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CHAPTER XV.

WAR LEGISLATION OF THE SENATE.

BY

HON. J. W. DANIEL, Member of Committee on Foreign Relations.

TH

HE causes of the war between the United States and Spain are to be found in the geography, in the past history, in the racial and institutional differences between the two peoples and in the cherished principles of American polity which are essential to our interest, peace and safety. Were I to enumerate them, I should say that they lie in the proximity of Cuba to the United States; in our Monroe Doctrine; in the incapacity, corruption and cruelty of Spanish rule; in the weakness and irritating incidents of our diplomacy with Spain; in our extensive commerce with Cuba, and the large investments of American capital there; and finally, in the destruction of the battleship Maine in Havana harbor on the night of February 15, 1898. The war with Spain has been called a war of humanity; and, to a certain extent, it was, as is demonstrated by the generous contributions of our Government and people to relieve the suffering Cubans. But it was no less a war of national interest, dignity and honor.

The Senate of the United States has played an important part in shaping the policy of our Government with reference to the war and the questions which produced it, but this policy cannot be appreciated without fully understanding the causes of the war and the incidents that led up to it. In some respects the Senate has more intimate relations with our foreign affairs than has the House of Representatives. It shares with the President the power of appointing officers, including the ambassadors, ministers and consuls who represent us in foreign lands. It shares, also, with him the power

of making treaties. By reason of its smaller membership and its greater freedom of debate, the sense of the body can be more readily collected, expressed and fashioned into measures. The Committee on Foreign Relations is the organ of the Senate in the consideration and presentation of questions. relating to our foreign affairs. When the Cuban revolution broke out, this Committee was composed as follows:

John Sherman, Chairman; William P. Frye, Cushman K. Davis, J. Donald Cameron, Shelby M. Cullom, Henry Cabot Lodge, Republicans; John T. Morgan, George Gray, David Turpie, John W. Daniel, Roger Q. Mills, Democrats.

The Committee was kept busy from the incipiency of the revolution to its close in considering the numerous and vexatious questions to which it gave rise. Contemporaneously other foreign affairs of great magnitude arose, which likewise required serious consideration, especially the Venezuela Boundary question, the Armenian massacres, Hawaiian annexation and the General Arbitration Treaty. From time to time the Committee took the evidence of witnesses as to the conditions in Cuba, and many communications and resolutions were laid before it. Numerous reports were made to the Senate, some of which were able and exhaustive discussions of international law questions, such as the Monroe Doctrine, arbitration, neutrality, belligerency, the rights of American citizens and the construction and interpretation of treaties and statutes.

The Senate took the initiative in dealing with the great issues arising concerning Cuba, and it is believed that the measures which it favored were in consonance with the spirit of our institutions, with our necessary political relations to the island of Cuba and with that sense of justice toward a people struggling for liberty which best befitted the first republic of the Western world.

It also initiated some less consequential though eminently worthy measures, such as that proposed by Mr. Gallinger authorizing the expenditure of $50,000 for the relief of suffering Americans in Cuba, and that proposed by Mr. Proctor authorizing the officers of our army in Cuba exercising separate commands to furnish subsistence, medical and Quartermasters' supplies to destitute inhabitants. It concurred without a dis

senting voice in the action of the House, which was equally unanimous, in placing fifty millions of dollars in the hands of the President to be used for war purposes;-an act of questionable policy from the point of view of constitutional criticism, but bespeaking clearly the confidence of Congress in the President and the unbounded patriotism with which all men were ready to sustain him.

The narrow space of this article forbids that I follow the course of debate in the Senate or even refer to the many able and eloquent speeches which were made during the successive Congresses that dealt with the Cuban struggle. They were as a rule of a high order and up to the highest standard of deliberative assemblies; but it is of the action of the body that I am to treat, and this prevents the reference that I should be often prompted to make to the excellent suggestions and eloquent addresses of particular Senators.

The late Cuban revolution broke out in February, 1895, on the eve of the adjournment of the Fifty-third Congress. Since that period there have been two sessions of the Fifty-fourth Congress, under Cleveland's administration, and three of the Fifty-fifth, under the administration of McKinley.

When the first session of the Fifty-fourth Congress convened, on December 2, 1895, President Cleveland said in his message:

"Cuba is again gravely disturbed, and an insurrection, in some respects more active than the last preceding revolt which continued from 1868 to 1878, now exists in a large portion of the eastern interior of the island, menacing some populations. on the coast."

But he exhorted Congress against sentimental sympathy with the Cubans and declared that—

Neither the warmth of our people's sympathy with the Cuban insurgents, nor our loss and material damage consequent upon the futile endeavors thus far made to restore peace and order, nor any shock our humane sensibilities may have received from the cruelties which appeared to specially characterize this sanguinary and fiercely conducted war have in the least shaken the determination of the Government to fulfil every international obligation."

At this time the revolution, which had been organized under the leadership of Jose Marti and Maximo Gomez, was ten months old. Numerous skirmishes had taken place between the Cubans and Spaniards. Marti had been killed and Gomez wounded. Martinez Campos, the most distinguished general of Spain, had succeeded Callejas as Captain-General, only to get his laurels dishevelled. The Cuban Convention had adopted a constitution. Betancourt had been chosen President, Maso Vice-President, and Maximo Gomez, a hero of the Ten Years War and a native of San Domingo, had been made General-in-Chief, with Antonio Maceo as his Lieutenant. A provisional government had been organized with its capital at Cubitas. Laws had been enacted for the collection of taxes and the establishment of post-offices. Fifty thousand Cuban volunteers were in arms, and Gomez and Maceo were riding over the island perplexing and baffling the armies of Spain marshalled for their subjugation. Maceo a little later appeared in sight of Havana.

This was the seventh insurrection that had agitated Cuba during the present century and it was soon evident that it was the most serious. Should the belligerency of the Cubans be recognized? This was the first question presented. Belligerency is a state of war. To recognize it is to accord to those on both sides engaged in it the rights of war. Many resolutions were soon offered in the Senate favoring the recognition of belligerency, Senators Allen and Call being the first to advocate their passage.

The strongest argument against such action on the part of the United States is to be found in the message of President Grant delivered to Congress during the Ten Years War, in which he opposed any sort of recognition of the Cubans, on the ground (1) that it would authorize the right of search on the high seas of vessels of both parties and would subject those carrying arms and munitions of war, which might now be transported freely in vessels of the United States, to detention and possible seizure; (2) would give rise to countless vexatious questions; (3) would release the parent government from responsibility for acts done by the insurgents; (4) would invest Spain with the right to exercise the supervision recog