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out of Krasnoi, his rear-guard only fell into the hands of his opponents. The French lost in these actions two eagles, 45 guns, above 5000 killed and wounded, and about 7000 prisoners, mostly stragglers.

There can be no doubt that Kutusoff here threw away a certain opportunity of utterly destroying the army of Napoleon. But he was essentially cautious in disposition; he feared the great name of Napoleon; he would not believe in the exhausted state of the French army; and he distrusted the number of young soldiers and recruits in his own. His real views are probably given with great truth in the following words addressed by him to the Prince of Wirtemberg, and quoted by Thiers:

"Je sais que vous jeunes gens, vous medisez du rieur (c'est ainsi qu'il se qualifiait lui-même), que vous le trouvez timide, inactif. Mais vous êtes trop jeunes pour juger une telle question. L'ennemi qui se retire est plus terrible que vous ne croyez, et s'il se retournait, aucun de vous ne tiendrait tête à sa fureur. Pourvu que je le ramène ruiné' sur la Berezina, ma tache sera remplic. Voila ce que je dois à ma patrie, et celà, je le ferai."(Thiers, xiv. 552.)

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But Ney's corps still remained to come up from Smolensko, and by Napoleon's retreat and the Russian occupation of Krasnoi, it was entirely cut off. Its destruction appeared inevitable. But Ney had a soul which no difficulties could overcome, and no dangers could daunt. He endeavoured at first to force a passage. But, says Wilson

"Forty pieces of cannon loaded with grape simultaneously on the instant vomited their flames, and poured their deadly shower on the assailants. The survivors intrepidly rushed forward with desperate energy; part reached the crest of the hill, and almost touched the batteries. The Russians most in advance, shouting their huzza, sprang forward with fixed bayonets, and without firing a musket. A sanguinary but short struggle ensued: the enemy could not maintain their footing, and were driven headlong

down the ravine. The brow and sides

of the hill were covered with dead and dying; all the Russian arms were dripping with gore, and the wounded, as they lay bleeding and shivering on the snow, called for death!' as the greatest

mercy that could be ministered in their hopeless state."-(WILSON, 279.)

That night (19th November), Ney, even in these desperate circumstances, disdaining to surrender, set out with 3000 combatants and as many followers (all that remained able to march out of 7000 soldiers and as many stragglers who had left Smolensko), and, turning to his right, moved through the darkness to the Dnieper. Abandoning on its banks all his artillery and waggons, he was able to pass most of his men on the thin and bending ice, and, pressing on down its right bank, after enduring the most frightful hardships in forcing his way across country enveloped by hordes of Cossacks, he succeeded on the 21st in joining Napoleon near Orcha. "I have two hundred millions in the vaults of the Tuileries," said the French Emperor on hearing of his arrival; "I would have given them all to save Marshal Ney."

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Napoleon, who had meanwhile crossed the Dnieper unmolested at Orcha, endeavoured to rally his army there, and restore some order to its ranks by means of a regular distribution of provisions from its magazines. But it was all in vain. stragglers would not rejoin their colours, and the most alarming intelligence came in from the rear. Tchichagoff had captured Minsk, with all its immense stores, and was advancing straight on Borissow, on the Berezina, where was the only bridge by which Napoleon could pass; while, on the other side, Victor and Oudinot had made a joint attack on Wittgenstein, and been defeated. There was not a moment to lose. Setting out on the 20th from Orcha, Napoleon on the 22d received at Toloczin the frightful news that Tchichagoff had made himself master of Borissow, and was in possession of the only bridge by which the deep stream of the Berezina could be passed. All hope seemed now over. The Cauddine forts, in all their bitterness, appeared inevitable. But Napoleon's vigour shone brightly out. Orders were despatched to Oudinot to move by forced marches on Borissow, and endeavour to recover the bridge;

while Victor was directed to cover the flank of the Grand Army against Wittgenstein, and, when it had filed past, follow as rear-guard. Oudinot's advanced guard, attacking with vigour, drove the Russians out of Borissow and over the river, but they destroyed the bridge as they crossed, and drew up on the other bank of the Berezina, to defend the passage of the stream and bar the road to France.

Napoleon's position was now all but desperate. In his front was the broad, deep, and bridgeless stream of the Berezina, guarded by Tchichagoff with 32,000 men. Descending on his right was Wittgenstein with an equal force; on his rear hung Milarado witch, detached by Kutusoff, with 10,000 men; while the main Russian army, which had discontinued its direct pursuit at Krasnoi, lay at Kopys, on the Dnieper. His own force did not exceed 40,000 combatants and as many stragglers, including the two fresh corps of Victor and Oudinot. His measures were taken with all his early genius and vigour. He fixed upon Studianka, about twelve miles above Borrissow, as the point of passage. Thither General Eblé, with all the engineers of the army, was sent to construct bridges on piles. But the whole mass of the troops were directed on Borissow, while ostentatious preparations were made for throwing a bridge below that place. This fortunately entirely deceived the Russians. Kutusoff having got, as he thought, certain information that the French intended to pass at Berezino, on the lower Berezina, ordered Tchichagoff to keep his troops in that direction to oppose them. This drew him off from the upper course of the river, and enabled Eblé to construct his bridges unmolested. Oudinot, whose corps now formed the van-guard of the army, crossed on the 26th. On the 27th, the main body of the French passed, but Partonneaux's division of Victor's corps, which had been left as a rearguard in Borissow to impose upon the

enemy, was assailed when on its march to Studienka, and entirely destroyed. The next day the Russian general, who had now got certain

information of the passage, assailed Napoleon on both banks of the river. Wittgenstein fell upon his rear-guard, under Victor, on the left bank. Tchichagoff assailed his main body, and more especially Oudinot and Ney, on the right. Tchichagoff was repulsed after a severe contest; but towards evening Victor was driven back on the bridges by Wittgenstein. At nine o'clock in the evening he passed the river. The two bridges had requently broken during the passage of the troops, and thousands of the stragglers who had accompanied the army had perished in their endeavours to cross; but when night came, a sort of torpor seized upon the helpless multitude, and nothing would induce them to move.

"The next morning," says Wilson, "Eblé had orders to destroy the bridges at eight o'clock, but he protracted the execution for half an hour. The flames then burst forth, and with them ascended

a wailing shriek of anguish and despair to the skies. Some sprang forward on the fiery platform, and were engulfed or consumed: some dashed into the river, and, crushed by massive blocks of ice, rolled down the stream, calling in vain for succour. It was a commingled herd of men, women, and children, doing they knew not what, flying they knew not whither, and in their delirium adding to each other's calamity. All was madness and indescribable woe. About nine, the Cossacks darted down upon their prey, and several thousands who were still frantically cleaving to the idea of an escape, found themselves thus for ever cut off from all hope."-(WILSON, 336.)

Henceforth the retreat of the Grand Army was little but a flight to Wilna: cannon and baggage were abandoned at every step. The cold increased to such a frightful pitch that the bonds of discipline and subordination were entirely broken in every corps except the Old Guard. The bivouac-fires each morning were marked by a frozen circle of dead

men.

"The cold," says Wilson, "was intense the thermometer 27° and 30° below freezing point, with sky generally clear, and a subtle, keen, razor-cutting, creeping wind, that penetrated skin, muscle, and bone to the very marrow, rendering the surface as white and the

whole limb affected as fragile as alabaster: sometimes there was a foudroyant seizure that benumbed at once the whole frame, and stiffened motionlessly the still breathing carcass, from which feet and hands were snapped off at the joints with the slightest degree of wrench, but without any pain."-(WILSON, 342.)

On the 5th December, Napoleon quitted the army at Smorgoni, and set out for Paris. The 9th, the miserable crowd of fur-covered and tattered stragglers, representing the invading host, reached Wilna. The next day they abandoned the place en route for the Niemen. Four thousand five hundred men in arms alone were grouped round the colours. Twenty thousand sick, wounded, and enfeebled were left behind in the town. Five miles beyond, a steep icecovered hill at Ponari, impassable to carriages, caused the last of the guns and the last of the treasure to be abandoned. On the evening of the 13th December, Ney, with the rearguard, recrossed the Niemen, and the next day there mustered on the Polish plains 400 infantry and 600 cavalry around the eagles of the Grand Army. Six hundred thousand men had crossed that fatal river to pour into the Russian territory.

"Thus," says Sir Robert," terminated the severest campaign of six months on record in the annals of the world. The

Russians calculated that 125,000 of the enemy perished in the different combats; that forty-eight generals, 3000 officers, and 190,000 soldiers were captured; and that 100,000 were destroyed by cold, hunger, and disease: that only 80,000, including the Austrians and Russians, repassed the frontiers; and that they (the Russians) captured seventy-five eagles or stands of colours, and 929 cannon, exclusive of those thrown into the rivers or buried; and this calculation as to totals cannot be impugned as exaggerated."(WILSON, 368.)

With regard to Kutusoff's conduct in this campaign, men will probably be for ever divided. The young and ardent, the vigorous in character, the hopeful in disposition, will condemn it in no measured terms, and point with triumph to the great results which would have followed a more vigorous course at Wiazma and Krasnoi. The old and cautious

those whom knowledge of the world has rendered distrustful of fortune, and experience of war doubtful of battle-will commend the prudence which produced such great results at so small a risk, and secured the destruction of the greatest army ever prepared by man without the hazardous chance of a general engagement. To us it appears that, in the general conduct of the campaign, the highest credit is due to Kutusoff. We know no more masterly exhibition of strategical skill than is afforded by his circular march round Moscow to the strong position of Taroutino, whence he both menaced his enemies' communications and covered his own; or his still more able pursuit of Napoleon by the parallel route of Medynsk and Jelnia, which both conducted his own army through a country abounding with supplies, and rendered any halt on the French Emperor's part impossible, from his constantly outflanking him. But, on the other hand, he twice showed a decided want of nerve when it was necessary to stake the issue of the war on the result of a general engagement. Once at Malo-Jaroslawitz, when he fell back towards Kalouga, abandoning the Medynsk road to Smolensko to Napoleon, had he chosen to take it. Again at Krasnoi, when, having established himself in a position where, with a decided superiority of force, he commanded Napoleon's line of retreat, he would not throw himself frankly on. His caution here became timidity. He evidently feared to risk his army, composed, after Borodino, in great part of young soldiers and recruits, in a contest with the wasted remains of Napoleon's veterans, who might, were they driven to despair, be joined by the great mass of stragglers who followed their columns. Alexander was highly displeased with his timidity; and the following extract shows clearly his opinion both of Sir Robert Wilson's services and those of the veteran Marshal. At Wilna, on the 26th of December, the Emperor's birthday, Alexander sent for the English Commissioner, and said—

"You have always told me truthtruth I could not obtain through any

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other channel. I know that the Marshal has done nothing he ought to have done -nothing against the enemy that he could avoid: all his successes have been forced upon him. He has been playing some of his old Turkish tricks; but the nobility of Moscow support him. half an hour I must therefore decorate this man with the great order of St George, and, by so doing, commit a trespass on its institution; for it is the highest honour, and hitherto the purest, of the empire. But I will not ask you to be present-I should feel too much humiliated if you were: but I have no choice-I must submit to a controlling necessity. I will, however, not again leave my army, and there shall be no opportunity given for additional misdirection by the Marshal."-(WILSON, 356, 357.)

It is now ascertained beyond all doubt that the frightful losses sustained by the French in Russia were not owing to the cold. The following facts, upon which all writers of all parties are agreed, decisively prove this. Napoleon crossed the Niemen with 420,000 men; left Witepsk with 180,000; abandoned Moscow with 100,000; and could only muster at Dorogobouge, before the deadly cold set in, 50,000 combatants in the ranks. Allowing for 120,000 detached during the advance to the flanks, this makes the loss of combatants from the ranks amount to 250,000 in the army under Napoleon in person, before the winter set in. The cold aggravated frightfully the sufferings of the 50,000 who remained, but had nothing to do with the destruction of the main body (the 250,000). To what, then, was it owing? To three causes. I. The immensity of the distances to be traversed. From the Niemen to Moscow is above 600 miles. No human efforts were capable of conveying provisions for 420,000 men over such a distance. An English army almost perished because it could not procure land-transport sufficient for six miles of bad road, during in

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clement weather, from Balaklava to its camp before Sebastopol. Napoleon had 600 miles of road to bring his supplies along. No power could accomplish this. II. The barren nature of the country through which they had to pass. The rich lowlands of Italy or Germany will afford sustenance to any number of men marching through them in an ordinary manner. that is there required is a store with the army of six or seven days' provisions, for the case of its concentrating to fight. But the vast Lithuanian and Russian plains, thinly inhabited, covered with pine forests, where towns are rare and cultivation sparse, could provide sustenance for no considerable body. The first corps exhausted their resources-the succeeding ones starved. III. The immense superiority of the enemy_in light-horse. The Cossack cavalry, almost impotent on the field of battle, are unrivalled for the light duties of a campaign. Their immense numbers, and the patriotic devotion of the peasantry, enabled them to destroy all the villages before the French reached them-to cut off all small parties sent out to forage-to capture all convoys, unless guarded by immense escorts. The innumerable cavalry, artillery, and baggage animals of the French army speedily devoured all fodder near the road; if they went to a distance in search of it, they were captured; if they did not, they died of want. This frightfully aggravated the difficulty, already overwhelming, of transport, and soon destroyed the efficiency of the allied horse. These three causes, combined with the heroic devotion of the Russian people, which led them to shrink from no sacrifice, however great, in the defence of their country, shivered to pieces the whole power of banded Europe, even when concentrated by the iron will and directed by the unrivalled genius of Napoleon I.

CAPTAIN SPEKE'S ADVENTURES IN SOMALI LAND.-PART III.

ADEN.

THIS was the climax of my first proceedings with Africa.

Lieutenants Stroyan and Herne were now both employed at Berbera or in its vicinity. The former had been making slight excursions inland, shooting, and had killed three elephants; whilst the latter was purchasing baggage-cattle for the expedition transport. After enjoying a short repose in civilised life, I again felt restless, and proposed a move to proceed thither in order to assist Lieutenant Herne in completing the desired complement of animals. This at once met the views of our commandant, who, doubting whether Berbera could supply a sufficient number of beasts of burden of itself, asked me to cross over the Gulf and see what I could do at Kurrum, to keep in communication with Herne, and as soon as I had got enough, to march with them along the sea-shore to Berbera.

Nothing could have suited me better. I saw before me, by this measure, active employment until the breaking up of the Berbera fair.

A kind friend (Lieutenant Dansy of the Bombay army, late Assistant Political Agent of Aden, who knew the characters of all the Somalis well) offered to procure me a man as guide and interpreter who had formerly performed, during the time of his appointment, some political service in the Somali country, with great credit both to his mission and himself. In consequence of this he was nicknamed el Balyuz, or the Ambassador.

Balyuz was a clever Hindostani scholar, and, as I ultimately found, possessed such an honesty of purpose and straightforwardness of character, as rendered him a perfect rara avis amongst all Somali. He was of the Mijjarthayne tribe. Travelling in his

company, after my experiences with Samater and Ahmed, was verily a luxury. I parted with him at the termination of the expedition with pure feelings of affection.

Lieutenant Burton now conceived the idea of suppressing the system of Abbanship, thinking, as the Somalis had access to Aden without any impost, Englishmen ought to enjoy a corresponding freedom to travel in Somali Land. This perhaps was scarcely the right time to dictate a policy which at once would be distasteful as well as injurious (in a monetary sense) to the people with whom we were about to travel, and with whom it was highly essential to our interest to be on the most friendly terms.

I now applied to the Government for some Somali policemen, but unfortunately there were then too few hands present to carry on the duties of the office, and I could not have them. I therefore engaged, by the orders of Lieutenant Burton, a dozen men of various races (Egyptians, Nubians, Arabs, and Seedis), to form an escort, and armed them with my sabres and muskets. They were all raw recruits, and unaccustomed to warfare. Still, we could get no others. With a little practice they learnt to shoot at a mark with tolerable accuracy.

Seven of these men, together with the eight camels I brought across from Bunder Goree, were despatched direct to Berbera, whilst the remaining five, and some ponies I purchased in Aden, remained with me. I then took a bag of dollars for purchasing camels; some dates and rice for the consumption of the party; and with the Balyuz and the old servants, Imam the butler, and Farhan the gamekeeper, all was ready for my second adventure on the 20th February 1855.

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