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futes himself, and no reliance can be placed upon his words!" We recommend to these persons a little deeper study of character. Mr Disraeli is not exactly a fool, and the political knavery with which his hostile critics charge him is the knavery of a simpleton.

Let us add that the defect of speech to which we refer Mr Disraeli is rapidly overcoming. It was never important enough to influence unprejudiced observers, who, in his sharp antitheses and brilliant epigrams, found more than enough to compensate for the absence of philosophical precision. But the Philistines have come down upon him so often for a word, that he has learned to be cautious, and sometimes expresses himself in the House of Commons with painful hesitation. We point now to a habit which he has latterly acquired of standing continually on guard. When he is about to express an opinion, he is at great pains to call attention to the fact that he is not giving an opinion on some other question, that on this other subject he reserves the statement of his views, that on a third point he is not yet in a position to speak, and that on a fourth particular he is equally unconfessed. So he goes on sometimes through the whole speech, insisting in the most lawyer-like way on the fact that no one is to take him up for the expression of an opinion on a collateral subject, with which, however important it may be, he has for the present nothing to do. Hostile critics listen, and what do they say? "Ah, there you see the insincerity of the man! See how unwilling he is to commit himself to an opinion. He is playing a game. He is waiting to see what his opponent will say, and then he will know what course to take for himself—yes or no. A genuine Englishman would be all frankness, and would blurt out his opinions, ay or no, without regard to consequences. This man has no opinions -no principles, and he won't admit anything that he is not compelled to admit." So they go on finding fault with whatever Mr Disraeli does. There was a time when he was too communicative, spoke too freely, and

then he was contradictory, senseless, and unprincipled. Now that he has learned to be cautious, weighs his words, and anxiously tells his critics not to accuse him of saying what he has not said, it is but another proof of insincerity, and it is wonderful that the Tory party can have faith in a leader so slippery. It is not by such prejudiced judgments as these that we shall ever attain to a knowledge of character. We might as well say at once that Mr Disraeli has intimate relations with the Archfiend, and that his success in life is a continual miracle, which is only to be accounted for by the hypothesis of a dreadful bargain concluded between him and the Tempter. This would be a far more simple and reasonable explanation of his position at the head of the great Tory party than the stupid and malignant theory, that the party are so barren of brains and so destitute of pride as to be compelled in their desperation to submit to the dictation of a clever but unprincipled jockey, who can ride them to the winning-post-that is, into the pleasures of office-although he cannot teach them to be statesmen. Malignant theories are generally stupid, and blind hatred is as foolish as blind love, but not nearly so respectable. Instead of wildly abusing Mr Disraeli, it would be well if his critics would first attempt to understand him. It is amusing to note how much he puzzles ordinary observers, who, adopting his own phrase, learn to speak of him as the

Asian Mystery." Those who dislike mysteries as not complimentary to their pride of intellect, get rid of this one in very summary fashion, by at once pronouncing Mr Disraeli to be an impostor without the incumbrance of principles. We admire the superior wisdom of those philosophers who quietly ignore the facts which they cannot explain, but we prefer to take a more vulgar view of Mr Disraeli's character. We do not expect to find the temper of a fanatic in a man who has sifted questions with so much care as he has displayed, and who has seen cause to reject not a few of the opinions which, in the course of his prolonged researches, he had temporarily played

with, if not embraced. On a good number of questions we have no doubt that true wisdom and large experience have taught him to cease from dogmatism; but if we do not expect him to be a political fanatic, most certainly, on the other hand, he is not a political infidel. In these days of political scepticism and Laodicean faith, the anxiety which he has all through his life displayed to get at the truth of things-to escape from shams and to seize realities-to penetrate through forms to the substance of events, and on every subject upon which he has to decide to take the philosophical as well as the practical view-is entirely to his credit, and places him in favourable contrast to not a few of our leading statesmen. If he has not been uniformly successful in arriving at the right conclusion, the earnestness of his endeavours ought to have saved him from the accusation of being indifferent to principles; and the peculiarity of that Orientalism which enters into his diction, giving it much of its charm, will mislead no candid person, while it accounts for a good many apparent inconsistencies. In the mean time, we may state that the great bulk of the Tory party take a view of Mr Disraeli's character somewhat different from that of his too captious critics, that they are not unmindful of his services, and that they are prepared to give him their cordial support. Now, indeed, if ever, the party ought to be united, for all over Europe the clouds are gathering, and the storm seems ready to burst. It is impossible, in the tail of an article, to do more than glance at the mighty issues which are at stake, when at one and the same

moment Naples is threatened with dissolution, Venetia is waiting to be released, Hungary is on the point of rising, Austria lies prostrate, Russia again discusses the Turkish question, Germany is disquieted, the annexation of Belgium to France is openly mooted; Spain has been tasting blood, and has patched up an unsatisfactory peace; England proposes to spend in this year alone £42,000,000 on land and sea forces, and on fortifications; and France is building ships, forging cannon, and organising troops, as if she were preparing for the whole world in arms. The gravity of the situation cannot be exaggerated, and we ask for leaders those who have faith in our institutions, and who represent the manly instincts of our country,-not those who would set class against class, who would despoil the rich, who would flatter the poor, who cry,

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Peace, peace, when there is no peace," and not those who (albeit their experience is great, and their individual tendencies are right) depend for their support on the demagogues and dreamers that preach such folly. If Lord Palmerston's Government is to receive our support, it must be as the exponent of Conservative principles, and as the guardians of the national honour. If submission to the views of Mr Bright, and to the fascination of Mr Gladstone's dreams, be essential to the integrity of the Cabinet, the sooner it is displaced the better; and we conceive that there would be not a few moderate Whigs willing to co-operate with the Tory party in supporting a Government strong in administrative ability, wise in its principles, and patriotic in its aims.

Printed by William Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh.

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ACCORDING to the practice of Continental nations, the "Report of the Commissioners appointed to consider the Defences of the United Kingdom" should be carefully locked up in the office of our Minister for War; and the works they recommend, both while in progress and when completed, should be jealously guarded from the inspection of strangers. Our Government has acted wisely in putting aside such prejudices, and boldly declaring what is considered necessary to render our dockyards secure. An attempt at secresy would have been a mere pretence, while any foreigner can hire a boat at Portsmouth and cruise about Spithead roadstead, counting the tiers of guns till sea-sickness compelled him to put back. The subject can now be well ventilated by the daily and periodical press, both at home and abroad, and we may get a few useful hints from the other side of the Channel-Fas est ab hoste docere. We hope our allies will pardon the expression. But it is a perfect misnomer to call this a Report on the Defences of the United Kingdom;" it is a report on the defences of the dockyards alone. "The defence of London," say the Commissioners, "has not been brought under our consideration." We are not told why Mr Sidney Herbert's instructions confined the Com

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VOL. LXXXVIII.—NO. DXXXVIII.

missioners' attention to certain localities, instead of calling on them for a general scheme to resist invasion. But we may guess with tolerable certainty that Government considered it better to put forward this Report (which is so far very useful) as a feeler, and accustom the public to the subject. In no other way can we account for their taking such care of the pence, and letting the pound take care of itself. Government knew very well that, once they had directed serious attention to the subject, no other result could follow the publication of this Report than a general outcry for a comprehensive scheme. There have been half-adozen pamphlets on the defence of our shores and metropolis, bearing, or which might have borne, wellknown names. At least as many others must have been drawn up officially, for the private information of the Inspector-General of Fortifications, and military authorities. Let all of these be now put into the hands of a commission, who will make such further examination of individuals and localities as they consider necessary, and tell us plainly what we ought to do, and what we shall have to pay. In such a delicate matter we see no objection to Ministers giving us the reports by two instalments, provided they do not procrastinate

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too long; only we must decline to reciprocate our instalments shall be paid when we know what Mr Mantalini terms the "demd total."

Although the Commissioners have offered no suggestions for the defence of London, they kindly inform us of the dreadful calamities which its capture would involve. Lord Overstone was asked his opinion on the matter, and a reply is published, in which he does not endeavour to soothe our apprehensions. If a timid capitalist or shipowner, therefore, dips into the pages of this Report, to see how the Commissioners propose protecting his safe-room in Lombard Street, or merchantmen at Blackwall, he will meet with disappointment. Instead of an antidote, he will only learn the virulence of the poison. But he may comfort himself with Lord Overstone's assurance, that if the French take London, the Londoners will not fall alone. Provincial competitors and correspondents must share their fate; and ruin, disaster, and national degradation be the common lot of Englishmen.

We shall first examine the Commissioners' Report, and then offer some further remarks on invasion generally, especially as connected with the duties of volunteers.

We shall assume throughout that an invader of England must be a Frenchman. This should excite no angry feelings; it is paying them a handsome compliment, and does not involve the converse that a Frenchman must be an invader of England. France would be extremely angry if we supposed any other nation dared plunge into an abyss on whose brink the great Napoleon paused. No one expects to see Don Cossacks prowling about the banks of the Thames, or the Great Eastern bringing over General Harney with an American division on her return trip. French authors write with such agreeable candour of fighting a bataille heureuse in Surrey, and making a hop-skipand-jump to London afterwards, that it is only fair to say what welcome they shall receive.

The dockyards of the United Kingdom, Pembroke excepted, are south of the Thames and Bristol Channel. The principal is Portsmouth, "not

only as regards its capabilities for building, repairing, and refitting ships of war, and the vast amount of stores of every denomination collected there for the service of the fleet, but also from its central position on the south coast of England." Plymouth is "the second great naval arsenal and port for men-of-war in the United Kingdom." Pembroke is "not a fitting-out yard, but its capabilities as a building-yard are greater than those of any other of our great naval establishments." Chatham and Sheerness are on the Medway, the former a building-yard, the latter "inferior in importance to the other naval dockyards." Woolwich is important as "a building and steam yard," besides its enormous arsenal, whence all our artillery equipments for land and sea service are supplied. Deptford on the Thames, above Woolwich, is a small building-yard, but large victualling establishment. Lastly, Haulbowline, in Cork harbour, affords means of "refitting, coaling, and provisioning the fleet." The Commissioners observe that, 66 without under-estimating the resources of the Thames, the Mersey, the Clyde, and other great centres of the commercial marine, we believe that the specialities of the royal navy are such as to render it impossible for any or all of them to make up for the loss of any of our dockyards."

The Commissioners direct their attention, in examining and reporting on each of the dockyards, to the seaward defences which are required against a purely naval force; and to the landward defences, which would only be necessary in case of actual invasion. Between the two there is a vast difference. For an invasion by land immense preparations must be made. Infantry, cavalry, and artillery must be embarked in France, and disembarked in England-operations requiring the greatest nicety, liable to be thwarted by the weather in spite of all the appliances of steam, and utterly impracticable if a superior naval force was anywhere within summons. But however great our naval superiority, our ships cannot at all times prevent an enemy from shelling our dockyards, if the dockyards look to the ships alone for

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protection. If our Channel fleet was at Cork, or even at Plymouth, the French admiral might get up steam in Cherbourg at midnight, and be abreast of Portsmouth by daybreak. It would be intolerable to allow him four or five hours to shell the dockyard before our fleet came up. The Commissioners justly remark that "to station permanently at each of our dockyards and arsenals a naval force sufficient for its defence, and having no other object, would be inconsistent with the duties of a fleet, and would, in fact, be using the navy to maintain the dockyards, instead of the dockyards to maintain the fleet." They recommend extensive additions to the seaward defences of our dockyards, for "in their present state an enemy might, in the temporary absence of our fleet, or in the event of any contingency giving him command of the Channel, destroy any of these establishments without the necessity of landing upon our shores." The forts which it is proposed to erect for the purpose of guarding the entrances to our dockyards, would be somewhat similar to those which kept our fleet at bay before Cronstadt and Sebastopol, modified to suit the localities. The Thames and Medway would both be further closed by a floating boom or barrier moored across the river in time of war. The Commissioners, for sundry good reasons, do not recommend the adoption of stationary floating batteries under any circumstances, but they describe a movable floating battery, or steam-ship, "which they conceive would be highly efficient for defensive purposes. It may be described as a powerful iron-sided steam-vessel, capable alike of maintaining a fixed position, or manoeuvring in a general engagement, mounting from twelve to twenty guns, having a speed of from eight to ten knots, and of as light a draught of water as is consistent with other good qualities." These vessels, intended exclusively for coasting purposes, would be "enabled to avoid an attack of a su perior force by retreating into shoal water, to which the sea-going vessels of the enemy would be prevented from following them, owing to their

VOL LXXXVIII.-NO. DXXXVIII.

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greater draught of water. should be divested of all qualities that are not necessary for this kind of service, in order to reduce the expense of building, and to prevent them from being detached on other duties."

Most of our readers would not thank us for entering into the details of the Commissioners' proposals regarding the landward defences. Those who desire to study the subject closely will find means of doing so in the pages and maps of the Bluebook. In support of our proposition, that the question of landward defences requires a wider investigation, which should fully embrace the inquiry of how many troops the nation can furnish, we shall give some of the answers made by Sir John Burgoyne, one of the very first soldiers in Europe.

To render Portsmouth secure against a distant bombardment, certain heights, called Portsdown Heights, must be occupied; but the position is very extensive-not less than seven miles. Sir J. Burgoyne objects to fortifying them, because he does not believe the requisite garrison of 20,000 men would be forthcoming. "My objection to

Portsdown is the vast extent of the place. I cannot see what chance you would have of ever finding a garrison which would be equal to covering such an extent of defences."

always reckon upon having, in militia "Q. Do you not think that we might levies, dock brigades, and volunteers, a force of 20,000 men in Portsmouth?

"A. If you can do that, then my objec tion as to Portsdown Hill is removed; but my fear would be of establishing works permanently, at a very considerable expense, and afterwards perhaps being forced to abandon them from want of troops. I do not expect that you would get a force of 20,000 men for Portsmouth, because Portsmouth would

not be attacked unless a great invasion took place. You would have the militia probably with your field army, as they would be a very valuable force."

At Plymouth the proposed lines are four miles long. Sir J. Burgoyne says the position would be more advantageous (than Portsdown), owing to its smaller extent; "but there is another circumstance affecting Ply

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