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CHAPTER II

PANAMA CANAL PROJECTS

ERHAPS there was never a time in the history of Colombia when some project looking to the

opening of an inter-oceanic canal across the isthmus of Panama was not a subject of agitation and discussion. Even before the date of the first formal declaration of the independence of the country, in 1810, the matter had been frequently discussed; and it continued to be agitated at intervals during the whole period of the twelve years' war. But the first serious movement in that, direction seems to have originated with General Símon Bolívar during the last years of that struggle, and precisely at the time when the cause of independence seemed least hopeful.

Soon after Bolívar became invested by the Colonial Congress with dictatorial powers, he sent out an agent authorized to propose an inter-oceanic canal scheme to the merchants and capitalists of London, the real object being to stimulate a formal recognition of the new Republic through the commercial powers of Europe. After many rebuffs and vexatious delays, this agent finally succeeded in interesting some British capitalists, who agreed to furnish the money necessary to the success of the enterprise, provided the absolute neutrality of the canal should be guaranteed by some maritime power able to maintain it. This could not then be obtained, and so the scheme failed.

The next effort was made in 1822.

The United

States had, at the instance of Mr. Clay and John Quincy Adams, formally recognized the new Republic, but all the great maritime powers of Europe held aloof through deference to the so-called "Holy Alliance." In order to stimulate them to formal recognition, President Bolívar asked and obtained from the federal Congress of Colombia authority to open negotiations with foreign capitalists, or with some foreign government, for opening a ship canal across the isthmus. The authority was readily granted, but no maritime power could be found willing to guarantee the neutrality of the transit, or Colombia's sovereignty over the isthmus itself, and so the scheme was again defeated.

It, however, continued to be discussed by the press and public men of Colombia, and was again revived in the proposed Panama Conference of American states in 1826. The Colombian delegates to that first PanAmerican Congress were instructed to "favor any reasonable project looking to a water transit of the isthmus; " but, as the Congress itself was a failure, the canal scheme was again doomed to defeat, or at least to indefinite delay.

It was again revived in 1830, when President Bolívar took active measures to have the isthmus explored by a corps of competent engineers. But even before the commissioners had reached the scene of their labors, internal political dissensions arose, which finally resulted in the disruption of the Colombian Union.

In the partition of territory which followed, the isthmus of Panama fell to the lot of New Granada (now Colombia), and in 1836 a concession was granted to certain capitalists, or rather to certain individuals who claimed to represent foreign capitalists, who proposed to organize an international company for the

purpose of opening the canal. The company was never organized, and the scheme again failed. But in the executive decree declaring the concession forfeited, an offer was made to treat with any company financially able to fulfil the agreement, and there soon followed in quick succession a multitude of concessions, none of which, however, ever amounted to anything.

Thus the matter stood in 1850, when an American company obtained the concession for the construction of the present Panama railway.

Still, the canal scheme would not "down." It continued to be talked about, both in Colombia and the United States, and finally, in 1868 Mr. Caleb Cushing was sent by our Government as special envoy to Bogotá instructed to obtain a concession for the survey of the isthmus with a view to the construction of a ship canal by what is known as "the Atrato route." He succeeded in negotiating a favorable treaty; but the Colombian Congress, to which it had to be referred for ratification, so altered and amended it as to make it unacceptable.

Negotiations were renewed in 1870, but failed of any practical results.

Meantime, the completion of our first transcontinental railway had interested American capital in a different direction. The canal project, however, still continued to be talked about. The feasibility of the Panama route had come to be doubted, and the whole question was finally referred to a Naval Commission which was instructed to survey and report upon the proposed Nicaragua route.

This stimulated activity among the public men ot Colombia, who now began to look again to European capital for the consummation of their long-cherished scheme. The result was the concession of 1878, gen

erally known as the "Salgar-Wyse Contract," under which Ferdinand de Lesseps organized his ill-fated company.

The history of that company is still fresh in the public mind. In many respects it is probably without a parallel in the annals of bold and shameless rascality. When the company finally broke down and became bankrupt, in 1889, comparatively little work had been done, though fabulous sums of money had been spent. No one who had taken the trouble to familiarize himself with the origin and history of that company, or who was cognizant of its peculiar business methods, was surprised at the result. Indeed, no one competent to judge ever believed that the canal could be opened on the route indicated. Possibly some modified plan might be adopted by the French government, which seemed likely at one time to fall heir to the Company's concession and assets; but in that case, international complications would be almost certain to arise, which would seriously involve the United States government. For, no matter by whom opened, the canal would be merely an artificial strait communicating between two open seas, and its navigation would have to be regulated by the same rules of international law which govern the navigation of straits in general. The only exceptions that could be claimed for it would be such modifications as might become necessary for the protection of the individual rights of the shareholders.

Under the modern rules of international law, when the navigation of both seas is free, the navigation of the connecting channel is likewise free; and this is true, although the connecting channel be bounded on both sides by the territory of some sovereign state, and be so narrow as to be easily commanded by cannon-shot from both sides. In such cases, the territorial jurisdiction of

the sovereign is modified by the public right of passage from sea to sea; but, while this is true, the public right of passage is itself modified by the right of the sovereign through whose territory the channel passes. He may prescribe such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to his own safety; and these, under certain contingencies, may amount to a positive prohibition. Thus, although open and free to all private merchant vessels of whatever nationality, the channel could be declared closed, as a matter of right, to all public armed vessels whenever this should become necessary to the safety of the state through whose territory it passes. And this would necessarily imply the right of the state to enter into alliances, offensive and defensive, for the enforcement of the closure against possible enemies; which, by the way, was precisely what Colombia did as early as 1846, by article 35 of the treaty of that date with the United States, and that treaty is still in force.

Another rule, applicable in such cases, is that the sovereign through whose territory the channel passes may exempt his own subjects from payment of tonnage or other duties, without thereby invalidating his right to unconditionally withhold such privileges from the subjects or citizens of other states. He may likewise exempt the subjects or citizens of his ally, and thus place them upon an equal footing with his own, without impairing his right to withhold such privileges from the subjects or citizens of all other nations. And this, again, is precisely what Colombia did by the treaty of 1846, wherein she guaranteed to the citizens of the United States "all the exemptions, privileges, and immunities," with respect to the isthmian transit, present and prospective, "enjoyed or to be enjoyed by Colombian citizens."