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CHAP. authority. Late in January the Prince Regent of England, in an interview with the Russian envoy, Prince Lieven, had strongly urged the expediency of having done with Napoleon altogether, and of the allies publicly declaring they would no longer treat with him. This was synonymous with a declaration in favour of the Bourbons, from which Lord Castlereagh and the Duke of Wellington both shrank, as possibly leading to a breach with Austria. Lord Castlereagh satisfied the Czar by adopting his views contingently, and couched his own in a solemn treaty, which was signed by all at Chaumont on the 1st of March. By it the four allies contracted with each other to remain united, in case of Napoleon refusing the frontier of 1790, and continue the war, till Europe was free and independent, Germany as a federation, Italy in independent states. For this end each Power was to keep on foot 100,000 men, England to pay the other three 5,000,000l. sterling annually, and that this treaty should be in force for twenty years."

The allies were willing to extend the armistice of Lusigny to all the armies, but Napoleon had limited it to those in front of Troyes, leaving himself free to attack Blücher, who was in movement towards the Marne and hoping to join Winzingerode and Bülow. Instead of advancing the negotiations, Napoleon marched upon him, drove the Prussians before him to the Aisne, and would no doubt have defeated or captured them, had not the French governor of Soissons opened its gates, thus giving the allies a bridge over the river, with the facility of uniting their forces. The attempt was every way unfortunate. In the first place, it evinced Napoleon so determined to fight rather than treat, that it mainly induced Austria to sign the treaty at Chaumont. In the next place, it irritated Napoleon and inspired him to pursue a plan which eventually proved fatal to him.

*Hardenberg, Fain, Castlereagh, Correspondence Danilesky.

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This was to carry the war momentarily into Lorraine, set СНАР. free the garrisons of the Meuse and Rhine, and through them raise his army to 100,000 or 120,000 men.* He had hoped to do this by the assistance of the army at Lyons, but Augereau, who commanded it, was at first inactive, and at last hard pressed himself. The defection of Murat prevented all succour from Italy, whilst the successes of Wellington, who in the battle of Orthez had forced the French to abandon the line of the Adour, kept back the reinforcements that Soult might otherwise have sent.

Napoleon was encouraged in his idea of crossing the Aisne, and rallying the garrisons of the north-east, by the hopes that Schwarzenberg would not advance,† and that Caulaincourt could open more successful negotiations at Chatillon; Blücher, however, was at the other side of the Aisne, and Napoleon did not fail to attack him on the 7th at Craonne. The Prussians had been so strongly reinforced that all the efforts of the French only succeeded in making them withdraw from the high plain. In the night occurred one more opportunity of obtaining peace. A courier arrived from Caulaincourt at Chatillon, to demand categorically what Napoleon insisted on. The Emperor durst not or would not precisely say. The evasion led to the breaking up of the Conference. Napoleon thought but of assaulting Blücher in Laon; whilst meditating it, he learned that Marmont's corps had been assailed in the night and put to the rout, with the loss of his artillery. It was too late to hope to capture Laon. A slight revenge was taken taken by the surprise of General St. Priest, commanding a Russian corps which had just taken possession of Rheims. The town was recaptured, and

Thiers represents this scheme as conceived somewhat later, but Napoleon, in his letter to Joseph of VOL. V.

Q

the 1st of March, plainly indicates
and declares it.-Mémoires de Jo-
seph, t. 10.
† Fain.

CHAP.
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the Russians driven from it, with the loss of their commander.

Whilst Napoleon was engaged in these vain manœuvres, the congress of Chatillon was at an end. Caulaincourt, by his master's order, had presented a contreprojet, maintaining the frontier of the Rhine, and the others replied by breaking up the conference on the following day, March 19, 1814. Nothing was left for the Austrians but to act upon the treaty of Chaumont, and advance upon Paris. The Austrian and Prussian armies had both been reinforced, and it was now resolved that they should unite and march together. Napoleon had hurried from the Marne, calculating that he could fall upon the rear of Schwarzenberg, whom he supposed to be advanced as far as Nogent. Instead of this, he fell upon the front of the Austrians, and fought with them on the 20th the murderous battle of Arcis. The chief result was to persuade Napoleon of his inability to check the enemies' advance upon Paris. And the sole plan that occurred to him was that already conceived and partially abandoned, of dashing into Lorraine, rallying the garrisons of the different fortresses, and coming back with 100,000 men on the rear and communications of the enemy. It would have been better perhaps had he persevered in these intentions. But tidings soon arrived of the panic of the Parisians and of the authorities, with the renewed intrigues of the Bourbons, encouraged by their success at Bordeaux, where the Duke d'Angoulême had declared his presence, and where the rights of his family had been acknowledged. After marching and countermarching between Vitry and St. Dizier for a full week, which was completely lost to him, Napoleon, early in the morning of the 28th, resolved to pursue the enemy to Paris.

He had given them ample time to render such resolve useless. Defeating the feeble corps of Marmont and Mortier at La Fère Champenoise, the allies arrived on the 29th before Paris, and on the 30th the attack of the

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heights north of that city began. Never was the capital CHAP. of a great military empire more utterly unprovided with the means of defence. The regular troops of the two marshals did not exceed 23,000 men. A commencement had been made of enrolling a large number of the citizens in the national guard. But there were not muskets to arm even them, much less the working classes and people of the faubourgs, who demanded and who might have most efficiently used them. Some guns were dragged up to the heights of Belleville, the boys of the Polytechnic School undertaking to serve them. Some palisades and tambours had been erected before the gates. There were neither the men nor the materials for defence. Even had these abounded, there was no influential personage or commander to direct it. King Joseph, who had returned to Paris in January, after being exiled from it, and treated with unaccountable severity, represented to Napoleon the necessity of at least one of his brothers remaining in the capital, in case of the enemy appearing or entering it. Napoleon deprecated this; an imperial commissioner would do, he said, but at length consented that Louis might remain.* He feared lest the enemy should replace him on the throne by one of his brothers. For the same reason, he ordered Joseph to remove the Empress and her son from Paris on the appearance of the enemy, as well as the ministers and grand dignitaries. Joseph passed some time on the hill of Montmartre to witness, if not direct, the defence. The heights of Romainville and Belleville were fiercely disputed against the Russians all the morning of the 30th, but Blücher poured over the plains of St. Denis to Montmartre, which put Joseph to immediate flight. Longer defence was impossible without exposing the capital to the horrors of an assault; Marmont and Mortier therefore capitulated, consenting

* Emperor's correspondence with Joseph. Memoirs of the latter.

СНАР. to withdraw the troops under their command, some

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20,000, to the south of the capital.

Whilst Schwarzenberg and Blücher were thus conquering the heights of Paris, and forcing Marmont and Mortier to capitulate, Napoleon had hastened from Troyes, with Berthier and Caulaincourt, taking the post, and following the road by Sens, Montereau, and Fontainebleau. It was only on approaching Cour-de-France towards midnight, that the travellers learned the events of the day, and the capitulation of the capital, by virtue of which the troops were then returning by the road to Fontainebleau. General Belliard, whom Napoleon first met, informed him of all. Thunderstruck, the Emperor sat for some moments silent opposite the fountains which adorn the road at Juvisy. He soon woke up with the hope that, as his troops could arrive from Troyes at Fontainebleau, he might still strike a blow at the enemy. To prevent the allied sovereigns taking any decided step, till he could do so, became his first object. And he accordingly despatched Caulaincourt to Paris, giving orders that the 20,000 men who had evacuated Paris should take post at Essonne, where in a short time the 50,000 he had left behind at Troyes could join them.

On the following day, the 31st of March, the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia made a solemn entry into Paris at the head of their troops. The Emperor of Austria remained still behind at Dijon. The emotion of the Parisians may be better conceived than depicted. The people were the most mortified. The upper ranks were gratified, as if an earthquake had passed beneath them. The middle class welcomed peace, as a substitute for glory. A review followed, after which Alexander repaired to Prince Talleyrand's, and even took up his abode there.* He was in perplexity what to do. To

* The Czar and his minister occupied all the upper part of the house, whilst Talleyrand and the pro

visional government were huddled into the entresol, of which Beugnot gives an amusing description.

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