CHAP. to Smolensko. The summer was splendid; its heat oppressive and destructive to the invading host, which found no more the homesteads and farms of Germany, or even of Poland. Russia was in comparison a waste, and its inhabitants had made it still more so by carrying away and destroying everything at the approach of the French. All the necessaries of life were wanting except meat, confined to which the French, who live on bread, experienced loathing. Illness invaded every division. It was impossible to regulate the commissariat of such a host, accustomed to live almost altogether upon the country which they traversed. Napoleon detested contractors, and would have all supplies furnished by the intendants of the army; but at last, and too late, was obliged to have recourse to the only capitalists of the country, the Jews.* Russia, in fact, was another Spain to the French. But in Spain there was fruit and bread at least, in Russia neither. In two months' march, Napoleon left well-nigh half his force behind in hospitals, when there were such, but more generally on the roads. At This state of things fully accounts for the days and weeks during which Napoleon delayed his march, first at Wilna and then at Witepsk or Smolensk. Wilna, indeed, he had been delayed by the demands of the Poles, who, under the protection of the Abbé de Pradt, had formed an Assembly at Warsaw, and who sent to demand a declaration from Napoleon restoring their ancient monarchy. Unfortunately for his reputation, as for his fortune, Napoleon hesitated. A resuscitated Poland would have given him devoted soldiers and enthusiastic support, not only from the Duchy of Warsaw but in Lithuania and Volhynia. The Emperor's evasive answer damped this ardour. If the Poles would all rise, and arm for their independence, they would obtain it, Napoleon said. But he could not deprive * Segur. XLIII. Austria of Gallicia, nor deprive himself, he hinted, of CHAP. all hope of an accord with Russia, by resuscitating an independent Poland. He accordingly established a provisional government in Lithuania to collect its revenues for his own army, not to reconstitute it as a part of Poland. At Witepsk the cause of the delay was other; the necessity of putting a stop to disturbance and desertion, of giving stragglers time to rejoin their corps, and to devise more efficient modes of provisioning the army. The Russian generals Barclay and Bagration had united their forces. And such was the impatience of their soldiers at the unbroken retreat, that it became necessary to adopt a bolder system. Whilst the Russian generals and high officers were thus clamouring to be led to the combat, those of a similar rank in the French army deprecated its further advance, at least for that season. At one moment Napoleon himself was of the same sentiment. Unbuckling his sword and flinging it on his maps he declared that the campaign of 1812 was over. He proposed maintaining his position, fortifying himself there, restoring order in his rear, and wearing out Russian enthusiasm by a prolonged occupation of the country. But what would the French at home say to a campaign without a victory? It was worse indeed than that, for Lord Wellington had defeated Marmont towards the end of July in the battle of Salamanca. To pause on the Dwina in August, implied the necessity of remaining there till April, seven or eight months of inaction, during which there was too much at stake to allow of the Emperor's absenting himself. Instead, therefore, of halting at Witepsk, Napoleon conceived a plan of passing the Dnieper without the enemy being aware, and surprising Smolensko ere they could arrive to its succour. As usual in this war, he only came in sight of the city to find Barclay and Segur. XLIII. CHAP. Bagration on the heights beyond it, and one of their divisions pouring in to defend it. His marshals attacked and carried the suburbs, not without conflict and loss. In the night the Russians showed their enemies the reception they were to meet with in great cities. They set fire to Smolensko as they evacuated it, and the French could but take possession of its smoking ruins (August 18). The capture cost some seven or eight thousand men, and still the enemy escaped. But Napoleon was somewhat consoled for the failure of his plans by learning that St. Cyr, commanding the left wing, had beaten Wittgenstein at Polotsk on the same day, the 18th, and maintained the superiority of the French arms. Meantime a change took place in the Russian command. Barclay, disliked as a Livonian and a German, and still more from his policy of always retreating and avoiding battle, was replaced by Kutusoff, a thorough Russian, who had been successful in Wallachia against the Turks, and who had commanded at Austerlitz without being responsible for its fatal manœuvres. Though old and obese, Kutusoff took the command for the purpose of giving battle, which indeed then began no longer to be an act of imprudence, for the French army had dwindled down to 140,000, of course little more than 100,000 being able to be brought into line. And this number the Russians under Kutusoff equalled upon the field, which he chose at Borodino. This was a strong position, crowning a line of hills, with a stream called the Kolotza flowing at the foot in front of the Russian right towards the river Moskwa. The Russian centre and left, with a ravine between them leading to the village of Semenoffskoie were defended, the first by a large redoubt, the latter by an advanced battery and works called flèches. Napoleon no sooner surveyed this position in the afternoon of the 5th the he ordered the latter battery to be carried. His order was accomplished, but not till after a severe struggle. The next day, the 6th, passed without any engagement; Napoleon issued a proclamation to his soldiers telling them to retain their character for courage so as to be able to boast of their presence in that great battle fought under the walls of Moscow.* Whilst the French Emperor thus called forth the efforts of his soldiers in the name of glory, Kutusoff paraded his ranks, preceded by the Holy Image of the Virgin, rescued from Smolensko. The battle of Borodino, or of the Moskwa, was commenced on the morning of the 7th by Eugène Beauharnais in the centre assailing the great redoubt, and by Davoust and Ney attacking the Russian left and its flèches. Bagration defended them with obstinacy, and when he lost, retook them; but he was borne mortally wounded from the field, and by the afternoon the French were masters of his position. The grand redoubt, also taken and retaken, remained longer in the hands of the Russians who occupied the line of heights immediately behind. Ney and Murat made strenuous efforts to penetrate through the ravine between the grand redoubt and the Russian left, but Kutusoff continually filled up the gaps they made by fresh troops from his unattacked right. Ney and Murat sent repeated entreaties to the Emperor to reinforce them with the guard, consisting of 20,000 fresh soldiers. Napoleon would not give them. And the grand redoubt was only won by a desperate effort of the French cuirassiers. Caulaincourt, brother of the Duke of Vicenza, led them, forced his way through the Russians in the ravine, and then turning entered the redoubt by its opening in the rear, but perished in the attempt. The soldiers of Eugène at the same time stormed on foot, and the redoubt was won. Here ended the success of the French. They had * This was a stretch, Moscow being seventy miles from Borodino. CHAP. XLIII. XLIII. CHAP. driven back the Russians, and remained masters of the field, but of neither guns, standards or prisoners. Some 40,000 soldiers fell on either side. It was victory, but victory dearly bought, and with little profit. It was no longer Austerlitz or Friedland, but mutual butchery. Even had Napoleon allowed his guard to charge and drive the Russians from the second line of heights, where was the profit, but to add to the list of dead and wounded, a great number on both sides? As it was, the battle opened the possession of Moscow to the French. Kutusoff could not fight another for its defence; and if the occupation of the second Russian capital was an object to Napoleon, he certainly gained it in the bloody field of Borodino. As the French advanced on the road to Moscow in pursuit of the enemy there was little exultation amongst them. They had left ten generals dead upon the field besides fourteen wounded. Such sacrifices, joined to those of men and officers, portended a war of extermination, not of glory. Still hope gleamed upon them, when in a week after the battle of Borodino the innumerable gilt steeples and cupolas of Moscow shone before them in the eastern sun. The entrance was, however, not jubilant. The entire population, save the very dregs, had vanished. There was no offer of keys, no submission of a municipality. The Emperor rode through empty streets to take up his quarters in the Kremlin, where on the first evening of repose he heard a cry of fire. It was the spirit store. By and by it was the bazaar, lately constructed. The flames were not left to accomplish the work of destruction alone. The soldiers and the rabble soon joined in it, from cupidity, resentment, or despair. All sought booty, and thought little of life, their own, or that of others. Churches there were in hundreds, offering richer spoil than even palaces, and the French were soon in possession of more than they * Segur, Labaume, Napoleon's Despatches and Correspondence. |