On the morning of January 21, 1869, the American steamer Colonel Lloyd Aspinwall, while on her way from Port-au-Prince to Havana, found herself within five miles of the Cuban coast in a deplorable condition. She had weathered a gale that had lasted for three days, but the seas had swashed across her decks, poured down her hatches, drowned her fires and choked her pumps. Only by extraordinary efforts in bailing had she been kept afloat. But the sea had gone down at last and heading away. on her course, she was making fair progress, when at noon she was overhauled by the Spanish warship Hernan Cortes, and boarded by an armed force. The Cubans were at that time engaged in what is known as their "ten years' struggle for liberty," and the Spaniards patrolled the Cuban coast to head off filibustering expeditions. The Cortes was one of the patrol boats.

To the Spanish officer, Captain McCarty brought the ship's papers, but the officer said:

"I cannot examine them. My orders are to take you to Nuevitas."

Captain McCarty protested, saying that he was "the bearer of despatches of the utmost importance for the Government of the United States," and for the American Admiral (Poor) in command of the station, then in Havana, but to Nuevitas he was obliged to go with an armed force on board. There he was detained

six days, with his papers sealed in a trunk by the Spanish officials, when he was ordered to proceed to Havana still under guard. This he refused to do unless his papers were returned to him, and the result of his refusal was that the Spanish steamer San Francisco towed him there.

Here he and all his crew were still held as close prisoners on board until February 13thin all twenty-three days after the ship was seized, before he was allowed even to communicate . with the American Consul. So it was not until she had been under Spanish guns for a month that our Government learned of the outrage.

Secretary of State Fish replied to the Consul's formal notice by telegraphing: "Report particulars, and if seized on the high seas demand immediate release." As she had been seized more than a marine league from shore, the demand was made. The Spaniards simply ignored it.

The seizure was by no means the first of its kind, though because of the fact of Government despatches being on board, it was the most aggravating. However, the State Department waited until February 26th, when the formal protest of Captain McCarty was received by mail, and then it made a demand on the Spanish Minister at Washington, Don Lopez Roberts, for reparation, adding to the demand these words:

"This Government trusts that your Govern

At that Sickles, on April 8th, called on Prime Minister Sagasta, who replied that the case was "undergoing examination in the prize court." To this Sickles replied that the United States could not recognize the jurisdiction of a prize court unless a state of war existed between the Spanish and the Cubans. If such a war did exist, the United States would be obliged to recognize the Cubans as belligerents, and this would soon be done. To this Sagasta replied that "the decision of the court will be given with all possible promptness."

And that was about all the satisfaction Sagasta would give him, though Sagasta did at last promise to release the steamer.

Meantime the Aspinwall was lying beside the Spanish flag-ship in Havana. She was under guard all the time and her crew were not permitted even to wet down her sides to keep the sun from starting the calking from her seams. After three weeks of this confinement the Spaniards brought a force on board to search her bunkers. The coal-handlers did not complete their search the first day, so that night they put an armed guard over the bunkers. At that Captain McCarty put his own crew to guard the Spanish guard and so prevent their sneaking arms into the bunkers during the night.

This fact is of importance, not alone as show

ing the Spanish character. It shows that McCarty believed his own Government would be likely to ignore the real principle of the case if arms were found on board. Whether she had arms in her bunkers or not had nothing to do with the main principle in the case, for the Aspinwall was an American ship and she had been seized on the high seas in time of peace. The Spaniards knew that they had no right to take her, but they were trying to establish a precedent, following which they might take ships wherever found when carrying arms to the insurgents in Cuba, and in their contempt for the Americans they thought they should succeed. As a matter of fact their feeling in this matter was well-nigh justified.

Having waited a week for Sagasta to fulfil his reluctant promise to release the steamer, Minister Sickles, on orders from Washington, called once more to learn why nothing was done. This was on April 14th. Sagasta replied that the local authorities at Havana had said that they "had no power to take the case out of court." At that Sickles declared emphatically that the United States Government considered the holding of the Aspinwall in a prize court an acknowledgment on the part of Spain that a state of war existed, and that belligerent rights would, therefore, be accorded the insurgents forthwith. Having said that,