wards Berlin, and another too far eastward to be within. succour or within call. But one of his objects was, not to allow his enemies to communicate with each other, or manœuvre in conjunction, when closing upon him. The truth, however, was, that Napoleon's genius was for offensive war, whilst his circumstances now reduced him to a defensive one, to which he could not reconcile either his tactics or his pride. He first launched his army against Blücher, and drove him back, but was recalled to defend Dresden from the Austro-Russians, who, emerging from Bohemia, had come to crown the hills around that capital with their legions.

This the first bearding of the lion by the allies, relying on their strength, proved exceedingly disastrous to them. Napoleon re-entered Dresden in the forenoon of the 26th. In the afternoon of the same day, the allies, descending from the heights, directed their attack bravely against all the gates. They imagined that St. Cyr's division alone occupied and defended the city. They soon perceived their mistake from the issue of French columns from every gate, which drove the allies back to their positions on the hills. Having thus effectually defended Dresden on the day of his return to it, Napoleon the next morning, the 27th, assumed the offensive and attacked simultaneously the right and left of his enemies, whilst the great park of his artillery played upon their centre. From one of the discharges, General Moreau, then accompanying the Emperor Alexander, had his limbs shattered by a ball. The French perceived that some general had fallen, but did not know who, till a dog with the name of Moreau on its collar, strayed within the lines. The German poet Körner perished about the same time. The chief honour of the day was for Murat, who at the head of his cavalry broke into a division of the Austrians, flung them into the valley of Plauen, and captured some 15,000. This was the signal for Schwarzenberg to

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order a retreat from Dresden behind the mountainous frontier of Bohemia.

The victory of Dresden resembled Napoleon's early triumphs. Thousands of prisoners and a great quantity of cannon were won. Whilst the allies, accusing one another as the cause of the defeat, were ready to part company. A proffer of peace at the moment by Napoleon would in all probability have been listened to. But the triumph of Dresden, obtained by Napoleon in person, was soon compensated by uniform defeat, incurred by his lieutenants one after the other.

Vandamme, posted with 40,000 men near Königstein, had menaced the rear of the allies in their attempt on Dresden. He was thus well placed to interrupt or harass their retreat. Whilst performing this latter task he pursued the Austrians over the hills, and halted half way down the declivity on finding the enemy stand their ground at its foot. Whilst thus partially engaged, another Austrian corps, which had diverged from the over-encumbered main road in its flight, came by cross mountainous paths to a position directly above the corps of Vandamme. The Austrians had thus to pass over the French in order to reach their friends; the French to do the same by the enemy above, to escape from being between two fires. The result was a horrible mêlée, in which the French division was broken and defeated, its guns abandoned, Vandamme and Haxo taken prisoners.

About the same time Macdonald had suffered a defeat from Blücher behind the Bober and the Katzbach. In an attempt to occupy Hirschberg one of his divisions had been surprised by a storm, divided by a swollen river, and the whole corps compelled to retreat with loss. Macdonald was much too far from Dresden to obtain timely succour. Napoleon committed the same fault with regard to Oudinot first and then to Ney, who were successively in command of some 70,000 men ordered to

march on Berlin. Bernadotte and Bülow barred their
with double the French force. The consequence
way
was, that Oudinot was obliged to retreat to Wittenberg,
and Ney, in resuming the enterprise, was defeated at
Dennewitz. The result of these several actions was the
French force diminishing from 360,000 to 250,000 men,
the confidence of the troops and generals diminishing
in proportion. Napoleon had triumphed when he was
present, but all his lieutenants had committed faults
and succumbed. The allies, too, had made mistakes and
suffered defeats, but they were in a situation to repair
their loss, whilst Napoleon, far from the French frontier,
could not remedy his. A band of Cossacks invaded
Westphalia and drove Jerome from his capital, whilst
Bavaria, long hesitating, at last joined its troops to the
allies.

These were so emboldened by their evident superiority of force and the general defection of the Germans, that they resolved to carry the war behind the Elbe in the rear of Napoleon, and thus force him to abandon Dresden, as well as the other fortresses on that river, which it had been his intention to hold. The Russians and Austrians, under Schwarzenberg, in pursuance of this new plan, emerged in the first days of October from Bohemia westwards of the Elbe, and directed their march upon Leipzig, whilst Blücher and his Silesian army joining that of Bülow and Bernadotte crossed the Elbe towards Wittenberg, and advanced also upon Leipzig from the north. Napoleon, in consequence, withdrew his forces also behind the Elbe, directing a portion of them upon Leipzig, with orders to defend that town against the Austrians, whilst he himself at the head of 140,000 men marched north against Bernadotte and Blücher. Whilst he hastened to come up with them. and fight them, they shrank from the encounter. And when Napoleon proposed following them north, the generals and officers around deprecated his adventuring

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so far from Leipzig and the great southern road. Whilst at Dueben, detained by torrents of rain as well as by uncertainty of the enemy's movements, his generals especially dissuaded him from venturing so far north. The Emperor, carried away by the passion of argument and contradiction, sought to show that it would be far better to march on Berlin, become master of the north, and liberate the French garrisons on the Oder and the Vistula, than to make an avowed commencement of retreat by recoiling to Leipzig. That such was not his real intention, his own correspondence and the sagacious Thiers fully prove. But his words led Fain, Caulaincourt, and others to represent Napoleon personally bent upon so mad a scheme as a march to the Oder, and themselves as compelling him to abandon such a resolution. He evidently never entertained it seriously, proposing merely to pursue Blücher and Bernadotte till he could find opportunities of bringing them to action, and then, after having won a victory, returning, by the right bank of the Elbe, to fall upon Schwarzenberg. He was unable, however, to reach either Blücher or Bernadotte, and returned to Leipzig, leaving unfortunately St. Cyr and Reynier, as well as Davoust, upon the Elbe, when the reunion of his entire force at Leipzig had become imperatively necessary to his safety.

Schwarzenberg was advancing from the south with 250,000 men, Bernadotte and Blücher from the north with 100,000. Napoleon had not more than 170,000. The first battle of Leipzig took place on the 16th of October; Napoleon commanded against the Austrians and Russians, Ney on the north against Blücher. It was a hard-fought day. The Austrian's advancing behind the Pleisse crossed or sought to cross it at

* At St. Helena, however, Napoleon spoke as if his proposed march to Berlin was serious, and as if the

subsequent disaster was occasioned by his being overruled.

Dölitz and at Connewitz, but were repulsed, and their commander Meerfeldt taken. The Russians, under Witgenstein, were well-nigh defeated. About 3 o'clock in the afternoon Napoleon broke through their centre with large masses of cavalry, and would have routed them, had not the Emperor Alexander sent forward his guards and reserves to restore the day. Still the allies on the south had not advanced their position when night fell. But on the north of Leipzig, Blücher had sorely pressed Marmont, and compelled him to abandon a large space of ground. Napoleon had lost between 20,000 and 30,000 men, and although the enemy's loss was equally great, still the gaps in their line were speedily filled, whilst to him could come no succour. He confessed this situation when he liberated the Austrian general Meerfeldt, and charged him to acquaint the Emperor Francis with his willingness to treat and to make large concessions.*

On the 17th no engagement took place, the allies expecting Bernadotte to join them. Napoleon was strongly advised to order a retreat during the night, but his reluctant pride overcame his sense of its expediency. The consequence was that another and a bloodier battle around Leipzig was fought on the 18th. At its very commencement the diminished force of the French compelled them to narrow their circle of defence. One of the most important points of this circle was held by General Reynier, a portion of whose force was Saxon. He held the roads which ran eastward from Leipzig, and formed the connecting link between Ney and Marmont on the north, and Napoleon, who was engaged with the Austrians on the south. Bernadotte entered the field by this road, and as he advanced, the Saxon soldiers of Reynier deserted the enemy. The double treason of Bernadotte acting fiercely against them, whilst the

* For these concessions, see Sir Robert Wilson's Private Diary, vol. ii. p. 172.

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