English general at the head, not only of his own native army, but of the Portuguese which had been organised and placed under the British commander, first advanced against Soult, and drove him back into Gallicia. He then, in co-operation with the Spanish generals, entered Spain, with the hope of again expelling the intrusive king from Madrid. The French armies and generals were at the time scattered, and had King Joseph waited for their concentration, Wellesley and the Spaniards must either have been beaten or have withdrawn. The new King of Spain was too clate, and with French troops more than doubling the British, 40,000 to 20,000-the Spaniards, however, making both armies pretty equal-he attacked his allied enemies on one of the last days of June at Talavera. The Spaniards were posted with their right upon the Tagus, the English on hills in continuance of their line. Victor, Duc de Bellune, really commanded the French, and during the evening of one day, and the CHAP. whole of the next, he directed a series of attacks upon XLIII the British positions. But these were defended with extraordinary skill and gallantry, the infantry repelling each assault, and the cavalry rushing upon the French columns as they failed and withdrew.* The victory of Talavera was complete, and its effect upon the minds of the sovereigns of the north of Europe most important. Each asked himself why Russia and Prussia might not resist the French generals and legions, as well as Wellington and his English army had done? But for all his victory Wellington was obliged to retreat into Portugal, being unable to face the masses of the enemy which flocked to the Tagus. Napoleon had obtained a great increase of power and renown, first by his defeat of Austria at Wagram, and then by his marriage, which seemed to give to him the entire resources of Austria. He was incensed with Russia, but ere breaking with her, or proceeding to punish her, he wanted to see an end of the British in the Peninsula. Portugal seemed there as a kind of door into which they shrunk when overpowered, to reissue when any circumstance might weaken their enemy. To extirpate these from Portugal as well as from Cadiz was thus Napoleon's double purpose. To effect this, one army was despatched to Andalusia under Soult, the other, little short of 100,000 men, was entrusted to Massena, in order to accomplish what Junot had failed in, the expulsion of Wellington from Lisbon. In September, 1810, Massena advanced at the head of his large army; Ciudad Rodrigo, entrusted to the Spaniards, fell before him. He first came up with the English at Busaco, found them in their usual position on a range of heights, but as he had one-third more force than they, Massena determined on attacking. He did so, with the same result and the same experience which * Napoleon, Wellington, Thiers, Napier. XLIII. Victor had gained at Talavera, that is, a severe repulse. CHAP. After the action, Sir Arthur Wellesley retreated to the line of fortified redoubts which he had caused to be thrown up at Torres Vedras, for protecting Lisbon, whither Massena followed with some 80,000 men. But when he reconnoitred the lines, and the mode in which every point of attack was fortified and flanked, he gave up the idea of forcing them. To tarry without attack was however, impossible, the country offering no provisions; and no means being provided for the maintenance of the French thousands, Massena abandoned the enterprise, and retired in mid November, leaving the English inexpugnable in Lisbon. The year 1811 did not much advance either the Spanish or the French cause. The latter chiefly directed their efforts to the south-eastern provinces, where there was no efficient force to oppose them. Nor could the English, though they fought at Albuera, and had besieged Badajos, take as yet a permanent footing on the Spanish soil. The same year, in the north, produced a kind of sparring between the two emperors. By the spring of 1812, Napoleon had collected an army of 450,000 men in Poland and the adjoining provinces of Prussia, besides a large reserve. Not more indeed than one-half of these were French. But all the troops that Alexander could muster to oppose them scarcely exceeded the number of French in Napoleon's army. The Czar, however, concentrated his efforts to resist the formidable enemy before him, and succeeded at the very outset in winning the neutrality, if not co-operation, of natural enemies north and south of him. Sweden might have been expected to join eagerly in the French expedition. A Frenchman governed it, and its first aim would naturally have been the recovery of Finland. But Napoleon had deserted Sweden and outraged Bernadotte; the latter made offers, if the French emperor could have СНАР. XLIII. considered them.* But he scorned to treat Bernadotte as other than a mere subordinate. To show his contempt the French troops took possession of Swedish Pomerania. Bernadotte in consequence concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with Russia. Alexander at the same time conciliated Turkey by waiving the chief pretensions with which he had begun the war. It had been conducted with varying fortune, latterly to the advantage of the Russians. But Alexander had need of his troops in the north, and recalled the greater part of them in consequence from the Danube, and was obliged to abandon his hold of Moldo-Wallachia, on the basis of the Treaty of Bucharest. Peace was thus concluded between Russia and the Porte towards the end of May. Napoleon had mustered around him at Dresden all the sovereigns and princes dependent on his will. Amongst these were the King of Prussia, anxious to preserve what remained of his patrimony by obsequiousness to the great conqueror. Far other were the thoughts of his followers and ministers. They encouraged without interruption the secret societies which were forming throughout Germany, with the avowed purpose of imitating the Spaniards and ridding Germany of the French. Jerome, indeed, warned his imperial brother in January 1812, that the entire population of the country between the Rhine and Oder were ready for insurrection, so great was their despair and destitution from the military oppression under which they suffered. † Napoleon saw the great remedy that could cover all in victory, and advanced from Dresden to achieve it. In the middle of June he was on the Niemen, and issued his proclamation announcing what he styled the second Polish war. Russia, at Tilsit, he said had vowed eternal friendship with France, eternal war with England. * Bernadotte required Finland, Norway, and a subsidy-demands certainly not moderate.-Segur. † Letters of Jerome. These vows it had broken, and France had come with half a million of bayonets to demand their fulfilment. It cannot be said that the Russians showed either foresight or skill. An able plan had been laid before the Czar for imitating the defensive strategy of Lord Wellington, avoiding battle, retreating behind strongly fortified walls, and inflicting repeated loss rather than defeat upon the enemy, enticing him at the same time from his basis of operations. * Although Alexander approved of this plan, and gave the command to Barclay de Tolly, who adopted it, still neither could confess to the Russians their intention to refuse battle and retreat continually. It seemed dishonourable and discouraging. And as if to contradict it, the two Russian corps d'armée were advanced to a short distance from the frontier, one on the road to St. Petersburg, the other on that to Moscow. Alexander spoke of defending Wilna, yet when the French crossed the Niemen, it was abandoned without a blow, and both Russian armies fell back, the French divisions frequently getting before and between them, and forcing them to great circuits, disorders, and loss in their precipitate retreat. As to the strongholds behind which they might rally, they were not completed. One was an entrenched camp at Drissa: it was abandoned without a struggle. It was not till reaching Smolensko that Napoleon met with serious resistance, the two Russian armies having united notwithstanding all Napoleon's efforts to fight them separately. Even then the Russians were not half the force of the French, and it was more to satisfy their own people than with any hope of victory, that the Russian commanders gave battle to the invader. Although they had met with such slight resistance, the French had taken nearly two months (from June the 24th to August the 17th) to march from the Niemen M. Thiers attributes the plan to Phuhl, a Prussian general. Hardenburg gives Armfeld and CHAP. XLIII. |