port free schools within a city; and as an instance of that character of taxes which the legislature might authorize without such vote, we would suggest that under article 8, section 9, of the constitution, the legislature might empower the city to levy a tax not to exceed twenty-five cents on the one hundred dollars for streets and other public improvements; and for either or both of these the homestead would be liable, if levied as a tax under the constitutional limitations.

The learned judge who wrote the opinion in the case of Lufkin v. Galveston, 58 Tex. 545, said, as above quoted, that "the plain import of its [the constitution's] terms is, that it is not protected from taxes that may be due 464 on it." And again he says: "Nor does it draw any distinction between general and special taxes to which it may be subject." It is not asserted that the assessment in question is a tax, general or special; but we conclude that it must have been treated as a special tax, as it is too clear for argument that it is not a general tax. Is it a special tax? If it be a special tax, then it is taxation, and would fall within the requirement, that "all taxation must be uniform and equal." If a special tax, it must be a tax for some purpose, and would come under the limitation as to taxes "for all purposes." And again, if it were a tax, though it be for a special purpose, it would be embraced in the terms of the law authorizing the collector to sell property for unpaid taxes. Our courts have held that such assessments are not included in any of these expressions, and we cannot see how it can be held to be a special tax, when it has none of the characteristics of a tax in any sense in which it is used in the constitution.

We feel constrained, upon authority and sound reasoning, to hold that the charge made against the homestead of William and Mary Higgins for the cost of the sidewalk was not a tax, general or special, within the meaning of article 16, section 50, of the constitution; and that the case of Lufkin v. Galveston, 58 Tex. 545, is in conflict with the decisions of this court, and, in so far as it holds the homestead liable to forced sale for such assessments, that case is hereby overruled.

There being no lien upon the lot sought to be subjected to sale in the case of Beaumont v. Higgins and wife, and the amount claimed being for a sum less than five hundred dollars, the judgment rendered by the court foreclosing a lien upon the lot was void, and the sale of the lot under that judgment conferred no title upon Bordages. These facts showing want of jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit appeared upon the face of the record, and the nullity of the judgment will be taken notice of by any court, and at any time.

The district court erred in rendering judgment for the plaintiff below, and the court of civil appeals erred in affirming the judgment (in which, however, both followed Lufkin v. Galveston, 58 Tex. 545), for which errors the judgments of both courts are reversed, and judgment will be here rendered that the plaintiff below, I. R. Bordages, take nothing by his suit, and that the defendants, Henry Higgins and Mary Higgins, go hence without day, and that they recover of the said I. R. Bordages all costs in this case in all the courts.

Reversed and rendered.

Denman, A. J., did not sit in this case.

HOMESTEAD-FOR WHAT CLAIMS LIABLE.-A homestead is not exempt from sale for taxes or assessments levied against it: See monographic note to Mertz v. Berry, 45 Am. St. Rep. 387, on homesteads, for what claims liable; citing Lufkin v. Galveston, 58 Tex. 545, holding that an assessment or tax levied against a homestead to cover the cost of a local improvement in constructing a sidewalk in front of it is a valid lien for which the homestead is liable, but which case is overruled in the principal one.

JUDGMENT-VOID FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION-NOTICE. A judgment showing upon its face that the court rendering it had no jurisdiction, either of the person or of the subject matter, is absolutely void: Moyer v. Bucks, 2 Ind. App. 571; 50 Am. St. Rep. 251, and note: Hope v. Blair, 105 Mo. 85; 24 Am. St. Rep. 366. A want of jurisdiction, either of the person or subject matter, appearing upon the face of the record, can be taken advantage of at any time, and in any court, where the conclusiveness of the judgment or decree is the subject of judicial inquiry: Note to Rogers v. Cady, 43 Am. St. Rep. 105. A court will recognize a want of jurisdiction even if no objection is made: State v. Van Beek, 87 Iowa, 569; 43 Am. St. Rep. 397.

NORTHSIDE RAILWAY COMPANY v. WORTHINGTON.

[88 TEXAS, 562.]

CORPORATIONS-EXERCISE OF POWERS.-While corporations are creatures of the law and can exercise such powers only as are granted by the law of their creation, an express grant of power is not necessary.

CORPORATIONS-IMPLIED POWERS.-In every express grant of power to a corporation there is implied a power to do whatever is necessary or reasonably appropriate to the exercise of the authority expressly conferred.

CORPORATIONS-IMPLIED POWERS.-A company may foster its legitimate business, whatever it is, by all the usual means, but it can go no further. If the means are such as are usually resorted to, and a direct method of accomplishing the purpose of the incorporation, they are within its powers; but if they are unusual, and tend in an indirect manner only to promote its interests, they are ultra vires.

CORPORATIONS-LIMIT OF IMPLIED POWERS.-A business corporation has implied power to do that which is reasonably

necessary to the business, or that which is usually incident to its prosecution, but this is the limit of its implied power. It cannot exercise abnormal and extraordinary powers to carry out its purpose.

CORPORATIONS-IMPLIED POWERS-BUSINESS STATED BY STATUTE.-A corporation created for the purpose of carrying on a business under a statute which merely states the nature of the business, and does not further define its powers, may exercise such powers as are reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose of its creation. It may exercise such powers as are usually incidental in practice to the prosecution of the business, but no more.

CORPORATIONS-AIDING EACH OTHER-IMPLIED POWERS. The law does not recognize a street railway company as a usual means of carrying out the purpose of a corporation organized to purchase and subdivide lands and to sell them in lots; neither can the latter corporation, without statutory authority, embark its capltal in a street railway enterprise. Neither corporation has lawful power to aid the other, though it might be mutually beneficial, as the furtherance of the interests of one is not necessary to the business of the other; but each should confine itself to its proper business, and not divert its capital or extend its credit to the assistance of the other.

CORPORATIONS — AIDING, AND BECOMING SURETY FOR, EACH OTHER-LIABILITY ON BONDS-ULTRA VIRES.If two business corporations, such as a street railway company, and a company organized to purchase and subdivide lands and to sell them in lots, borrow a sum of money, to be divided between them, and bind themselves jointly and severally for the payment thereof by the issuance of bonds which are sold below par, the bonds are not necessarily ultra vires and void as a whole because of the fact that neither corporation can lawfully divert its capital or extend its credit in aid of the other, where there is no fraud in the transaction and a fair equivalent is given for the obligations; but each company is liable for such proportion of the bonded indebtedness as the amount actually received by it bears to the amount paid for the bonds; and is not liable for more than its proportionate amount of the debt incurred.

CORPORATIONS BECOMING SURETY FOR EACH OTHER.-If two business corporations have different charter purposes, and have, therefore, no lawful right to aid or assist each other in business, one cannot, in the absence of statutory authority, become surety for the other. Hence, one of the corporations is not liable upon its indorsement of a promissory note given by the other corporation for machinery furnished to the latter for its own use.

CORPORATIONS-ULTRA VIRES CONTRACT-LIABILITY. A company organized to purchase and subdivide lands and to sell them in lots is not liable upon its joint obligation with a street-car company for the cost of street-cars furnished the railway company as the charter purposes of the two companies are different, and neither can aid the interests of the other.

Walton, Hill & Walton, C. M. Templeton, and J. C. Randolph, for the appellants, Mrs. Sallie Huffman, Northside Railway Company, and Fort Worth City Company.

Ross, Chapman & Ross, for Thomas Worthington and the American Loan and Trust Company, Trustee, appellees.

566 GAINES, C. J. The following statement of the nature and result in the trial court of this suit is taken from the brief of appellants filed in the court of civil appeals:

"This suit was instituted in December, 1891, by Thomas Worthington, one of the appellees, and plaintiff below, in the district court of Tarrant county, against the Northside Railway Company, the Fort 567 Worth City Company, the Fort Worth Street Railway Company, Mrs. Sallie Huffman, the ThompsonHouston Electric Company, Brownell Car Company, the Smith Bridge Company, and Aldace W. Caswell. The American Loan and Trust Company subsequently became a party plaintiff.

"The main suit was for judgment against the two first defendants on certain joint bonds executed by them, and to foreclose a mortgage, also jointly executed by them, on all their property, property rights, and franchises, to secure the payment of said bonds. The action against the other defendants was collateral in a great measure, if not wholly.

"The Thompson-Houston Electric Company and Brownell Car Company each by cross-bill set up alleged causes of action against the Northside Railway Company and Fort Worth City Company upon promissory notes which they allege the latter jointly executed, and each sought to foreclose a mortgage alleged to have been executed by the Northside Railway Company.

"There were interventions by other creditors and relief prayed by them, but the issues joined on pleadings of intervenors are not vital, except P. E. Lane, Wallace Hendricks, and George Hendricks, who occupy the same status as plaintiffs.

"The defendants Sallie Huffman and A. W. Caswell, who were joined by the Northside Railway Company and the Fort Worth City Company, made by their pleadings the main issues. in the case, and upon which this appeal has been taken and will be prosecuted.

"Contemporaneously with the institution of the suit, a receiver was prayed for by the plaintiffs and appointed by the court, for the benefit of all and whomsoever was concerned.

"The court appointed a master in chancery, to whom was referred all the issues made by the pleadings, including the validity of the bonds, notes, and acceptances sued on, and the deeds of trusts or mortgages given to secure the payment thereof. This master made report, but, by agreement, it was waived by all parties in so far as report was made passing on validity of the said bonds, notes, etc., and mortgage, which issue was tried as an original question by the court.

"A trial was had, the plaintiffs prevailing, securing judgment on the bonds with foreclosure of the mortgage, order of sale, etc., the holders of notes securing judgments and foreclosures as well."

The defendants Northside Railway Company, Fort Worth City Company, and Mrs. Huffman, perfected an appeal to the court of civil appeals, where the judgment of the trial court was affirmed.

The Fort Worth City Company and the Northside Street Railway were both organized under the general laws of this state which provide for the creation of private corporations—the purpose of the first, as expressed in its charter, being "the purchase, subdivision, and sale of lands in cities, towns, and villages" and that of the second, "the construction and maintenance of street railways." They were organized 568 about the same time, the stock taken by the same persons, with some unimportant exceptions, and in the same proportions. The same persons held the offices of directors, president, and secretary, respectively, in each company. The city company acquired title to a tract of land consisting of about fourteen hundred acres, lying north and northwest of the city of Fort Worth, and laid it out in streets, alleys, blocks, and lots, for the purpose of selling to settlers and of building up the suburb. The street railway was projected to extend from a point in the city to and through the city company's property. There was testimony to show that the street railway was calculated to enhance the value of the lots, if not necessary to enable the city company to sell them at a profitable price; and also that it was essential to build up the suburb in order to make the street railway a paying investment. Such was the condition of affairs when the bonds in controversy were executed. The city company needed a large sum of money to pay off an indebtedness and for other purposes, and the street railway company needed funds for the construction and equipment of its line of street railway. The officers of the two corporations thereupon agreed to issue a series of bonds, one hundred and fifty in number, and for one thousand dollars each, to be executed by the two corporations jointly, and to be secured by a mortgage on their property. The formalities of the law having been complied with, the bonds were issued and sold at ninety-five cents on the dollar, and the plaintiff Thomas Worthington became the holder of those here sued upon, one hundred and forty-two in number.

It is contended on behalf of the plaintiffs in error that the execution of the bonds was ultra vires, and that, therefore, they are void. In determining this question, we may recur to a few leading principles. Corporations are the creatures of the law, and they can only exercise such powers as are granted by the law of their creation. An express grant, however, is not necessary. In every express grant, there is implied a power to do