From these considerations it would appear, that in politics, as well as in many of the other sciences, the loudest advocates for experience are the least entitled to appeal to its authority in favor of their dogmas; and that the charge of a presumptuous confidence in human wisdom and foresight, which they are perpetually urging against political philosophers, may with far greater justice be retorted on themselves. An additional illustration of this is presented by the strikingly contrasted effects of statistical and of philosophical studies on the intellectual habits in general;-the former invariably encouraging a predilection for restraints and checks, and all the other technical combinations of an antiquated and scholastic policy;—the latter, by inspiring, on the one hand, a distrust of the human powers, when they attempt to embrace in detail, interests at once so complicated and so momentous; and on the other, a religious attention to the designs of nature, as displayed in the general laws which regulate her economy;-leading, no less irresistibly, to a gradual and progressive simplification of the political mechanism. It is, indeed, the never failing result of all sound philosophy, to humble, more and more, the pride of science before that Wisdom which is infinite and divine ;-whereas, the farther back we carry our researches into those ages, the institutions of which have been credulously regarded as monuments of the superiority of unsophisticated good sense, over the false refinements of modern arrogance, we are the more struck with the numberless insults offered to the most obvious suggestions of nature and of reason. We may remark this, not only in the moral depravity of rude tribes, but in the universal disposition which they discover to disfigure and distort the bodies of their infants;-in one case, new-modelling the form of the eyelids ;-in a second lengthening the ears ;-in a third, checking the growth of the feet;-in a fourth, by mechanical pressures applied to the head, attacking the seat of thought and intelligence. To allow the human form to attain, in perfection, its fair proportions, is one of the latest improvements of civilized society; and the case is perfectly analogous in those sciences which have for their object to assist nature in the cure of diseases; in the development and improvement of the intellectual faculties; in the correction of bad morals; and in the regulations of political economy.

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SECTION VI.

OF THE SPECULATION CONCERNING FINAL CAUSES.

I.-Opinion of Lord Bacon on the subject.-Final Causes rejected by Des Cartes, and by the majority of French Philosophers.Recognised as legitimate objects of research by Newton.-Tacitly acknowledged by all as a useful logical Guide, even in Sciences which have no immediate relation to Theology.

THE study of final causes may be considered in two different points of view: first, as subservient to the evidences of natural religion; and, secondly, as a guide and auxiliary in the investigation of physical laws. Of these views, it is the latter alone which is immediately connected with the principles of the inductive logic; and it is to this, accordingly, that I shall chiefly direct my attention in the following observations. I shall not, however, adhere so scrupulously to a strict arrangement, as to avoid all reference to the former, where the train of my reflections may naturally lead to it. The truth is, that the two speculations will, on examination, be found much more nearly allied than might at first sight be apprehended.

I before observed, that the phrase "final cause" was first introduced by Aristotle; and that the extension thus given to the notion of causation contributed powerfully to divert the inquiries of his followers from the proper objects of physical science. In reading the strictures of Bacon on this mode of philosophizing, it is necessary always to bear in mind that they have a particular reference to the theories of the schoolmen, and, if they should sometimes appear to be expressed in terms too unqualified, due allowances ought to be made for the undistinguishing zeal of a reformer, in attacking prejudices consecrated by long and undisturbed prescription. "Causarum finalium inquisitio sterilis est, et tanquam Virgo Deo consecrata, nihil parit." Had a similar remark occurred in any philosophical work of the eighteenth century, it might perhaps have been fairly suspected to savor of the school of Epicurus; although, even in such a case, the quaintness and levity of the conceit would probably have inclined a cautious and candid reader to interpret the author's meaning with an indulgent latitude. On the present occasion, however, Bacon is his own best commentator; and I shall therefore quote, in a faithful, though abridged translation, the preparatory passage by which this allusion. is introduced.

"The second part of metaphysics is the investigation of final causes; which I object to, not as a speculation which ought to be neglected, but as one which has, in general, been very improperly

regarded as a branch of physics. If this were merely a fault of arrangement, I should not be disposed to lay great stress upon it; for arrangement is useful chiefly as a help to perspicuity, and does not affect the substantial matter of science. But in this instance a disregard of method has occasioned the most fatal consequences to philosophy; inasmuch as the consideration of final causes in physics has supplanted and banished the study of physical causes; the fancy amusing itself with illusory explanations derived from the former, and misleading the curiosity from a steady prosecution of the latter." After illustrating this remark by various examples, Bacon adds: "I would not, however be understood, by these observations, to insinuate that the final causes just mentioned may not be founded in truth, and, in a metaphysical view, extremely worthy of attention; but only, that when such disquisitions invade and overrun the appropriate province of physics, they are likely to lay waste and ruin that department of knowledge." The passage concludes with these words: "And so much concerning metaphysics: the part of which relating to final causes, I do not deny, has been often enlarged upon in physical as well as metaphysical treatises. But while, in the latter of these, it is treated of with propriety, in the former, it is altogether misplaced; and that, not merely because it violates the rules of a logical order, but because it operates as a powerful obstacle to the progress of inductive science." (De Augm. Scient. lib. iii. cap. iv. v.)*

Metaphysicæ pars secunda est finalium causarum inquisitio, quam non ut prætermissam, sed ut male collocatam notamus. Solent enim inquiri inter physica non inter metaphysica. Quanquam si ordinis hoc solum vitium esset, non mihi fuerit tanti. Ordo enim ad illustrationem pertinet, neque est ex substantia scientiarum. At hæc ordinis inversio defectum insignem peperit, et maximam philosophiæ induxit calamitatem. Tractatio enim causarum finalium in physicis, inquisitionem causarum physicarum expulit et dejecit, effecitque ut homines in istiusmodi speciosis et umbratilibus causis acquiescerent, nec inquisitionem causa. rum realium, et vere physicarum, strenue urgerent, ingenti scientiarum detrimento. Etenim reperio hoc factum esse non solum a Platone, qui in hoc littore semper anchoram figit, verum etiain ab Aristotele, Galeno, et aliis, qui sæpissime etiam ad illa vada impingunt. Etenim qui causas adduxerit hujusmodi, palpebras cum pilis pro sepi et vallo esse, ad munimentum oculorum: aut corium in animalibus firmitudinem esse ad propellendos calores et frigora: aut ossa pro columnis et trabibus a natura induci, quibus fabrica corporis innitatur: aut folia arborum emitti, quo fructus minus patiantur á sole et vento: aut nubes in sublimi fieri, ut terram imbribus irrigent; aut terram densari et solidari, ut statio et mansio sit animalium: et alia similia. Is in metaphysicis non male ista allegarit; in physicis autem nequaquam. Imo, quod cœpimus dicere, hujusmodi sermonum discursus (instar remorarum, uti fingunt, navibus adhærentium) scientiarum quasi velificationem et progressum retardarunt, ne cursum suum tenerent, et ulterius progrederentur: et jampridem effecerunt, ut physicarum causarum inquisitio neglecta deficeret, ac silentio præteriretur. Quapropter philosophia naturalis Democriti, et aliorum, qui Deum et mentem à fabrica rerum amoverunt; et structuram universi infinitis naturæ prælusionibus et tentamentis (quas uno nomine fatum aut fortunam vocabant) attribuerunt; et rerum particularium causas, materiæ necessitati, sine intermixtione causarum finalium, assignarunt; nobis videtur, quatenus ad causas physicas, multo solidior fuisse, et altius in Naturam penetrasse, quam illa Aristotelis, et Platonis: Hanc unicain ob causam, quod illi in causis finalibus nunquam operam triverunt; hi autem eas perpetuo inculcarunt. Atque magis in hac parte accusandus Aristoteles quam Plato: quandoquidem fontem causarum

The epigrammatic maxim which gave occasion to these extracts has, I believe, been oftener quoted, particularly by French writers, than any other sentence in Bacon's works; and, as it has in general been stated, without any reference to the context, in the form of a detached aphorism, it has been commonly supposed to convey a meaning widely different from what appears to have been annexed to it by the author. The remarks with which he has prefaced it, and which I have here submitted to the consideration of my readers, sufficiently show, not only that he meant his proposition to be restricted to the abuse of final causes in the physics of Aristotle, but that he was anxious to guard against the possibility of any misapprehension or misrepresentation of his opinion. A further proof of this is afforded by the censure which, in the same paragraph, he bestows on Aristotle, for "substituting nature instead of God, as the fountain of final causes; and for treating of them rather as subservient to logic than to theology."

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A similar observation may be made on another sentence in Bacon, in the interpretation of which a very learned writer (Dr. Cudworth) seems to have altogether lost sight of his usual candor. credibile est quantum agmen idolorum philosophiæ immiserit, naturalium operationum ad similitudinem actionum humanarum reductio." "If," says Cudworth, "the advancer of learning here speaks of those who unskilfully attribute their own properties to inanimate bodies, (as when they say that matter desires forms as the female does the male, and that heavy bodies descend down by appetite towards the center, that they may rest therein,) there is nothing to be reprehended in the passage. But if his meaning be extended further to take away all final causes from the things of nature, then is it in the very spirit of atheism and infidelity. It is no idol of the cave or den (to use that affected language) that is, no prejudice or fallacy imposed on ourselves, from the attributing our own animalish properties to things without us, to think that the frame and system of this whole world was contrived by a perfect understanding and mind."

It is difficult to conceive that any person who had read Bacon's works, and who at the same time, was acquainted with the theories which it was their great object to explode, could, for a moment, have hesitated about rejecting the latter interpretation as altogether absurd; and yet the splenetic tone which marks the conclusion of Cudworth's strictures, plainly shows, that he had a decided leaning to it, in preference to the former.* The comment does no honor

finalium, Deum scilicet, omiserit, et naturam pro Deo substituerit, causasque ipsas finales, potius ut logic amator quam theologiæ, amplexus sit. Neque hæc eo dicimus, quod causæ illæ finales veræ non sint, et inquisitione admodum dignæ in speculationibus metaphysicæ, sed quia dum in physicarum causarum possessiones excurrunt et irruunt, misere eam provinciam depopulantur et vastant." De Augm. Scient. lib. iii. cap. 4.

*

Even the former interpretation is not agreeable, as appears manifestly from the context, to Bacon's idea. The prejudices which he has here more particularly in

to his liberality; and on the most favorable supposition must be imputed to a superstitious reverence for the remains of Grecian wisdom, accompanied with a corresponding dread of the unknown dangers to be apprehended from philosophical innovations. Little was he aware, that, in turning the attention of men from the history of opinions and systems to the observation and study of nature, Bacon was laying the foundation of a bulwark against atheism, more stable and impregnable than the united labors of the ancients were able to rear;-a bulwark which derives additional strength from every new accession to the stock of human knowledge.*

Whether Bacon's contempt for the Final Causes of the Aristotelians has not carried him to an extreme in recommending the total exclusion of them from physics, is a very different question; and a question of much importance in the theory of the inductive logic. My own opinion is, that his views on this point, if considered as applicable to the present state of experimental science, are extremely limited and erroneous. Perhaps, at the time when he wrote, such an exclusion may have appeared necessary, as the only effectual antidote against the errors which then infected every

view, are those which take their rise from a bias in the mind to imagine a greater equality and uniformity in nature than really exists. As an instance of this, he mentions the universal assumption among the ancient astronomers, that all the celestial motions are performed in orbits perfectly circular;-an assumption, which, a few years before Bacon wrote, had been completely disproved by Kepler. To this he adds some other examples from physics and chemistry; after which he introduces the general reflection animadverted on by Cudworth.-The whole passage concludes with these words. "Tanta est harmoniæ discrepanti inter spiritum hominis et spiritum mundi."

The criticism may appear minute; but I cannot forbear to mention, as a proof of the carelessness with which Cudworth had read Bacon, that the prejudice supposed by the former to belong to the class of idola specus, is expressly quoted by the latter, as an example of the idola tribus. (See the 5th Book de Augment. Scient. chap. iv.)

*Extabit eximium Newtoni opus adversus Atheorum impetus munitissimum præsidium.-Cotesii Præf. in Edit. Secund. Princip.

In the above vindication of Bacon, I have abstained from any appeal to the instances in which he has himself forcibly and eloquently expressed the same sentiments here ascribed to him; because I conceive that an author's real opinions are to be most indisputably judged of from the general spirit and tendency of his writings. The following passage, however, is too precious a document to be omitted on the present occasion. It is indeed one of the most hackneyed quotations in our language; but it forms, on that very account, the more striking a contrast to the voluminous and now neglected erudition displayed by Cudworth in defence of the same argument.

"I had rather believe all the fables in the Legend, and the Talmud, and the Alcoran, than that this universal frame is without a mind! It is true that a little philosophy inclineth man's mind to atheism; but depth in philosophy bringeth men's minds about to religion; for while the mind of man looketh upon second causes scattered, it may sometimes rest in them and go no farther; but when it beholdeth the chain of them confederate and linked together, it must needs fly to providence and Deity: nay, even that school which is most accused of atheism, doth most demonstrate religion; that is, the school of Leucippus, and Democritus and Epicurus; for it is a thousand times more credible, that four mutable elements and one immutable fifth essence, duly and eternally placed, need no God, than that an army of infinite small portions, or seeds unplaced, should have produced this order and beauty without a divine marshal."-Bacon's Essays.