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would permit of the general subject of railroad management and control of railway corporations, and to make a faithful report of the results of such labors.

NATURE OF THE CONTROVERSY.

Transportation is a matter that touches, in some important way, every branch of industry and every interest of society. No community is unaffected by the cost of transportation, because none either produces all it consmues, or consumes all it produces. The same is true of each individual member of society. Hence commerce is as old as civilization, and has of necessity been as unresting as the forces of nature; plying at first upon inland seas, along the ocean shores, and upon the navigable rivers, which by a wise provision of nature open highways into the interior of continents; later still upon the oceans themselves, and last of all building for itself artificial highways over vast regions otherwise practically inaccessible.

At the beginning, these highways were canals and wagon-roads. But the former, besides being too costly for such multiplication as would accommodate all sections of country, were scarcely available for travel, and hence practically left the inhabitants of interior portions comparatively isolated, and to a great extent denied the benefits of that spirit of progress which comes of commercial activity and frequency of intercourse with other communities and nations. Thus it was that highways upon land, equal in capacity to the transportation of vast quantities of raw material and the products of manufacturing industry became a necessity. Railways are the result of this imperative demand. And the amazing rapidity with which they have multiplied, extended, and ramified over vast regions on all the continents, becoming thus the open paths of a new civilization, is the distinguishing feature of the industrial progress of this marvelous age.

It is manifest that this rapid growth of railway enterprise could not have been made without the united effort of capitalists and the expenditure of vast sums of money.

Again, it is natural that capitalists, who are few and powerful, whose chief aim it is to increase their wealth, and who, by reason of the very nature of their undertakings, must possess those other elements of strength, organization and singleness of purpose, should

use these advantages for the promotion of selfish, rather than public er.ds.

On the other hand, it is no less apparent that the great public to be served by railways, feeling the necessity of better facilities for transportation, were at first ready to make almost any concession to secure them; trusting to the self-interest of railway companies, and to the natural laws that control a free commerce, for protection against extortionate tolls. Nor is it strange that, under these circumstances, they have, in many instances, been ready to unite their smaller resources with the larger ones of the capitalists, and even make great sacrifices to secure the construction of roads that seemed otherwise impossible or in danger of indefinite postponement; or that, notwithstanding the ill success of such trials of natural-law security, yet other communities have been willing to make repetition of these experiments. And yet the futility of a reliance on such means of security is now apparent.

SELF-INTEREST AS A RELIANCE.

To a considerable extent, the interests of the railroad corporations and the public are in harmony-very much more really so than the corporations appear to believe, if we may judge from the policy they so often pursue. Thus, it is clearly for the real interest of the corporations to build good and safe roads, and upon lines that will accommodate the largest number of people and the greatest amount of traffic; and yet, practically, they not unfrequently disregard both these elements of success, and are found building very poor roads, at full cost to the stockholders, and on lines which accommodate the public less than they should. It is for their real interest to encourage the agricultural industry of a country tributary to their roads, by affording cheap facilities for the transportation of the products it may be made to yield under the stimulus of prospective rewards for the requisite labor; and yet, in some cases, they adopt tariffs which practically prevent production. It is for the real interest of railroad companies to encourage the building up of flourishing manufacturing villages along their lines by supplying the raw material and carrying away the products of their industry at as low a rate as possible; but how often do they pursue a course actually prohibitive of such new enterprises, and deadening to those that already exist! It is sometimes for their real interest to develop new commercial points, which, by their

better facilities and their quickening influence upon both productive industry and commerce, would create a traffic where none would otherwise exist; but, are they always ready to do this, even where it could be done with immediate as well as great future advantage? And if not, why not?

First, because the wisdom and foresight that should eminently characterize the management of railways are often wanting to the managers.

Secondly, because the managers are not unfrequently in their places for the sole purpose of promoting their own personal ends. But, again, there are cases in which the interests of railway corporations and the public are opposed. For example, it is the interest of the companies to prevent the building of competing roads; to hamper and embarrass rival lines already established; to force such traffic as they are able to command over as much of their own lines respectively as possible, though it be at the expense of time and other advantage on the part of the shipper.

For all these reasons, and others that might be named, the insufficiency of self-interest on the part of companies, as a protection to the public, has been long recognized.

COMPETITION AN UNCERTAIN RELIANCE.

Competition is so invariably applicable as a restraint in all sorts of trades, professions, and ordinary commercial enterprises, that it is not surprising how long it has misled the public and legislative bodies. It always serves as a protection where it is full and permanently maintained, as well in matters of transportation as in the case of the trades and most individual enterprises. Bui therein lies the difficulty: Competition implies freedom of the operator, both as to material and forces. In case of the ordinary avocations, this freedom is practically quite complete; the materials and the labor to be used can be had in the open market, and fair purchase is protected by the active interest of those who have them to sell.

To some extent, this is also true in matters of transportation. For example, there is entire freedom for all upon the high seas, and upon great inland waters, where the laws of nations or the treaties of nations, and the universal sentiment of civilized peoples defend the rights of all alike. These are nature's highways which neither. capitalist nor potentate can shut up for his own exclusive use. Wherever they exist they insure a fair rate of transportation upon

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the water; first, because any one able to build a vessel can compete for a share of the carriage; secondly, because of the facility with which vessels can be moved from an over-crowded and nonpaying locality or traffic to a better, and thus enable the trader to employ his capital all the year round.

The same is true, to a less extent, of navigable rivers; while the current flows, they are open to the enterprise of one citizen as well as another.

Where any one

of these means of transportation exists, there is not only good security against extortionate charges on such highway, but there is also greater security against such charges on railways; inasmuch as, by a law of commerce, the price at which any necessity can be supplied to a great market by one line of transportation sets a practical limit to the rate of transportation by another line.

So far as this influence relates to rivers, it is limited by this circumstance: that, in cold climates like our own, it is only operative for a part of the season. While in the case of canals, there are still other circumstances limiting it, namely, the fact that they are generally so limited in extent as to be only very local, as well as temporary, in their influence; and the other fact that, being artificial highways, they are property, and hence liable to fall into the very hands they were designed to restrain.

We may consider it, therefore, a decision of reason as well as experience, that while competition upon ocean or inland sea is both potent and permanent as to its own field of operations, and is also potent as against railway transportation wherever it can be brought to bear; and while competition by river and canal are also to a considerable extent available, they are none of them sufficient to afford the requisite security.

Still less reliable is competition between railway companies. Here the natural law is not certainly operative. There is neither freedom of means nor of forces. A road once built cannot be placed in any market the company pleases and compete for freight, as the manufacturer can compete for his raw material, or the merchant vessel for a cargo. It can only offer its facilities and bide its time. Should no rival spring up to contest the field, it can command the produce of the section of country tributary to it, on its own terms, so that it leaves barely margin of profit enough to the producer and dealer to induce production and delivery. And if,

bye and bye, a rival line should be established, and the traffic should be less than equal to the carrying capacity of both, the two are almost sure, after fruitless efforts to drive each other from the field, to form a combination, agreeing either to demand equal rates agreed upon, or to "pool" their earnings.

This point having been reached, the public have no ground of hope except in the possibility of a falling out of the companies and renewal of the competition which gave origin to the compact. For the companies themselves, there seems, in most cases, to be no safety but in a still closer union, under an act of consolidation from which there is no breaking away.

The controversy, then, is irrepressible, if the reliance is upon economical laws alone; being a conflict between the necessities of soeiety, on the one hand, and the natural selfishness of strong monopolies on the other.

OTHER DIFFICULTIES.-EVILS OF RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION AND MANAGEMENT.

To make the matter worse, the roads are often so constructed, and railway transportation so managed, as to almost compel heavy exactions on the part of the railway companies, and lead to dissatisfaction and condemnation on the part of the public.

INDIVIDUAL INTEREST, WITH NO HARMONIZING GENERAL CONTROL.

An overshadowing evil, attendant upon railway construction and operation, is the fact that all railway enterprise is the result of individual interest and purpose, subject to no harmonizing general control. The consequences are comparative disorder, the misapplication or actual waste of much energy and capital, and a want of economical accord in the practical administration of railway affairs. The public confidence in competition as a protection from exorbitant charges, has not only proved delusive, but has also furnished occasion for the payment of increased interest upon an increased capital. In some portions of our state, and, in one notable instance, between one city of our state and one city of another state, we find two roads running where one would equally suffice, and the public charged with the obligation of paying interest upon the capital of both. To avoid inconvenience and losses consequent upon discordant management, the companies themselves are impell

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