alry in addition, to fall upon Negley and Baird with only eleven thousand.

Rosecrans was in utter ignorance of the state of affairs. Bragg's spies sent in purposely had done their work well.

"All the information I have received," wrote Rosecrans to Thomas on the evening of the 9th, "induces the belief that there is no considerable Rebel force this side of Dalton."

General Negley's scouts had a different tale to tell, - so different, that that officer, with wise precaution, started his train back toward Baird's position, and moved his troops in the same direction two miles.

Bragg ordered Hindman to begin the attack early in the morning. Cleburne was to advance as soon as he heard Hindman's guns. The morning came and passed, none of Hindman's cannon were thundering; forenoon passed, still no artillery. Courier after courier was sent to know the reason of the silence. Not till three o'clock was Hindman ready to advance.

It is not known why Hindman was not ready. Bragg does not inform us in his report; but at three o'clock Hindman's guns began to play, and Cleburne advanced.

Two companies of the 19th Illinois Infantry were behind a wall biding their time. Cleburne's line was coming on. Suddenly the stone wall was all aflame, and thirty of Cleburne's men went down. The next moment two of Negley's guns on a hill in the rear, began to hurl shells into the advancing column, which came to a stand-still. The golden moment had slipped

away. Negley and Baird could not be successfully assailed, and Cleburne withdrew his troops. He had failed in his design.

What next should Bragg do? He resolved to leave Thomas and McCook, recross Pigeon Mountain at Lafayette, turn north, and annihilate Crittenden before Thomas and Crittenden could join their forces. Then he would attend to McCook. Major-General Polk, who had laid aside a bishop's gown to wear the stars of a major-general, had command of Bragg's right. He was only three miles east of Lee and Gordon's Mills, and opposite a part of Crittenden's corps which had advanced to that point.

"You have a fine opportunity of crushing Crittenden in detail, and I hope you will avail yourself of it tomorrow morning," was Bragg's message to Polk, at 6 P. M. September 12.

"Attack at daylight," said Bragg's second despatch.

The morning of the 13th dawned. Bragg rode in haste northward from Lafayette to see Polk crush first one, and then another of Crittenden's divisions, which were then three miles apart, when, lo and behold! Major-General Polk was quietly eating his breakfast, and his troops were showing no sign of advancing! General Bragg made use of many words, which were more forcible than elegant.

Another golden opportunity had slipped through Bragg's fingers by no fault of his own. How shall we

account for it? Was it that a Divine hand was directing affairs? General Rosecrans saw that himself, and Halleck had been mistaken in the supposition of what

Bragg would do. He began to see that all the pleasant stories told him by men who had come into his camp, informing him of Bragg's retreat, were lies. Bragg, instead of retreating, was preparing to cut him up piecemeal. Now was the time for action.

General Garfield instantly comprehended the situation of affairs. The army must be concentrated. There must be quick marching. Crittenden was at Lee and Gordon's Mill, McCook was fifty miles south of him, and Thomas twenty-five miles from Crittenden, who must hold the roads leading across Missionary Ridge to Chattanooga till Thomas and McCook could join .him.

The salvation of the army depended upon the carrying out of this plan. Couriers rode at break-neck speed, carrying orders. Bragg was hastening his troops north. Bragg had the shortest distance to march, but he must cross Pigeon Mountain, cross Chickamauga Creek, and seize the roads in the rear of Crittenden, which would compel Rosecrans to fight on ground of Bragg's choosing. It was on the morning of the 13th that he abandoned his effort to annihilate Negley. On that day he decided to move north.

"Go over the Pigeon Mountain, and make a demonstration against the Union left," were Bragg's orders to Wheeler's cavalry. At the same time he ordered Forrest to proceed north and threaten Crittenden's connections with Chattanooga. He had decided under cover of these demonstrations to move his army north, cross Chickamauga, and get possession of Missionary Ridge. He decided to go, but did not start. For four

more.

days he remained inactive! Why? Possibly for this reason: Longstreet was on his way, and he would wait. The golden thread dropped from his grasp once Well for our country that it was so, for, had he moved on the 13th, there can be little doubt that Rosecrans's army would have been swept from the face of the earth cut up, a division at a time. He did not move till the night of the 17th, and all through those hours, Thomas and McCook were marching.

Who can measure the value to the country, of that unaccountable delay of Bragg? Not till Rosecrans's three corps were almost in supporting distance of each other, did Bragg give the order to advance.

There are several roads leading eastward from the Lafayette road along the east side of Missionary Ridge to fords and bridges across the creek. The first ford north of Lee's mill, a mile distant, is called Dalton's; a half mile farther is Smith's; a half mile beyond that is Alexander's bridge; a little farther is another ford; beyond that is Reed's bridge; and beyond that is Dyer's bridge. The distance in a straight line from the mill to Dyer's bridge is about five miles. On the Dry-Gulf road, leading along the west side of Missionary Ridge, about a mile and a half from the mill, is the house of Wisdom Glen, where Rosecrans established his headquarters.

XVIII.

FIRST DAY AT CHICKAMAUGA.

HUS far we have been dealing with movements.

TH

We come to the morning of the 19th of September. Bragg has a well-defined plan to cross the Chickamauga at the different bridges and fords, move rapidly by his right flank, seize the road leading from Rossville to Lafayette, push across Missionary Ridge to Rossville, cutting off Rosecrans from Chattanooga. Having done that, he will close in upon the Union troops and overwhelm them by his superior numbers.

Rosecrans has made his movements over Lookout Ridge to compel Bragg to evacuate Chattanooga, and he has succeeded. Crittenden holds it. Rosecrans does not wish to fight a superior force, but sees that a battle is inevitable. If he can meet Bragg and hold on to Chattanooga, even though he may be compelled to fall back from Missionary Ridge, he will have attained the primary object of the campaign. If Bragg does not drive Rosecrans out of Chattanooga and across the Tennessee, his attack will be a failure, even though he may drive Rosecrans from Missionary Ridge.

Rosecrans and his chief of staff General Garfield,