CHAPTER XXVI.

THE WORK OF THE ARMY AS A WHOLE.

BY

MAJ.-GEN. NELSON A. MILES, Commanding U. S. Army.

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UR war with Spain had many exceptional features. Some preceded, some occurred during the progress, and some appeared after the close of hostilities. In the first place, there was a formal declaration of war before the opening of hostilities. This is not only far from being the rule in the experience of warring nations, but is a rare occurrence. For many months the nation had been expecting war. Fifty millions of dollars had been appropriated for the national defense, and for each and every purpose connected therewith, to be expended at the discretion of the President. Presumably that immense sum was used in the purchase of ships, arms, and the munitions of war for the Army and Navy, that new levies might be promptly armed and equipped. That the war was inevitable was apparent to every thoughtful reader of history. The statesmen of the nation had recognized the question of the duty of the Government of the United States towards Spain and the Cuban struggle for liberty, as being by far the most important problem with which we were then called upon to deal. If that did not mean something more than a mere probability of war, what did it mean? For several years previous to the declaration of war, we had energetically employed our powers, if not in the interest of Spain and against the interest of the Cuban patriots, at least to maintain our friendly relationship with the kingdom of Spain. Nearly a year in advance of the declaration of war, the unanimous voice of the people of the nation, expressed in the nominating conventions of the great political parties, was a direct command for a cessation of this policy, and its reversal. This

voice was heard, expressly recognized, and with apparent cordiality accepted by the candidates. The voice of the people was heard by Congress, and Congress responded. So clearly was the approach of war discerned that, weeks before the declaration of war, the continental powers unitedly, through their ambassadors and envoys, addressed to the Executive an expression of hope that humanity and moderation might mark the course of this Government and people; as if this Government and people had not led all the nations. of all the world in humanitarian principles. This notice was not only an exceptional, but an unprecedented feature. Not only that, but it now forms a precedent pregnant with possibilities of future perplexities and dangers for this country.

War having been declared, it was an exceptional feature that our antagonist had already more than she could handle with patriots of Puerto Rica, Cuba and the Philippine Islands alone. For three years she had been steadily losing ground. Cuba was lost to Spain. The circumstances of Cortes were immeasurably less favorable than ours when he burned his ships behind him. With a few hundred followers he joined the weaker side, and with it won an empire, vastly greater in extent and numbers than our acquisitions from Spain; not only so, but with a loss of fewer of his men, all-told, than we had killed at Santiago.

Another exceptional feature was the practical unanimity of our people as evidenced in the voting of $50,000,000, in the declarations in their political conventions, and the response to the call for volunteers. Such unanimity had never before been known in all our history. In 1861 the cause of disunion had many sympathizers in every section of the country; in 1846 more than one half the population was averse to the war; in 1812 the prospect was that whole states would have to be coerced; in 1776 the Tories were a large, vigorous and dangerous minority.

Another exceptional circumstance in our experience of war was the immense number of trained soldiers for service. It is true our regular military establishment was small, but nearly a million of the best-trained soldiers in the world stood ready as minute men to answer the call of their country in an emer

gency. The few individuals among them, whose services were for some reason accepted, abundantly proved their experience and aptitude in camp, on the march and in action.

Some further exceptional features will present themselves in due course, as we now proceed with a sketch of the history of the war from the commencement of actual hostilities.

In conducting the preparations for war, it was reasonable that the highest executive should expect and fully consider, in dealing with military questions, the best thought, based on long experience and mature study, of the highest military and naval officials. In case their superiors in authority should decide against any advice or plan submitted and in favor of some other, then it became their duty to support the one adopted with unhesitating zeal. Such being the case, we believed that the calling for so large a number of volunteers before they could be properly equipped and especially the manner in which they were brought into service, was injudicious. We felt as Wellington must have felt in the campaign in Spain. Plagued as he was by the Spanish habit of getting together recruits first, and thinking of how to feed and equip them afterwards, he wrote:

"It will answer no purpose to bring to the theatre of war on the Douro or the Ebro crowds of starving soldiers. We shall increase our difficulties without reaping any advantage from the trouble taken in forming them. An army well equipped, disciplined, officered and instructed is far more effective than a larger one without these essential conditions."

The President, on the 25th of April, announced to the world that Congress had declared war, and immediately directed the Secretary of the Navy to telegraph orders to the Commander of the Asiatic Squadron, then lying in the Port of Hong Kong, pointing out in diplomatic terms that, as there could be no harbor of rest within his reach, there remained for him only to commence operations; and nothing could be more superb than the promptitude with which the summons was obeyed, and a new name emblazoned high over all on the roll of naval heroism. The proclamation of neutrality by different governments having debarred our Asiatic Squadron from harbor privileges, this was recognized as the

only course open, for inaction would mean the speedy exhaustion of the supplies of the fleet, 12,000 miles from any home port and from the means of replenishing. As is usual in momentous affairs of the history of the world, and as the event proved, the man for the occasion was present. There was not a moment's hesitation or vacillation as to the course he would pursue. He at once ordered the ships of his squadron to Mirs Bay, and gave it a formation that it maintained throughout the voyage and to the end of the epoch-making battle. There was no uncertainty or doubt manifested by him, as there was when Nelson set out from Naples, the latter having obtained provisions and water through the interposition of his friend, Lady Hamilton, just prior to the battle of the Nile. On the 26th of April, Dewey set out for Manila, leading his fleet in the following order: the flagship Olympia, bearing the broad pennant of the Commanding Commodore; then the Baltimore, the Raleigh, the Petrel, the Concord, and the Boston. The revenue cutter McCulloch, with the transports Nanshan and Zafiro, formed a separate column to the starboard. The Commander of the squadron had never been at Manila, nor had a single one of his officers; yet he had made a study of the charts he had taken care to procure, of Philippine waters, made his plans thereon, and proceeded to put them into execution. He well knew that the enemy was informed by telegraph of his movements, and would have nearly a week in which to complete their preparations to receive him. In this he was at one disadvantage that Nelson never had to take into account. "In early morn, at dawn of May," as some poetical genius has expressed it, he found himself with his squadron intact and in order of battle, and with the order established at Mirs Bay unchanged, calmly reposing on the waters of the harbor of Manila. The change from darkness to light and from light to darkness, comes with extreme rapidity in the tropics, and as the great disk of the equatorial sun swept up from below the horizon, the squadron of the enemy was presented suddenly but distinctly to the view, formed in battle array. Its formation was very similar to that which Nelson encountered in Aboukir Bay, when he exclaimed that before the morrow his fate would be a peerage or West

minster Abbey. We hear no such exclamation on the part of Dewey. It was about 5:30 that the attack began in both cases; Nelson in the evening, Dewey in the morning. All night long Nelson's battle raged, replete with dramatic personal incidents, and, as at Trafalgar, ship to ship, and hand to hand encounters. We hear of nothing personally demonstrative on the part of Dewey. Nelson himself describes the French position as "a strong line of battle for preventing the entrance to the Bay, flanked by enormous gun-boats, four frigates, and a battery of guns and mortars." The French ships were placed “at a distance from each other of about 160 yards, with the van ship close to a shoal in the Northwest, and the whole of the line just outside a four-fathom sand bank; so that an enemy, it was considered, could not turn either flank." The Spaniards had disposed their forces so as to cover the entrance to Cavité, the western flank of the fleet resting on Sangley Point, and the eastern flank resting on the shoal near the land on the other side of the Bay, both flanks being apparently so close to shoal water as to prevent Dewey from passing at either place, or "doubling" on them. Here the parallelism ended. No signal was flying to the breeze over Dewey like that of Nelson at Trafalgar that America 'expects every man to do his duty." He simply ported his helm at once and headed for the Spaniards, followed by his ships. As was afterwards learned, the Spanish line consisted of the Reina Christina (flagship), Castilla, Isle de Luzon, Isle de Cuba, Don Juan de Austria, Don Antonio de Ulloa, and the Marques Del Duero. Five times he slowly passed along the Spanish line of battle, back and forth, steadily closing in towards them, and working his 120 guns mounted on 19,500 tons of ship displacement against the enemy's 90 guns and 12,000 tons of ship displacement, after which he quietly went. to breakfast. It was the next morning after the battle when Nelson finished his work, and estimated his loss and gains; it was immediately after breakfast when Dewey deliberately proceeded to finish the business and take an account of stock. Never in the history of the world was the superiority of intellect over mere brute force more gloriously illustrated. Every portion of the contest in Manila Bay seems to have been