ing. The movement would threaten his communication with Chattanooga. He must fight or retreat.

The outline of operations as given by Garfield was accepted; a division of cavalry taking possession of the gap in the hills. In one engagement General Johnson's division of Bragg's army lost two hundred and thirty-one killed and wounded.

General Bragg seems not to have understood the meaning of the movement till Rosecrans was abreast of Wartrace, nearly east of that place, having not only turned his flank, but having crossed Duck River, which was but a rivulet on Rosecrans's line of march.

While Rosecrans was moving on Manchester and Dechard with the main body of the army, the force which had been detailed to make the feint at Shelbyville was vigorously at work.

Bragg having discovered the meaning of the movement, began to move southeast to counteract it; but he was too late, and there was the spectacle of both armies marching south on nearly parallel lines. Bragg along the railway to Dechard; Rosecrans farther east.

The Union cavalry under Mitchell and the brigades of infantry under Colonel Minty, boldly attacked the Confederate troops under Wheeler, whom Bragg had detailed to hold Shelbyville, pushing on with such impetuosity that the Confederates suffered a total defeat, losing more than five hundred men, several pieces of artillery, and a large amount of supplies.

From McMinniville, Wilder's brigade was sent to tear up the railroad north of Dechard. The troops started in the early morning, struck the railroad at eight in the

evening, tore up one thousand feet of the track, and burned the rest, but were obliged to fall back before a superior force, avoiding a division of Rebel cavalry, rejoining the main body, which all the while was advanc ing, reaching Manchester at noon, June 30th.

"Bragg has fled," said a farmer to General Rosecrans as his army advanced to within two miles of Tullahoma on the morning of June 30th.

The army pressed on, overtaking Bragg's rear-guard, pressing it all the way southward to the Tennessee.

It was a nine days' campaign, in which Rosecrans had lost 85 killed, 413 wounded, and 13 captured. Bragg's loss in killed and wounded was far greater, 50 being officers; 1575 prisoners were captured, together with 8 field-pieces, and 3 rifled siege-guns, beside a vast amount of material abandoned in the retreat.

Bragg had been forced south of the Tennessee; and with the movement of Burnside to East Knoxville, the State of Tennessee was brought once more under the dominion of the old flag.

It was the genius of James A. Garfield that had brought it about; the courage to set forth his own convictions in opposition to every other commander; and his persuasive power over his commander-in-chief. He planned the campaign, and aided in carrying it out.

THE

XVII.

TO CHICKAMAUGA.

HE Tennessee River, flowing from the east for a long distance, has a general southwestern course. The village of Chattanooga, on its southern bank, in 1863 contained about fifteen hundred inhabitants. It is situated in a mountain gate-way. Lookout Mountain, a long ridge lying parallel to the river, rising twenty-four hundred feet above the level of the sea, presents on its northern face an almost perpendicular bluff. Its eastern and western sides are more sloping and partially wooded.

Between Lookout and the Tennessee is a lower ridge, the northern portion of which is called Raccoon Mountain, and the southern portion Sand Mountain. Eastward of Lookout is Missionary Ridge, an elevation much lower than Lookout. It is about twentyfive miles long, and West Chickamauga Creek flows along its eastern base, and empties into the Tennessee at Chattanooga. East of the creek is still another ridge called Pigeon Mountain.

The railroad from Chattanooga to Atlanta runs due east from Chattanooga almost five miles, bends southwest, crosses the Georgia line just above the town of

Ringold,.and then runs on to Dalton, where it forms a junction with the railroad coming down from Knoxville. Eastern Tennessee.

The whole country is one of long mountain ranges lying parallel to each other, with streams flowing northward to the Tennessee and southward to the Coosa, which empties into the Gulf of Mexico.

The movement of Rosecrans upon Tullahoma had forced Bragg across the Tennessee. He held Chattanooga, and his army was posted along the southern bank of the stream, holding every important position for a long distance. It was of the utmost importance. to the Confederacy to prevent the Union army from crossing the stream and moving up the Chickamauga valley, or advancing by any other route to central Georgia and Alabama, from which the Confederates were receiving their supplies.

General Burnside had moved into Eastern Tennessee, and was in possession of Knoxville. Bragg could therefore have no communication with Lee in Virginia by that route, but only through Georgia. Rosecrans's front from East Tennessee extended west far beyond Chattanooga, making a line of positions fully one hundred and fifty miles long. The problem before him was a movement which should compel Bragg to retire from Chattanooga. How could that be done? Certainly not by attempting to cross the Tennessee at Chattanooga, with all of Bragg's cannon ready to hurl a storm of shot, shell, and canister upon the engineer corps if they attempted to lay their pontoons.

To General Garfield was assigned the task of devising

a movement which would compel Bragg to evacuate Chattanooga. Rosecrans did not wish to fight a battle except upon grounds of his own choosing. It may seem an easy matter to plan a campaign, but he who undertakes must study all the factors in the problem, — by what routes the army can march; what obstacles it will encounter, of rivers, mountains, forests; how fast it can move, how it can subsist, how it can be concentrated; what the probable movements of the enemy will be, which routes it will take, where it will make a stand, whether it can be reinforced. It is a problem of vast proportions.

General Garfield saw that the only movement which could be made would be by the right flank crossing the Tennessee, Raccoon and Sand Mountains, Lookout Range, gain the valley of the Coosa, and threaten Bragg's communications with Atlanta. This would involve on the part of Rosecrans a cutting loose from his base of supplies, the crossing of the mountain by gaps wide apart separating his corps, hazarding an attack upon one of the three by Bragg's whole force, and its possible annihilation before either of the others could join it.

Bragg's army numbered fifty-nine thousand; Rosecrans's, after deducting those necessary to guard the railroad and his supplies, was several thousand less. Could Rosecrans hope to make such a movement and concentrate his force before being overwhelmed in detail by Bragg? What could Bragg do? Generals must see what the enemy will be likely to do. Would not such a movement threatening Bragg's communications with Atlanta compel him to retreat?