Imágenes de páginas
PDF
EPUB

in

would find themselves perfectly capable of communicating to others the steps by which they were led to their conclusions. In consequence of these circumstances, the attainments of the human mind, in its ruder state, perish with the individual, without being recorded in writing, or perhaps expressed in words; and we are left to infer them indirectly from the structure of language, or from the monuments of ancient customs and institutions.

When a train of thought leads to any interesting conclusion, or excites any pleasant feeling, it becomes peculiarly difficult to arrest our fleeting ideas; because the mind, when once it has felt the pleasure, has little inclination to retrace the steps by which it arrived at it. This is one great cause of the difficulty attending philosophical criticism. When a critic explains to us, why we are pleased with any particular beauty, or offended with any defect, it is evident, that if his theory be just, the circumstances which he points out as the foundation of our pleasure or uneasiness, must have occurred to our minds before we were pleased with the beauty, or offended with the defect. In such cases, it sometimes happens, when a critic has been fortunate in his theory, that we recognize at first sight our old ideas, and without any farther consideration, are ready to bear testimony to the truth, from our own consciousness. So very difficult, however, is it to attend to the ideas which excite such feelings, that it often appears to be doubtful, whether a theory be right or wrong; and that where there is every reason to believe that the pleasure is produced in all men in the same way, different critics adopt different theories with respect to its cause. It is long practice alone, joined to what is commonly called a metaphysical turn of mind, (by which I think is chiefly to be understood, a capacity of reflecting on the subjects of our consciousness,) that can render such efforts of attention easy. Exquisite sensibility, so far from being useful in this species of criticism, both gives a disrelish for the study, and disqualifies for pursuing it.

Before we leave the subject of attention, it is proper to take notice of a question which has been stated with respect to it; whether we have the power of attending to more than one thing at one and the same instant; or, in other words, whether we can attend at one and the same instant, to objects which we can attend to separately? This question has, if I am not mistaken, been already decided by several philosophers in the negative; and I acknowledge for my own part, that although their opinion has not only been called in question by others, but even treated with some degree of contempt as altogether hypothetical, it appears to me to be the most reasonable and philosophical that we can form on the subject.

There is indeed a great variety of cases, in which the mind

I have added this explanation to obviate the question, What is meant by one object.

[ocr errors]

V

apparently exerts different acts of attention at once; but from the instances which have already been mentioned, of the astonishing rapidity of thought, it is obvious, that all this may be explained, without supposing these acts to be co-existent; and I may even venture to add, it may all be explained in the most satisfactory manner, without ascribing to our intellectual operations, a greater degree of rapidity than that with which we know from the fact that they are sometimes carried on. The effect of practice in increasing this capacity of apparently attending to different things at once, renders this explanation of the phenomenon in question, more probable than any other.

The case of the equilibrist and rope-dancer already mentioned, is particularly favorable to this explanation; as it affords direct evidence of the possibility of the mind's exerting different successive acts in an interval of time so short as to produce the same sensible effect, as if they had been exerted at one and the same moment. In this case, indeed, the rapidity of thought is so remarkable, that if the different acts of the mind were not all necessarily accompanied with different movements of the eye, there can be no reason for doubting that the philosophers, whose doctrine I am now controverting, would have asserted, that they are all mathematically co-existent.

Upon a question, however, of this sort, which does not admit of a perfectly direct appeal to the fact, I would by no means be understood to decide with confidence: and therefore I should wish the conclusions I am now to state, to be received, as only conditionally established. They are necessary and obvious consequences of the general principle, "that the mind can only attend to one thing at once;" but must stand or fall with the truth of that supposition.

It is commonly understood, I believe, that, in a concert of music, a good ear can attend to the different parts of the music separately, or can attend to them all at once, and feel the full effect of the harmony. If the doctrine, however, which I have endeavored to establish, be admitted, it will follow, that in the latter case, the mind is constantly varying its attention from the one part of the music to the other, and that its operations are so rapid, as to give us no perception of an interval of time.

The same doctrine leads to some curious conclusions with respect to vision. Suppose the eye to be fixed in a particular position, and the picture of an object to be painted on the retina. Does the mind perceive the complete figure of the object at once, or is this perception the result of the various perceptions we have of the different points in the outline? With respect to this question, the principles already stated lead me to conclude, that the mind does at one and the same time perceive every point in the outline of the object, (provided the whole of it be painted on the retina at the same instant,) for perception, like consciousness, is an involuntary operation. As no two points, however, of the outline are in the

same direction, every point, by itself, constitutes just as distinct an object of attention to the mind, as if it were separated by an interval of empty space from all the rest. If the doctrine therefore formerly stated be just, it is impossible for the mind to attend to more than one of these points at once; and as the perception of the figure of the object, implies a knowledge of the relative situation of the different points with respect to each other, we must conclude, that the perception of figure by the eye, is the result of a number of different acts of attention. These acts of attention, however, are performed with such rapidity, that the effect, with respect to us, is the same as if the perception were instantaneous.

In farther confirmation of this reasoning, it may be remarked, that if the perception of visible figure were an immediate consequence of the picture on the retina, we should have, at the first glance, as distinct an idea of a figure of a thousand sides, as of a triangle or a square. The truth is, that when the figure is very simple, the process of the mind is so rapid, that the perception seems to be instantaneous; but when the sides are multiplied beyond a certain number, the interval of time necessary for these different acts of attention becomes perceptible.

It may perhaps be asked, what I mean by a point in the outline of a figure, and what it is that constitutes this point one object of attention? The answer, I apprehend, is, that this point is the minimum visible. If the point be less, we cannot perceive it; if it be greater, it is not all seen in one direction.

If these observations be admitted, it will follow, that, without the faculty of memory, we could have had no perception of visible figure.*

* I have been accused of overlooking, in the preceding Chapter, a very important distinction between Voluntary and Involuntary attention. In some cases (it is said) attention attaches itself spontaneously to its object. In others it requires a painful effort to keep it steady,-nay, when we will to fix it on one subject, we find it perpetually wandering to another. The fact on which the criticism is founded must unquestionably be admitted, but the conclusion drawn from it is nevertheless erroneous. It proceeds on a vague use of the words voluntary and inroluntary. These words, as well as the substantive will, are often but very inaccurately employed to express a general purpose or intention, as well as that state of mind which is the immediate antecedent of action. Thus, if I resolve to keep my eyes steadily open, I may, according to common modes of speech, be said to will to keep them open, and if in consequence of some sudden alarm, I should de part from my purpose, the winking of my eye lids may be said to be involuntary. And yet in strict philosophical propriety the winking of my eye-lids is an act purely voluntary; an operation which I will to perform, in consequence of the effect which my alarm has to banish my general purpose or resolution from my mind. The case is perfectly parallel with respect to attention. When I am anxious to attend to a particular subject, I am apt to say that I will to attend to it, and when I forget my purpose, that my inattention is involuntary; whereas the fact is, that the unintended distraction, like the unintended winking of the eye-lids, was the effect of a particular volition of the mind, exerted in consequence of a momentary forgetfulness of my general purpose. Indeed, to those who are at all accustomed to precision in the use of language, the phrase involuntary attention must appear a manifest contradiction in terms.

CHAPTER III.

OF CONCEPTION.

By conception, I mean that power of the mind, which enables it to form a notion of an absent object of perception; or of a sensation which it has formerly felt. I do not contend that this is exclusively the proper meaning of the word, but I think that the faculty which I have now defined, deserves to be distinguished by an appropriated name.

Conception is often confounded with other powers. When a painter makes a picture of a friend, who is absent or dead, he is commonly said to paint from memory and the expression is sufficiently correct for common conversation. But in an analysis of the mind, there is ground for a distinction. The power of conception enables him to make the features of his friend an object of thought, so as to copy the resemblance; the power of memory recognises these features as a former object of perception. Every act of memory includes an idea of the past; conception implies no idea of time whatever.*

[ocr errors]

According to this view of the matter, the word conception corresponds to what was called by the schoolmen simple apprehension; with this difference only, that they included, under this name, our apprehension of general propositions; whereas I should wish to limit the application of the word conception to our sensations, and the objects of our perceptions. Dr. Reid, in his Inquiry, substitutes the word conception instead of the simple apprehension of the schools, and employs it in the same extensive signification. I think it may contribute to make our ideas more distinct, to restrict its meaning and for such a restriction, we have the authority of philosophers in a case perfectly analogous. In ordinary language, we apply the same word perception, to the knowledge which we have by our senses of external objects, and to our knowledge of speculative truth and yet an author would be justly censured, who should treat of these two operations of the mind under the same article of perception. I apprehend there is as wide a difference between the conception of a truth, and the conception of an absent object of sense, as between the perception of a tree, and the perception of a mathematical theorem. I have therefore taken the liberty to distinguish also the two former operations of the mind: and under the

Shakespeare calls this power "the mind's eye."
Hamlet." My father! Methinks I see my father.
Horatio." Where, my Lord?

Hamlet." In my mind's eye, Horatio."-Act 1. Scene 4.

article of conception, shall confine myself to that faculty whose province it is to enable us to form a notion of our past sensations, or of the objects of sense that we have formerly perceived.

Conception is frequently used as synonymous with imagination. Dr. Reid says, that "imagination, in its proper sense, signifies a lively conception of objects of sight." "This is a talent," he remarks," of importance to poets and orators; and deserves a proper name, on account of its connexion with their arts." He adds that "imagination is distinguished from conception, as a part from the whole."

I shall not inquire at present, into the proper English meaning of the words conception and imagination. In a study such as this, so far removed from common purposes of speech, some latitude may perhaps be allowed in the use of words; provided only we define accurately those we employ, and adhere to our own definitions.

The business of conception, according to the account I have given of it, is to present us with an exact transcript of what we have felt or perceived. But we have, moreover, a power of modifying our conceptions, by combining the parts of different ones together, so as to form new wholes of our own creation. I shall employ the word imagination to express this power; and, I apprehend, that this is the proper sense of the word; if imagination be the power which gives birth to the productions of the poet and the painter. This is not a simple faculty of the mind. It presupposes abstraction, to separate from each other qualities and circumstances which have been perceived in conjunction; and also judgment and taste to direct us in forming the combinations. If they are made wholly at random, they are proofs of insanity.*

The first remarkable fact which strikes us with respect to conception is, that we can conceive the objects of some senses much more easily than those of others. Thus we can conceive an absent visible object, such as a building that is familiar to us, much more easily than a particular sound, a particular taste, or a particular pain, which we have formerly felt. It is probable, however, that this power might be improved in the case of some of our senses. people, I believe, are able to form a very distinct conception of sounds; and yet it is certain, that, by practice, a person may acquire

Few

* In common discourse, we often use the phrase of thinking upon an object, to express what I here call, the conception of it. In the following passage, Shakespeare uses the former of these phrases, and the words imagination and apprehension as synonymous with each other.

-Who can hold a fire in his hand,
By thinking on the frosty Caucasus ?
Or cloy the hungry edge of appetite,
By bare imagination of a feast?

Or wallow naked in December's snow,
By thinking on fantastic summer's heat?
Oh no! the apprehension of the good
Gives but the greater feeling to the worse.

K. RICHARD 11. Act 1. Scene 6.

« AnteriorContinuar »