selves and our countrymen, than that taught in our schools. We did not feel able to construct such a philosophy as we felt was needed; we knew no one amongst us that was able. There was too great indifference on the subject. It was necessary to kindle up an interest in philosophical studies. It was at that time more important that our countrymen should think, than it was what they should think. Philosophy had no audience. We thought, and so thought some of our friends, that of all philosophical writings, within our reach, Cousin's were best adapted to the wants of our countrymen. Our first aim was to get them read and studied, confident that by so doing we should prepare the way for a sound philosophy, even in case Cousin's should be found to be not altogether satisfactory. It was the best, the most satisfactory, that we were acquainted with. It had great and positive merits, and we felt that it was admirably adapted to the state of philosophic thought in our community. We therefore, did what we could to commend it. We had no disposition to dwell upon its defects, for our purpose was, not to criticise it, but to induce others to study it. We commended it not for these defects, but for its merits. But, we own, that these defects were greater than we at the time thought them, and now that an interest is awakened among us in philosophical studies, we have felt that it was time to point them out, as they had not been pointed out before.

But we still maintain our respect for Cousin, as a philosopher, and as a man. We abate nothing of what we have heretofore said in his praise. If his philosophy, taken as a whole, is not all that we at first thought it, we still contend, that he deserves a high rank among the eminent men, who have at different epochs contributed to the progress of metaphysical science. His writings contain nearly all the materials requisite for constructing a sound system of philosophy. There is scarcely a point involved in the whole subject, on which he has not shed more or less light. or less light. We have borrowed from him the very light, by which we have

been enabled to criticise him; and if we are able on some points to offer a more satisfactory explanation of our mental phenomena, than he has done, it is to him that we are indebted for our ability. We know very little that we would say, which he has not already said or implied; and if we were asked what books were best to be studied by one wishing to form just philosophical views, we know of none, that we could more conscientiously or unreservedly recommend than his. They are the best, all things considered, that we are acquainted with. Whoever would become familiar with metaphysical subjects, must study them. They have a permanent value, which no progress in science, or changes of doctrine can altogether destroy. We are pleased, therefore, to find them introduced as text books into our venerable University at Cambridge; and equally pleased are we, too, that their introduction has not caused the expulsion of Locke from the same University; for we are not ashamed to own, that our respect for Locke is every day increasing, and we would not repeat the severe things which the indiscreet zeal of his admirers have, on some former occasions, induced us to say of him. The more we study him, the more are we struck with his merits. The philosophy, that commends itself by detracting from the imperishable glory of such a man as John Locke, can be in vogue only for a day, and must soon take its place with the things that are as if they had not been.

M. Cousin is a true philosopher, and would have given us a sound philosophy in all its parts, if he could have undertaken to do it at once, in a regular systematic treatise. His errors and defects grow, we apprehend, from his having studied philosophy somewhat after the fragmentary manner in which he has treated it. in his writings, and from having confounded, too much, philosophy with the history of philosophy. He has nowhere given us a complete system of philosophy; and we confess, that we do not find ourselves able to mould all that he has at different times advanced into one and the same system. We find, or we seem to ourselves to

find, in his writings the elements of incongruous systems, which are not, and cannot be made parts of the same whole. We have been forced to this conclusion, by undertaking to mould his scattered fragments into a complete and systematic body of philosophy, an undertaking we have been compelled to abandon. We could not succeed. We have, however, attempted the construction of a system on our own account, with what success it is not for us to say, though with a success more satisfactory to ourselves than we anticipated. We have the satisfaction of feeling that, for the first time in our life, we have a system, which, though not constructed without assistance, is yet as a system our own. Some of its elements appear in this article; and those familiar with metaphysical matters will not judge them unimportant. The whole system will be laid before the public, at the earliest day possible; and we are confident, when seen as a whole, it will be found able to reconcile many jarring creeds, and in no small degree to meet the wants of both the Old School and the New. This much we may say in advance of its publication, that, viewed in relation to the systems of philosophy already extant, it assumes English philosophy as its starting point; that is, it takes up philosophy where it exists in our literature, and in our national character, and continues it; but attains to all those moral, spiritual, and religious results, for which we and others have valued the metaphysical speculations of modern France and Germany. Without claiming for man more than finite powers, or pretending to solve all problems, it will, we think, show a solid basis for science and religion. We pretend not, however, to have made any discovery that will supersede the necessity of Divine Revelation, or a childlike trust in the wisdom and goodness of Providence, whose ways are often dark and mysterious, and whose purposes are not seldom past finding out. Man does well to aspire; it is the glory of his nature, and the condition of his advancement; but, he does well, also, to remember that he is a limited being, and his intelligence but a feeble

taper burning in the bosom of infinite night. For a feeble distance it may furrow the darkness, and as it grows by burning, it may furrow it farther and still farther; but can never overcome it, and enlighten in

finity.

EDITOR.

ART. II. ASSOCIATION AND A SOCIAL REFORM. No. I.

BY ALBERT BRISBANE.

I WISH in a short series of articles to lay before the readers of the Boston Quarterly Review a general idea of the system of Association, discovered by CHARLES FOURIER. The social principles, given to the world by that great genius, are beginning to excite a deep and widely extended interest. Since his death in 1837, his doctrine has spread rapidly, and his disciples, who may now be counted by thousands, are to be found in every civilized country on the earth. Besides Europe and the United States, where it is natural to suppose new social principles would first penetrate, circles of converts to the theory of Association and Attractive Industry are to be found in South America, and even in the distant India.

Men of wealth and talent have been gained to the cause in Europe; papers have been established in Paris and London, and the political parties of France have been compelled, by the persevering efforts of the disciples of FOURIER, to devote their attention to social principles, and the grand question of a reörganization of Society. The day is not, I believe, far distant, when in some of the most advanced countries, the present superficial and controversial systems of politics will give way to a true Social Science.

The illusive doctrines and schemes of politicians are, to a true science of society, what the wild speculations

of astrology were to astronomy, or the wilder researches of alchemy to chemistry, and they must lead to and be replaced by a positive Social Science.

They, who wish to keep up with the social movement of the age, should become acquainted with the discoveries of FOURIER. He has treated almost every subject, which belongs to the domain of Social Science, such as the system of Property, Education, the organization of Industry, the division of Profits; the question of Liberty, Equality, human Happiness, the Harmony of the Passions, the Destiny of Man, the Theory of Immortality, &c., with that profound research and clear analysis, which carry irresistible conviction to the impartial mind.

It is impossible to furnish in a few short articles, like those which I propose to write, anything more than a general idea of some one or two branches of so vast a system. I will, in the present one, direct my observations to the defects of the system of Isolated Families and Free Competition, and point out some of the evils which result from them, in order to predispose the minds of readers favorably towards Association, against which the instinct of selfishness and individualism, so universal in society, arouses objections of every kind.

Association, combined Action, Unity of Interests, are the principles upon which a true Organization of society should be based. Our present societies, founded on individual action, conflict of interests, free competition or universal strife, and the system of isolated families, are false, and are not the Social Destiny of the Human Race. Man is a social Being, a being made for varied and extended social relations, for unity and harmony; not for isolation, antagonism, duplicity, and discord. The feeling, which exists in the minds of people against association and union with their fellow men, arises from discordant interests, antipathies, poverty, vulgarity of manners, brutality, and the desire of the shrewd and scheming to take advantage of the It will be impossible to associate men, so long as these causes of disunion exist, and so long as they

mass.