Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917–1945

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Cornell University Press, 2003 M03 28 - 304 páginas

The U.S. Army entered World War II unprepared. In addition, lacking Germany's blitzkrieg approach of coordinated armor and air power, the army was organized to fight two wars: one on the ground and one in the air. Previous commentators have blamed Congressional funding and public apathy for the army's unprepared state. David E. Johnson believes instead that the principal causes were internal: army culture and bureaucracy, and their combined impact on the development of weapons and doctrine.

Johnson examines the U.S. Army's innovations for both armor and aviation between the world wars, arguing that the tank became a captive of the conservative infantry and cavalry branches, while the airplane's development was channeled by air power insurgents bent on creating an independent air force. He maintains that as a consequence, the tank's potential was hindered by the traditional arms, while air power advocates focused mainly on proving the decisiveness of strategic bombing, neglecting the mission of tactical support for ground troops. Minimal interaction between ground and air officers resulted in insufficient cooperation between armored forces and air forces.

Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers makes a major contribution to a new understanding of both the creation of the modern U.S. Army and the Army's performance in World War II. The book also provides important insights for future military innovation.

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Crítica de los usuarios  - CharlesFerdinand - LibraryThing

The First World War abruptly propelled the US Army into the 20th Century. One of the main questions was how to deal with new technologies, mainly tanks and aircraft. More specifically, the Army faced ... Leer comentario completo

Contenido

Introduction
1
America the Army and the Great War
19
The Tank Corps
30
The Air Service
40
The Army in the Aftermath of the Great War
54
Peace and Quiet
63
Infantry Tanks
72
The Failed Revolution and the Evolution of Air Force
81
Autonomous Air Power
153
A Crisis in the War Department
176
The Arsenal of Attrition
187
Armored Bludgeon
189
Air Force Triumphant
202
Coequal Land Power and Air Power
212
Conclusion
218
Notes
231

The War Department
95
From Domestic Depression to International Crusade
107
Alternatives for Armor
116
Primary Sources
277
Index
285
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Acerca del autor (2003)

David E. Johnson is a senior research staff member at RAND. A retired U.S. Army field artillery colonel, he served in a variety of command and staff assignments in the United States, Korea, Germany, and Hawaii. His last assignment was at the National Defense University, where he served as Director of Academic Affairs, Chief of Staff, and Professor.

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