often and loudly proclaimed by France, this is nowhere to be found in her public documents, as one of those particularly specified. On the contrary, she complained of violations of our neutrality, and it was prob ably her policy as well as interest that we should occupy the position of neutrals at that time. The trade which through our means she was enabled to carry on, was probably worth more than our assistance would have been if we had joined in the war. She did not formally relinquish the guaranty, because she knew its inconveniences to us, and she wished to retain it for purposes of negotiation. The expression referred to in Mr. Adet's letter, November 15, 1796, cannot be construed into a demand of the execution of the guaranty, but refers to another subject. He complains (page 367) that "we allow the French colonies to be declared in a state of blockade, and its citizens interdicted the right of trading with them." In the summary of grievances of the French government, made March 9, 1796, it is said, (page 133,) speaking of us, "They have consented to extend the denomination of contraband even to provisions. Instead of restricting it, as all treaties have done, to the case of an effective blockade of a port, as forming the only exception to the complete freedom of this article, they have tacitly acknowledged the pretensions of England to extend the blockade to our colonies, and even to France, by the force of proclamation alone." It was not the execution of the guaranty which Adet demanded; he was complaining of an article in Jay's treaty. But if France had called upon us for the execution of the guaranty, to make out the casus fœderis, she must have shown hers to be a defensive war. Our government did not admit that the casus fœderis had occurred in the war then existing, (see instructions to our ministers, July, 1797, page 458;) and so much is to be said on both sides of this question, that the right of France, if it existed at all-which is by no means admitted-was not clear enough to justify her in demanding the execution of the guaranty. But be that as it may, she certainly made no demand for its execution previously to 1796, and before that time her own conduct had been such as to forfeit her rights under the treaty. Let us review, now, the conduct of France herself in relation to these treaty obligations. On the 9th May, 1793, she issued a decree which violated the provision of the treaty of 1778, making the goods of an enemy free in our ships. Provisions, too, which by the treaty were not contraband if on their way to an ememy's port, were then so considered, (page 43.) Our vessels, 92 in number, were seized and detained at Bordeaux in 1793 (page 75,) and in July (page 149) a decree was passed to treat all neutral vessels as the English treated them. In March, 1797, a decree was issued, confiscating all merchandise belonging to an enemy, and if the productions of a hostile people were not sufficiently proved to be neutral property, they were directed to be seized on board of Ameri can vessels. American vessels without a role d'equipage were suddenly declared to be good prizes; and thus vessels, although supplied with proper papers under our law, were taken because they did not have papers according to a certain antiquated French form, of which the Americans were ignorant. If articles of the growth or manufacture of an enemy, although the property of Americans, were found in American vessels, they were seized under the pretence that they were not proved to be neutral. Depredations of all sorts were committed on our commerce, and the extraordinary commission consisting of Marshall, Pinckney, and Gerry, appointed to treat of these matters, was repulsed. Wearied out with

these repeated outrages and insults, in July, 1798, an act of Congress was passed reciting these outrages, and declaring the treaties with France to be abrogated. From that period the treaty obligations were annulled by act of Congress; an act justified by the law of nations, and binding at least upon our own citizens. "Between the year 1793, (says Mr. Benton-see App. Cong. Globe, page 898,) and the complete restoration of friendship with France in 1801, the appropriations for the army were above $20,000,000; those for the navy exceeded $15,000,000; the authorized loans were above $25,000,000; duties on imports were increased; direct taxes were laid. The stamp act and excise also made its appearance among us. The statute book from 1793 to March 4, 1801, is thickly sprinkled over with acts for these taxes, loans, and appropriations." Again: "Ships of war were built; the regular army was augmented; a provisional army of 10,000 men was raised, and Washington was called to take the command; ships of war convoyed the merchantmen." Blood we know was actually spilt in the collision of armed ships of the two nations. For an abstract of the various acts of hostility towards France, see an extract from the speech of Judge Bell of Kentucky, (App. Cong. Globe, 1st session 29th Congress, page 901.) Such was the state of affairs under which the commission, consisting of Ellsworth, Davy, and Murray, was sent out to treat with France. When the negotiations commenced which led to the treaty of September, 1800, the correspondence on both sides was conducted on the basis of an existing and uninterrupted peace. The reason was obvious: according to the American construction of the treaty, their claim for indemnities would be much larger if tried according to the principles of the treaty, than if based simply upon the rights of their government according to the code of national law. They, therefore, treated upon the basis of the existence of the treaty until it was abrogated by their government, in 1798. The French commissioners professed to consider this treaty as having existed the whole time, and as never having been interrupted up to the period of the last negotiation. It was upon this basis that they claimed the existence of the guaranty, and all those peculiar privileges which, according to their construction, they were entitled to under the treaties of 1778 and 1788. The history of the negotiation had shown our aversion to the guaranty. They did not doubt their ability to escape from the payment of the indemnities, by urging their claims to the guaranty, and they probably hoped to obtain some of those privileges which had been claimed and refused under those treaties. The whole history of the negotiation shows that these were the objects which France valued most; indeed it is probable that, except for purposes of negotiation, that article was little valued by France. But however it commenced, the progress of this negotiation at last developed the real state of the case. It had become obvious that there was an irreconcilable difference of opinion between the two commissions; the Americans denying, and rightly, that the treaty was in existence since 1798, or that France had any claims upon them for infractions of it. The French, on the other hand, maintained that their claims under this treaty were a fair offset to the American demands for indemnities. The resources of diplomacy had now been exhausted; a system of hostilities had been pursued which had led to a waste of public money, the capture of property, and the effusion of blood. The interests for peace in both countries were great and pressing; and as these were

more urgent, the diplomatists became more earnest. There was no longer a chance for settling these differences, except by a continuance of these hostilities, to be followed probably by an open declaration of war. For, with the relations then existing between France and the residue of the world, an arbitration was impracticable, as was hinted by her commissioners; and there was no prospect of an agreement between the diplomatists of the two countries. Then it was that the French commissioners declared that in truth there had been war. Their President said, (see Senate Doc. 633,) "that if the question could be determined by an indifferent nation, he was satisfied such a tribunal would say that the present state of things was war on the side of America, and that indemnities could not be claimed." The French commission had previously (ibid., page 617) declared that the hostile acts of the United States had been war, and "that France disguised the true state of her relations with the United States when she recognised them as a simple, temporary, and reparable misunderstanding;" "that a new treaty between France and the United States ought to be before all a treaty of peace." Upon these grounds the French denied that any indemnities were due, the United States having taken satisfaction by war. A treaty was then concluded, in September, 1800, adjusting other subjects of differ ence, and postponing further negotiation as to these particular disputes to a future and indefinite time. The United States commissioners justify this arrangement, (p. 634,) on the ground "that it would extricate the United States from the war, or that peculiar state of hostility in which they are at present involved." The existence of war was thus admitted on both sides. The treaty provided for the payment of a large class of American claims which were made upon other grounds than those of treaty stipulations; it also provided for a release of captured vessels, and the adjudication of the cases then depending, upon the principles of the treaty. Three years afterwards, the treaty of Louisiana provided for the payment of damages to those Americans whose vessels had been detained by embargo at Bordeaux, and the two together covered nearly all of those cases ever acknowledged by France to have been good. Those claims for captures and seizures whose merits depended upon the construction of the treaties, she did not provide for. The largest class of cases for which we claimed indemnity were violations of our rights according to our construction of the treaties. But France justified them by her construction of those instruments. The two classes of claims pronounced by our Secretary to be most interesting (p. 563) were, first, where the vessel's lading, or any part thereof, consisted of provisions or merchandise coming from England or her possessions; and secondly, when they were seized for want of a "role d'equipage." Now France claimed, under the treaty of 1778, to be entitled to all the privileges given by Jay's treaty to Eng land; and in order to exercise that right of seizing enemies' property in neutral vessels, she presumed everything of British growth and manufac ture to be the property of an enemy, until clearly proved to the contrary. (See decree of Executive Directory, March 2, 1797, in which she makes this claim for that cause, and for the same reason assumes the right to require a role d'equipage.) Such was the state of the negotiation when the treaty was presented to our Senate for ratification. The Senate ratified, with the exception of the second article. This was probably stricken out because the Senate did not desire to keep open this cause of dispute. The

subject had been pursued as far as it was due to the claimants or national honor to carry it. The treaty thus amended was ratified by Napoleon, with an assertion that by this amendment it was to be considered "that the two States renounced the respective pretensions which are the object of the said article." This treaty, thus altered again, was finally ratified. by the Senate, and each State thus "renounced its pretensions." This is the state of the case upon which the claimants demand of us indemnity for spoliations committed on their commerce. We sacrificed their claims, they say, for a valuable public consideration, viz: for the abandonment of the claims for France under the treaty-or rather for the abandonment of the claim of France to the continued existence of the treaty; for that was her real demand. But it has been shown that France had no claims for the continuance of this treaty. It was abrogated for just cause by our government in 1798, and never renewed. It has been shown, too, that France had no claims on us for infractions of the treaty. The defence of the United States against all such accusations was ample and complete. We obtained, then, no valuable consideration in exchange for those claims; nor did we sacrifice them. We prosecuted them in every possible manner-by diplomacy, by hostilities, at the expense of blood and treasureuntil it became manifest that they could not be recovered, if at all, except by a long and bloody war, which the government was not bound to wage, under the circumstance-a war whose losses would have been peculiarly severe upon this very commercial interest. But is this the whole of the argument against these claimants? Had they, in fact, any claim for indemnities, in 1800, even against France? It is said, we know, that the French commissioners admitted the existence of just claims against them for indemnity. But did they ever define the classes which they admitted to be just, or ever designate the probable amount which would be due on such demands? For a certain class of claims, which they acknowledged to be just, they provided in the treaties of 1800 and 1803. But it is to be remembered that, in relation to the two classes of claims said by our Secretary to be most important, France defended herself under the treaty. It is true that some such general admissions were made early in the negotiation on the subject; but, at the close of the correspondence, the French commissioners insisted that all claims for indemnity had been discharged by the war. In the letter of the French commissioners, August 11, 1800, (see pp. 617, 618,) they take this ground distinctly. In the following September, the president of the French commissioners took the same ground, and declared that, "if it could be determined by an indifferent nation, such would be its decision"-(p. 633.) It is beyond dispute, that a treaty of peace which closes a war made in prosecution of a claim, closes that account, either by a provision for its payment, if the one making war conquers the other, or by the treaty itself, if the contest is closed by mutual exhaustion. If a State is insulted by outrages committed on those under her flag, or otherwise within her jurisdiction, she is entitled to satisfaction, either by payment made to her injured citizens by the wrong-doer, or else by the execution of preventive justice in declaring war and inflicting punishment for the wrong. In either case the satisfaction is complete: the presumption is that war retaliates the injury by the sufferings inflicted on the wrong-doer with whom it is waged; for punishment, as well as payment, may be a satisfaction for a wrong. If this be so, the question arises, if the hostilities waged

against France were not a satisfaction of the claim, for the very same reason for which an openly declared war would have been so considered. It was war in all its features save that of an open declaration, which is not necessary to constitute a war. It inflicted the injuries and sufferings which war occasions; large sums of money were expended and blood was spilled in the contest. The inconveniences occasioned were so great as to lead to a more acceptable treaty, and to put a stop to the wrongs of which we complained. This state of hostilities effected all that a bloodier war could have done, unless we suppose, what is incredible, that we had conquered France; for, without a conquest, as was said by her commissioners, we could not have enforced a payment from her by war. Indeed, these hostilities constituted war itself, according to the declarations of the commissioners on one side, and the admissions of those on the other. If this be so, there was no sacrifice on the part of either State, for there were no unsatisfied claims between them. In the language of the clause last added to the treaty, it was a renunciation of "pretensions" on both sides, for rights they were not. But in truth this gov ernment did not renounce the claims of our citizens against France: it renounced its pretensions as a State against France, as founded upon these claims: it renounced its right to claim satisfaction for them from that nation. It is true that such a renunciation, according to the law of nations, barred the claim; but does this constitute an obligation upon our government to pay the claimants itself, because of the abandonment of its duties towards them? This brings us to the question as to the duties and obligations of a government to its citizens in such cases. Is there no period at which the obligation of a government to pursue even the just demands of its citizens should stop? The obligations of a government to its people grow either out of particular engagements in its social compact, or from the nature of society itself. There is no obliga tion in any constitution of government with which we are acquainted which binds a government to insure its citizens against losses sustained by depredations from foreign powers. There is a natural obligation on it to dispense justice at home, and to maintain its rights as a society, according to the law of nations, amid the different States of the world. The measure of assistance which a citizen can claim of his government against the wrongs of a foreign power to herself individually, is that it should maintain its rights as a society under the law of nations. If an individual becomes a creditor of a foreign government by a transaction within its own jurisdiction, he has no pretence for asking his government to collect that debt. But if that foreign power invades a vessel sailing under its national flag, and despoils its owner illegally of the property which belongs to him, it is an insult to the flag under which he sails, and an offence to the nation of which he is a citizen. This is an offence to the whole of the people of whom he is one, and the government has a right to demand satisfaction. The most usual and effectual reparation, is a payment in full satisfaction of the damages sustained by the wrong-doer. Another mode of vindicating the na tional honor is to declare war against the aggressor, and take satisfaction by punishing him for the wrong. The right of the government, in either case, does not arise from any obligation to collect the debt of its citizens, but to redress a wrong offered to it as a society, and to remove the stain of an insult from its name. If its obligation were to col