an experimental stage, has admitted that he is already satisfied that these vessels are a most important development for harbour and coast protection. The long runs which have been made by several boats in an open sea way in French and American waters give reason to believe that in the near future their role as an offensive force may be also amply established. Already we have the achievement of the Narval in May 1901 in travelling 260 miles at sea, remaining submerged for several hours, as an indication of the line of development from the purely defensive to the offensive. Probably in the coming decade we shall see every sea-going squadron with its flotilla of these boats, carried from point to point when cruising in a large 'mothership,' and dropped at convenient spots for the training of officers and men in their use and in the development of a scheme of tactics suited to the part which they will take in an attack on a blockaded fleet in port, or in checking operations on the part of the blockaded force within.

The future is in the lap of the gods, but already the submarine looms large, and it would be rash to attempt to mark the limits of its employment in time of war. We may not have yet evolved the ideal warship of this design—that experiment in English waters may reveal-but the progress that has been made in the past few years exceeds in result all the laboured, though spasmodic, effort of the century preceding the French infatuation. We may be on the eve of a naval revolution almost as momentous and as far-reaching in its results as the change from wood and sails to the steel and steam of to-day, so effectively typified in Portsmouth harbour by Nelson's old flagship Victory (flying still the flag of the admiral in command of the port) and the many modern ships, from gaunt battleships to swift devilish destroyers, which are ever passing in and out of that arsenal. Under the influence of the demonstrations that have taken place in America and off the French ports the naval opinion of the world has been undergoing a gradual change, and it must be recognised that as the submarine now promises to become a formidable engine of war, and is also an instrument of commerce like other warlike material, its future development along the lines of the present models is certain. Already France possesses thirty-four of these craft of terrible import, vessels which may mean not only a revolution in naval construction, but a complete change in existing tactics. Thirteen more are to be ordered this year. Italy is building five, and Russia one. If one can read aright the signs of the times, in a few years the French Navy will have not thirty-four, but probably ten times as many submarines wherewith to protect the ports of the Republic, and to lead attacks on our commerce maybe; in the last resource, if bolder tactics fail, carrying on a species of guerilla warfare in the English Channel similar in some measure to the operations that the Boers have pursued

with so much success in South Africa. Fully 90 per cent. of the merchant ships that are ever passing up and down this narrow waterway fly the British flag. How narrow the Channel is, and what an admirable field it offers for commerce destruction, the people of this country apparently fail to recognise. There is no route beyond a few hours' steaming of the French ports. Dover and Calais are only twenty-two miles apart; Portsmouth and Cherbourg are seventy-three; Portsmouth and Havre are ninetyone; and Plymouth and Brest 150. None of these distances is beyond the steaming capacity of a submarine. At eight knots one of these vessels could travel from Cherbourg to Portsmouth in nine hours; in other words, leaving the French shore under average weather conditions at dusk, say four o'clock, it could be off St. Catherine's shortly after midnight, and who shall say what it might not achieve ?-for from this point it could proceed either awash or submerged. Dover is even nearer our neighbours, and this is the reason why over three millions sterling are being expended in a defended harbour. Plymouth is within less than a day's run from Brest. These figures illustrate the restriction of the Channel in these days of steam, and emphasise the fact that there is not a trade route in this narrow sea that is beyond the reach of the submarine operating from one or other of the French ports. It is not difficult to picture the danger in which our ships may be placed in time of war, remembering that the officers of these mosquito ships will run great risks to attain their ends. A hundred submarines let loose at sunset in these narrow waters would render existence on our warships by no means enviable. The field for operation in the Mediterranean is hardly less favourable to these boats.

The French people have long ago assimilated these possibilities, which are responsible for the enthusiasm with which the submarine has been welcomed. Frenchmen know that it has come and has come to stay, a thorn in the side of the greatest naval Power with its hundred millions sterling invested in battleships and cruisers, more or less at the mercy of these ships, deadly in their threat though insignificant in size, and cheap. It is because this danger threatens, if it does not already exist, that the British people should watch with keen interest the development of this craft, and welcome every effort made by the authorities to arrive at a true understanding of the problems that it presents. The old policy of refusing to admit that submarines are or can be of any service to a Power that intends to pursue an offensive-defensive scheme when war occurs must be abandoned, since there can be no doubt that the new vessels will be of the greatest service for harbour and coast defence if only on account of their moral influence. This has been already proved by the Narval, Morse, and Gustave Zédé in France, and by the old type of Holland boat which has been most thoroughly tested in America. What the utility

of the new craft may be as an offensive weapon it is still early to state definitely, because the results of past experience cannot be accepted as satisfactory for or against the British type of boats. The presumption, however, is that as the craft are so small that they can be moved with a battle fleet with the greatest ease on board a 'mothership,' their rôle in this respect may be outlined by subsequent experiment beyond the possibility of criticism. The right line of action was set forth by the Secretary to the United States Navy when he informed Congress that 'well trained and thoroughly reliable crews are indispensable for submarine boats, and like all torpedo boats their efficiency will largely depend on the nerve, dash, and steadfastness of their personnel. This marks the accurate attitude towards the submarine boat in its present stage-a desire to ascertain its powers, and a recognition that this can be done only by detailing officers and men to the craft, and giving them every opportunity and encouragement to test the capabilities of this audacious development of naval warfare. So far as can be judged this is the line of action that the British Admiralty have laid down, and this way lies truth as opposed to theoretical condemnation or over-appreciation, both of which are fraught with danger.

ARCHIBALD S. HURD.

SHOULD TRADE UNIONS BE

INCORPORATED?

TRADE Unions have been placed in a serious dilemma by the revolutionary decision of the House of Lords in the Taff Vale case.

There are about 800 trade unions of employers, distributed over the chief industries, and 1,300 unions of workmen, with an approximate membership of 2,000,000.

These unions have all been formed and built up upon the assumption that they were purely voluntary associations, with no more legal personality than that possessed by a cricket or a West-End social club. The Law Lords have now shown this universal assumption to have been erroneous by declaring that a registered trade union is a legal entity, capable of being sued for the wrongful acts of its officers if committed within the scope of their authority. Many eminent persons have quarrelled with the decision on the ground that it is not good 'law.' Such criticism, whether right or wrong, is really beside the mark. The decision is not based upon strict law, but is just one of those quasi-legislative pronouncements which the Lords have delivered from time immemorial in the exercise of their jurisdiction in equity. And we all know what a very elusive and unfettered creature equity is. Indeed, has not Selden quaintly told us in his Table Talk that ' equity is according to the conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so is equity.' But it is idle to quarrel with the decision, upon quite other grounds. It is the final pronouncement of the highest tribunal in the land. Be it good law, bad law, or indifferent law, it is the law. The trade unions frankly recognise this, and know full well that if they would be relieved from its crippling and harassing effects, they must seek fresh legislation. This they are earnestly bent upon procuring. It is as yet too early for their desire to have crystallised into definite legislative proposals. All one can say at present is that it vaguely alternates between the suggestion on the one hand that the unions should seek the full rights and capacities of corporations, and, on the other hand, that they should endeavour to get back to the limited status of

voluntary associations, such as they hitherto believed was conferred upon them by the Trade Union Act of 1871.

The suggestion that the trade unions should be incorporated can scarcely claim the merit of novelty. Thrice within the last thirty-five years the question has been raised in connection with contemplated labour legislation. Therefore, before grappling more closely with the subject as one of prime political importance at this moment, it will be of advantage to make a brief excursion into trade union history. This will enable us not only to appreciate the reasons for the attitude of employers and workmen towards the question, but also to realise how completely the Taff Vale judgment has changed the conditions of the problem.

At the time the Royal Commission was appointed, in 1867, to inquire into the organisation and rules of trade unions, those unions were for all practical purposes illegal bodies, as being combinations in restraint of trade. True, the Combination Act of 1825 conferred a certain degree of freedom upon the unions. It exempted from punishment 'persons meeting together for consulting upon and determining the rates of wages which the persons present at the meeting, or any of them, should demand for their work, or the hours during which they should work.' It also contained a similar limited exemption with respect to persons entering into an agreement for these purposes. Stepping beyond these very narrow provisions, the unions found themselves in the shadow-land of illegality. Meetings, or strikes, or the payment of strike alimony, or agreements in pursuit of certain other equally essential purposes of a union, were all unlawful. Thus meetings to protest against the tyranny of foremen, an agreement to regulate the number of apprentices, a strike against the sweating' or sub-contract system, or the payment of alimony to men on strike against 'knobsticks,' piecework, or insanitary conditions of employment, were all illegal. The presence of any of these objects in the rules made the union an illegal association in restraint of trade. From this illegality flowed two serious consequences. In the first place, the members of such unions had no remedy against embezzling officials. In the second place, both members and officials were liable at any moment to be indicted for criminal conspiracy. To escape these consequences some of the unions resorted to subterfuge. They expunged from their rules all reference to their trade protection purposes, and registered under the Friendly Societies Acts as quite innocent-looking associations for the provision of friendly benefits. They then pursued their 'illegal objects' in secrecy. In other words, the 'trade' parts of their unions were converted into secret societies. The members of these secret societies knew full well that upon discovery they were as liable to be indicted for conspiracy and heavily punished in seeking to condition piecework, or regulate the number of apprentices, as for organising violence or