CHAPTER IV. THE NAVAL BATTLE OF MANILA BAY. BY LIEUT. C. G. CALKINS, U. S. N. N° OT long ago the Philippine Archipelago was nothing but a geographical expression to most of us. Now it threatens to become an interminable problem in our political future and appeals to the interest of millions of eager Americans. It may be worth while to discuss the historic event which brought about this transformation. Even personal impressions and incidental corrections may, perhaps, be set forth without suspicion of vanity or pedantry. For instance, it is worth noting that the Philippine Islands were discovered by Commodore Dewey before May 1, 1898. The work done by the Navy in the campaigns of 1898 was based quite as much on mental preparation as on that splendid, though incomplete, material equipment which has been one of the most picturesque features of our national progress since 1885. Given the constant factors of loyalty and discipline, the problems of war are solved by taking thought before putting on the panoply of battle. When the Philippine Islands had to be studied, it appeared that sources of information were neither numerous nor interesting. Beside a few rare old books of rambling gossip about monastic affairs, there are two or three modern works blending scientific fragments with travelers' tales. Vague consular documents relating chiefly to commerce have also been printed. But the true basis of the campaign was contained in the portfolio of charts of the China Sea and Eastern Archipelago. The modern arts of navigation and pilotage reduce themselves to the interpretation of charts, and the tactics of naval warfare as well as strategy in general are only special applications of the same method. These graphic representations are supplemented by volumes of Sailing Directions, which attempt verbal expression for hydrographic and topographic detail. Special interest attached to the Estado General de la Armada, or Navy List of Spain, which enumerates the armament of ships and the accomplishments and decorations of officers with elaborate candor. We knew the force of the Spanish squadron in every detail, and were informed in regard to the names and ages of all officers on duty in the Philippines. But no minute comparisons were attempted. Our confidence was founded on national and personal qualities and convictions. After buying every chart of the Philippines in Hong Kong and examining the approaches to Manila, it became plain that no strong defensive combination was ready to oppose our advance on that capital. The situation might have justified the removal of the Spanish squadron to some place of greater tactical advantage, but there were political and other considerations to oppose such action. It did not appear that forts commanding the entrance to Manila Bay had been constructed during the three centuries of Spanish domination, and it was felt that no improvised batteries or torpedo-lines could serve as barriers for both channels. Once inside the bay, our fleet would find convenient anchorage anywhere within a circle twenty miles in diameter. Security would be attained as soon as the Spanish fleet was disabled and the batteries silenced or isolated from support. men While it was known that Spain had a more numerous squadron in the Archipelago than we had on the Asiatic station, there was more reason to dread their dispersion than their concentration at Manila. Light draught and local experience should have given them many advantages in a dodging campaign. If concentrated, their ships would have more afloat and nearly as many modern rifled guns as we carried, but they had no ship equal to the Olympia in all round effectiveness, to the Baltimore in weight of metal, or to the Raleigh in rapid fire. Moreover, they had "lame ducks" well known at the Hong Kong dock-yards. Therefore we counted on finding them at anchor and disposed for fighting under the protection of shore-batteries, under conditions implying discouragement and anticipation of defeat. Our own preparations began with the choice of an objective. Ten days after the destruction of the Maine, while most of us were still holding that tragedy an accident, the Commander-in-Chief was informed that his squadron must be ready to attack the Philippines if war were declared. Concentration was immediately directed. The Olympia and Petrel were already at Hong Kong; the Boston and Concord hurried thither from Korea; the Raleigh, and later the revenue cutter Hugh McCulloch, came north from the Indian Ocean via Singapore. Last of all, and not a day too soon, came the Baltimore from Honolulu. There was a scanty margin of time for cleaning her bottom and filling her coal bunkers after the British authorities had issued their proclamation of neutrality. Two small steamers, the Nan-Shan and the Zafiro, were purchased and prepared for service as colliers or tenders. There was time for the discussion of this gathering and an exchange of reassuring editorials between colonial and metropolitan journals. Manila was cheered from Madrid by statements denying that our concentration had any serious meaning, and depreciating our equipment for attack. But this report, reaching the Philippines during the last week of April, came too late to restore public confidence. After coaling, the ships were all painted a dull greenish gray," wet moon color," as the Spanish Admiral named it when prescribing a tardy imitation. The tint selected was found to blend naturally with the waters of Manila Bay. Another important detail was the distribution of ammunition. All the stock on hand, including a supply brought out by the Baltimore, was divided according to the batteries of the different ships. Some attempt was also made to get rid of superfluous wood-work to reduce the danger from sparks and splinters in action. So much had to be left in place that the precaution appeared suggestive rather than final. Fortunately the enemy's shells did not complete the demonstration of this well-founded opinion. Changes in personnel had also to be considered. The Commanding Officer of the Boston had served his time on the sta tion and his relief was at hand. But Captain Wildes wanted to stick to his ship to test the discipline which he had spent thirty months in establishing. Therefore Captain Lamberton joined the Olympia as Chief-of-Staff. Lieutenant Elliot and other officers had also voluntarily prolonged their term of service. There were cases where there seemed no room for choice. Both the Captain and Executive Officer of the Olympia had been stricken by climatic disease before war was declared. Captain Gridley had not been ill until after the ship reached Hong Kong in February, and he insisted on retaining his command. He performed all his responsible duties with unfailing skill and with characteristic coolness and courtesy until the battle was over. A month later he died on his way home, a willing sacrifice to his country and his profession. Lieutenant-Commander Paine had suffered longer in his effort to complete a three-years' cruise without surrendering to the climate. The doctors were kind and inflexible, and he was sent home in April. He had been an eager and active officer for thirty-three years, two-thirds of which had been passed in the grade of lieutenant, and there was much regret that he should be forced to miss this opportunity of employing hist recognized talents in working a battery in action. Lieutenant Rees came from the old Monocacy, which was laid up at Shanghai, and was assigned to duty as Executive of the Olympia. He was followed by several officers and most of the crew of that antique side-wheeler, and every ship had her full complement. Altogether our force was about 1,750 men. A few Chinamen were missing at the last moment; a painter with twenty years of naval service, some stewards, and several mess-attendants deserted in Hong Kong. The Chinese who remained showed no fear in action and could bear comparison with any other race for cool industry and cheerful curiosity. The Baltimore having made good use of the days of grace following the proclamation of neutrality, the flagship led the last group of ships out of the hospitable harbor of Hong Kong on April 25. As we passed the vessels of the British fleet, their bulwarks were thronged with eager soldiers and sailors. The men-of-war might not cheer, but the convales |