of such ships as we had was gathered at Key West during the negotiations, and the condition of the ships when brought together was such as to compel public consideration of the needs of the navy. The Virginius affair was in a way, too, like that of the Chesapeake be fore the War of 1812. It served, though remotely, to prepare us for a war for a principle. Moreover, as our attitude in the Chesapeake affair did but degrade us in the eyes of the aggressor, so our management of the Virginius case increased the contempt of the Spanish people for whom they were pleased to call "the American pigs.'

1

CHAPTER III

THE WHITE SQUADRON

MONEY GRUDGINGLY PROVIDED FOR A NEW NAVY-THE ADVISORY BOARD-A FRIGATE, TWO CORVETTES, AND A DESPATCH-BOAT— WHAT “JUNKETING" DID FOR THE NAVY-DISCOURAGIng the

YOUNGER OFFICERS WHILE DEMANDING INCREASED SERVICE.

ALMOST a quarter of a century passed away before the anarchy in Cuba again roused our people to thoughts of war. It was, on the whole, a period of remarkable prosperity for us as a nation. What breadths of prairie lands and mountain valleys were settled! What deserts were reclaimed! What wondrous resources were developed! Indeed it was in this period that we achieved, at last, industrial independence of the world, and that, if we look at it rightly, was second only to the political independence we had obtained so long before by force of arms.

The bearing these statements have upon a history of the naval war with Spain shall be explained at once. It was because of our commercial greatness that the Spaniards believed

us a nation of money-getters who would not fight lest we lose dollars, and so they were led to rush blindly into a war where disaster inevitably awaited them. Another view of the matter is not less instructive. The building of a new navy was the most important step taken in all those years for the achievement of industrial independence.

Moreover it was because of our industrial independence that we were able to bear the shock of war with scarce an added throb in the arteries of commerce. There was never a moment when anyone doubted our ability to pay in gold the expenses of the war, and the depreciation of even "wild-cat securities" was no greater when war came than is known in times of peace and over-expansion of credit.

But before entering upon the story of our navy in the war with Spain it is necessary to tell what kind of a navy we had when the war began, and how we got it. It will help us to understand how it was that swift destruction fell upon our enemies, while we escaped, if the expression may be allowed, with losses so insignificant as to excite universal wonder.

There was a time (1865) when the American navy, in ships as well as men, was the most powerful in the world, but it was neglected, and even treated by legislators as a means for dishonest gain, until it became the world's

standard of inefficiency. Indeed it had deteriorated so far by 1873, only eight years after our civil war ended, that even Spain's navy was well-nigh a match for it. But a worse degra dation awaited it. The need of improving it was made apparent by the Virginius affair, and yet the peril of the nation served only to invite the Secretary of the Navy to an act that was the most disgraceful in the history of the Department. He deliberately began to build new ships under the false pretence that he was repairing old ones. Physically the seapower of our navy, if we may use Mahan's adaptation of Ruskin's term, reached its lowest ebb in 1873. We did in succeeding years add a few vessels to the force, but they were built under circumstances that destroyed self-respect, and they were in no point superior to other ships already in existence. As a whole the tide of the navy still ran ebb, leaving the mudflats bare, and it was not until June 29, 1881, that anything was done for a real rehabilitation. On that date a board, called the Rodgers board because Rear Admiral John Rodgers headed it, was appointed to consider the state of the navy and report what action ought to be taken by Congress in the matter.

As a matter of fact but one vessel, the Ammen ram, was built out of all that this board recommended. But it is a significant

fact that public opinion was prepared for the appointment of such a board by the writings of naval officers on naval matters before it came into existence, and, although the ships it recommended were not built, its statement that new ships were imperatively needed received respectful consideration. The Navy Department had been smirched, but the honor, integrity, and ability of the personnel of the navy had never been doubted for a moment. In eight years our force afloat descended from the highest place to the lowest, in spite of the remonstrances of the naval officers; but they were not not wholly disheartened. They continued their appeals to the public, using the pen as vigorously and efficiently as they have always used gun and sword, and at the end of another period of eight years they turned the tide.

As a result of the Rodgers report, Congress, in the following year (1882) inserted this paragraph in the naval appropriation bill approved on August 5th :

"Any portion of said sum not required for the purposes aforesaid (in the general uses of the Bureau of Construction and Repair) may be applied toward the construction of two steam cruising vessels of war, which are hereby authorized, at a total cost, when fully completed, not to exceed the amount estimated by