arts of plunder and devastation than of war, they were unable to withstand the forces that were brought against them; hence they were repeatedly driven back to the mountains, from which they as repeatedly returned, whenever a favourable opportunity invited them to renew their aggressions.

In the eyes of the planters the Maroon negroes appeared as slaves, who became the property of the English by the right of conquest. And hence they concluded, that to reduce them again to bondage was an act of justice, and that even to destroy them while in this state of rebellion against their lawful masters was a meritorious deed. The Maroons, on the contrary, gloried in the efforts which they had made to break off the fetters of servitude, and viewed their depredations on the whites as acts of retaliation for the injuries they had sustained, and which, though severe in themselves, did not sufficiently compensate former wrongs.

Actuated by principles so diametrically opposite to each other, an irreconcileable hatred took place between the contending parties. The planters kept a perpetual watch to prevent the incursions of the Maroons, while these were as constantly employed in planning new schemes of plunder and revenge. Every act of violence increased the animosity of the adverse party; the virulence which rankled at heart led to new enormities, and finally produced actions on each side which human nature blushes to acknowledge.

For nearly half a century this savage warfare continued with little or no intermission. The Maroons assassinated several planters and their families, who had taken up their residence in the vicinity of those mountains which they denominated their own, and frequently cut off such of the British troops and militia as were sent out in small detachments to subdue them. The enormities which they committed generally became the heralds of alarm, and the intelligence of depredations collected the scattered soldiers, and drew them to the spot. In vain were the insurgents beaten and driven back to their mountains with loss; in vain were forts erected and patroles established at stated distances to prevent their inroads. I heir intimate acquaintance with the various defiles of the country enabled them to elude the vigilance of their opposers, and to renew their onsets on the more defenceless parts. The legislature, alarmed at the incursions of these enemies, whom the whole force of the island had not been able to subdue, passed various acts to rouse the inhabitants from their supineness, and offered considerable rewards for taking the Maroons either alive or dead. But all their efforts fell short of their expectations; their foes grew more and more turbulent, in propor

tion to the opposition which they were compelled to encounter, and derived courage from those very circumstances which were contrived to deprive them of it. The expenses of the colony in keeping up a standing army to watch all their movements, were almost immense; and the sanguinary measures to which the colonists resorted, when any prisoners fell into their hands, only exasperated the Maroons to madness, and, by maturing in their bosoms the principles of retaliation, rendered them still more savage, vindictive, and cruel. The legislature, on perceiving that the methods which they had hitherto adopted had proved ineffectual, contrived, about the year 1735, to establish another mode of warfare. The flying patroles were recalled; and a number of fortified houses were erected, defended by bastions, and strongly garrisoned; so that a chain of fortifications was stretched along the frontiers of the plantations, in the vicinity of those mountains which the Maroons inhabited, and which threatened them with a perpetual blockade.

To render these formidable preparations more cperative, the troops that were thus established in these fortified positions, for the annoyance of the common enemy, were directed to make frequent excursions into the heart of their country. The forests and mountains were ordered to be scoured, their secret haunts to be explored, and their gardens and provision-grounds to be destroyed. Thus the sword and famine were directed to enter into an alliance. In short, their efforts were calculated to carry destruction among the Maroons in all its horrible forms. To prevent these excursions from being rendered inefficient, each man was directed to take with him provisions for twenty days; and slaves were appointed to carry the burdens, lest the load might retard the progress of those who marched in arms. This method was adopted, that the want of sustenance might not compel them to relinquish their pursuit, while traversing the inhospitable mountains in quest of an implacable enemy, whom they seemed resolved to exterminate from the face of the earth.

As the Maroons were fully sensible that they were unable to withstand their pursuers by open force, they invariably had recourse to stratagem, to counterbalance their own deficiency in military tactics. Hence they divided themselves into small parties, and, availing themselves of the numerous advantages which the country afforded, annoyed the troops that had been sent against them, by unexpected sallies and artful ambuscades. To meet these manoeuvres, the soldiers were also divided into small detachments, with orders to explore the recesses of their enemies, and trace them to their retreats, as circumstances might direct. To render this service still more complete, in imitation of that unnatural cruelty which had disgraced the Spanish name, each barrack, or fortified house,

was furnished with a pack of dogs, of that species which has since been known by the name of blood-hounds. And, as if Christianity were to be implicated in the crimes of her degenerate sons, these blood-hounds were to be provided by the churchwardens of each parish in which the fortified houses were erected. These dogs were employed not only to prevent surprises in the night, but to pursue the fugitives through the pathless deserts, and to join in the conflict when a skirmish occurred we will not say to enjoy their portion of the horrid spoils of war. But even these measures eventually proved unsuccessful. The spirits of the Maroons were invincible. Fu gitive negroes supplied them with recruits, who more than restored the number that had been slain; and even their own losses inspired them with revenge, which became a ferocious substitute for more exalted courage.

The soldiers who had been imported from Europe, as well as those who had been raised in the colony, at length grew dispirited with incessant fatigues, and became dejected with the afflictions of a perpetual campaign, and with prosecuting a war to which they could perceive no termination, and from which they could gather no renown. The assembly, on being made acquainted with their condition, passed an act, about the year 1737, for the calling in of two hundred Indians from the Mosquito shore, to assist in the reduction of the Maroons. These Indians were preferred, from their being inured to the climate in which they were to act, and from their being intimately acquainted with that mode of fighting which they were called to pursue. What services these Indians might have rendered, can only be the estimate of conjecture, as they were recalled and sent back to their native country the following year. Thus much is clear: they were admirably adapted for the exploits they were imported to perform, and remained faithful to their engagements. And it is but just to state, that they were dismissed with honour, and rewarded for the services which they had rather promised than performed.

It was in the midst of these commotions, which threatened the Maroons with inevitable ruin, that the arrival of Lord Trelawney threw a new aspect on the face of affairs. This nobleman was appointed governor of Jamaica in 1738. Immediately on his arrival, those rigorous measures which his predecessors had pursued were superseded by others, at once more politic, and more congenial to the feelings of human nature. That prudent and humane commander soon perceived that both parties were heartily tired with a conflict in which each had been a loser,-in which much blood had been spilt, and an immensity of treasure wasted-and to which, notwithstanding the

measures whereto they had resorted, the most sagacious could not rationally calculate upon a termination. As to the Maroons, they had scarcely any other employment, and consequently but few things, with them, had sustained an interruption. But with the colonists the case was exactly the reverse. The military duties which they were obliged to perform, and the perpetual alarms in which they were kept, drew off their attention from agricultural and commercial pursuits; while the enormous expenses that the war occasioned, drew from the vitals of trade that wealth which alone had rendered the island valuable. The enlightened governor well knew that the Maroons, who for nearly a century past had lived upon wild fruits, had gone naked, and been inured to all the vicissitudes of the elements and weather to which they had been exposed, and who had never ceased to fight in the midst of defeats, even against superior numbers of disciplined troops, would never be subdued by open force, and to conquer them by stratagem all perceived would be a vain attempt. On these considerations, he proposed to his council, and to the legislative assembly, the prudence and necessity of having recourse to pacific overtures. The proposal met with their unanimous approbation. He therefore not only offered to the Maroons lands to cultivate, which should be deemed their own property, but engaged to guaranty that liberty and independence for which they had been so long contending. These peaceable proposals, held out by governor Trelawney, were comprised in fifteen articles; of which the following are the substance. First, All hostilities were to cease on both sides for ever. Secondly, The Maroons were to be in a perfect state of liberty and independence; and those fugitive negroes who had taken up their residence among them were to be included in the general grant, excepting such as had deserted from their masters within two years from the date of the pacification. These, who had thus deserted, should be at liberty to return to their original masters, by whom they should be pardoned, or, if they preferred remaining with the Maroons, they should be subject to their chieftains. Thirdly, They should enjoy for themselves, and posterity for ever, fifteen hundred acres of land, lying within certain boundaries specified in the treaty. Fourthly, They should be at liberty to plant coffee, cocoa, ginger, tobacco, and cotton, and to breed all sorts of cattle, and dispose of their commodities to the inhabitants of the island. Fifthly, Such of the Maroons as entered into this treaty should live in Trelawney town, and should be at liberty to hunt any where, except within three miles of a plantation. Sixthly, Those who entered into this treaty should aid and assist in killing and destroying all rebels of every description

whatsoever throughout the island, who would not accept of the same terms of accommodation which were now proposed to all. Seventhly, In case the island should be invaded by a foreign enemy, all those who submitted to these terms of pacification should repair to any part of the island which the governor might appoint, and, acting in subordination to the commander in chief, should co-operate with the regular troops in repelling the hostile armament. Eighthly, The courts of justice and law should be alike open to the aggressors and injured both of Maroons and whites; and punishment and redress should be impartially administered to all, relative to differences which might take place between them. Ninthly, In case any negro slaves should thereafter desert from their masters, and repair to the abodes of the Maroons, they should be immediately secured, and delivered up to the nearest magistrate to the place in which they were taken, who should reward the Maroons for their trouble, and reimburse their expense. Tenthly, That all negroes recently taken should immediately be given up. Eleventhly, The commander of the Maroons should wait on the governor of the island, at least once in every year, if required. Twelfthly, The Maroon chief should be at liberty to inflict any punishment he might deem proportionate to the offence, upon any of his own people, provided it did not affect their lives; but in case the culprit should be thought deserving of death, he should be delivered up into the hands of the English, who should proceed against him according to the laws then in practice relative to the free negroes. Thirteenthly, The Maroons should cut and keep open convenient roads from Trelawney town to Westmoreland and St. James's. Fourteenthly, Two white men should be appointed to reside in Trelawney town, who should be of the governor's nomination; that through the medium of these men a friendly correspondence might be preserved between the contracting parties. Fifteenthly, Certain chiefs, then nominated, should succeed each other in the command of the Maroons, in case death did not derange the order; but finally, after the decease of all, the governor for the time being should select from among their own people whomsoever he might deem qualified for the important office. This treaty was concluded March 1st, 1738.

The terms and conditions of this treaty, held out by governor Trelawney, were received on all sides with marks of the most decided approbation. The colonists, wearied out with a tedious and expensive war, to which they could otherwise see no prospect of a termination, beheld in these overtures an opportunity of making allies of men whom they had been unable to subdue, and of transforming implacable enemies into friends.