Sec. 795. Payable to order, when. The instrument is payable to order when it is drawn payable to the order of a specified person or to him or his order. It may be drawn payable to the order of: (1) A payee who is not maker, drawer or drawee; or (2) the drawee or maker; or (3) the drawee; or (4) two or more payees jointly; or (5) one or some of the several payees; or (6) the holder of an office for the time being. Where the instrument is payable to order, the payee must be named or otherwise indicated therein with reasonable certainty. (R. S. 1909, § 9979.)

Sec. 796. Payable to bearer, when. The instrument is payable to bearer: (1) When it is expressed to be so payable; or (2) when it is payable to a person named therein or bearer; or (3) when it is payable to the order of a fictitious or nonexisting person and such fact was known to the person making it so payable; or (4) when the name of the payee does not purport to be the name of any person; or (5) when the only or last indorsement is an indorsement in blank. (R. S. 1909, § 9980.)

This section cited and construed, and held a promissory note, indorsed in blank by the payee, is payable to bearer. Trust Co. v. Ramge Co., 196 A. 206, 190 S. W. 1045.

A promissory payable to the maker and indorsed by him in blank is "negotiable" by sale and delivery of a third person. Id. Section cited and applied and held, a note is considered as made payable to bearer when it is made payable to a fictitious or non-existing person, or when the name of the payee does not purport to be the name of any person. Pen Co. v. Buckner, 188 A. 259, 175 S. W. 81.

Sec. 797. Terms, when sufficient. The instrument need not follow the language of this chapter, but any terms are sufficient which clearly indicate an intention to conform to the requirements hereof. (R. S. 1909, § 9981.)

Sec. 798. Date, when deemed prima facie to be true.-Where the instrument or an acceptance or any endorsement thereon is dated, such date is deemed prima facie to be the true date of the making, drawing, acceptance or indorsements, as the case may be (R. S. 1909, § 9982.)

Section cited and construed. Yoemans v. Nachman, 198 A. 195, 198 S. W. 180. Held the purchaser of a note having attached thereto interest coupons that are not paid and past due and which provide that when interest is not paid when due that the whole note may become due, and which does not compare with description in deed of trust by which it purports to be secured, is chargeable with notice of its infirmities. Id.

Sec. 799. Antedating or postdating. The instrument is not invalid for the reason only that it is antedated or postdated: Provided, this is not done for an illegal or fraudulent purpose. The person to whom an instrument so dated is delivered acquires the title thereto as of the date of delivery. (R. S. 1909, § 9983.)

Section cited and applied. Bank v. Day, 145 A. 410, 122 S. W. 756, held this section seems to contemplate instruments which are ante-dated or post-dated by the parties in accordance with a mutual agreement to that effect.

Sec. 800. Effect of inserting date in instrument undated.Where an instrument expressed to be payable at a fixed period after date is issued undated, or where the acceptance of an instrument payable at a fixed period after sight is undated, any holder may insert therein the true date of issue or acceptance, and the instrument shall be payable accordingly. The insertion of a wrong date does not avoid the instrument in the hands of a subsequent holder in due course, but as to him the date so inserted is to be regarded as the true date. (R. S. 1909, § 9984.)

See notes to preceding section.

Sec. 801. Prima facie authority to fill blanks. Where the instrument is wanting in any material particular, the person in possession thereof has a prima facie authority to complete it by filling up the blanks therein. And a signature on a blank paper delivered by the person making the signature in order that the paper may be converted into a negotiable instrument operates as a prima facie authority to fill up as such for any amount. In order that any such instrument, when completed, may be enforced against any person who became a party thereto prior to its completion, it must be filled up strictly in accordance with the authority given and within a reasonable time. But if any such instrument, after completion, is negotiated to a holder in due course, it is valid and effectual for all purposes in his hands, and he may enforce it as if it had been filled up strictly in accordance with the authority given and within a reasonable time. (R. S. 1909, § 9985.)

Filling blanks.-While the presumption is in favor of the integrity of a note in the hands of the payee of indorsee, yet where it appears to be in different handwritings, written at different times, and in different ink, such presumption is destroyed and the fact must be found without aid of the presumption. Bank v. Robinson, 185 A. 582, 172 S. W. 628. As ro authority to fill blanks, see National Bank of Paris v. Nickell, 34 A. 295; Mackey v. Basil, 50 A. 190; Schooler v. Tilden, 71 Mo. 580.

Sec. 802. Incomplete instruments, when invalid. Where an incomplete instrument has not been delivered it will not, if completed and negotiated without authority, be a valid contract in the hands of any holder, as against any person whose signature was placed thereon before delivery. (R. S. 1909, § 9986.)

Section cited and applied. Grocery Co. v. Bank, 192 A. 476, 182 S. W. 777. Where the plaintiff, president of a corporation, before going on vacation, signed some checks in blank and left them with his manager and, while manager was out, a traveling salesman stole the checks, filled in certain amounts and cashed them and defendant bank paid checks, held, maker estopped from claiming he did not voluntarily part with possession of checks. Id.

Sec. 803. Instruments incomplete until delivered. Every contract on a negotiable instrument is incomplete and revocable until delivery of the instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto. As between immediate parties, and as regards a remote

party other than a holder in due course, the delivery, in order to be effectual, must be made either by or under the authority of the party making, drawing, accepting or indorsing, as the case may be; and in such case the delivery may be shown to have been conditional, or for a special purpose only, and not for the purpose of transferring the property in the instrument. But where the instrument is in the hands of the holder in due course, a valid delivery thereof by all parties prior to him so as to make them liable to him is conclusively presumed. And where the instrument is no longer in the possession of a party whose signature appears thereon, a valid and intentional delivery by him is presumed until the contrary is proved. (R. S. 1909, § 9987.)

Delivery. See note to preceding section.

As to necessity and sufficiency of delivery, see Williams' Admr. v. Williams, 67 Mo. 661; Greene County Bank v. Chapman, 134 Mo. 427, 35 S. W. 1150; School District v. Sheidley, 138 Mo. 672, 40 S. W. 656; Fogg v. School Dist., 75 A. 159; Wood v. Flannery, 89 A. 632. As to what constitutes conditional delivery, see Massman v. Holscher, 49 Mo. 87; Ayres v. Milroy, 53 Mo. 516.

Sec. 804. Rules of construction.-Where the language of the instrument is ambiguous, or there are omissions therein, the following rules of construction apply: (1) Where the sum payable is expressed in words and also in figures and there is a discrepancy between the two, the sum denoted by the words is the sum payable; but if the words are ambiguous or uncertain, reference may be had to the figures to fix the amount; (2) where the instrument provides for the payment of interest, without specifying the date from which interest is to run, the interest runs from the date of the instrument, and if the instrument is undated, from the issue thereof; (3) where the instrument is not dated, it will be considered to be dated as of the time it was issued; (4) where there is a conflict between the written and printed provisions of the instrument, the written provisions prevail; (5) where the instrument is so ambiguous that there is doubt whether it is a bill or a note, the holder may treat it as either at his election; (6) where a signature is so placed upon the instrument that it is not clear in what capacity the person making the same intended to sign, he is to be deemed an indorser; (7) where an instrument containing the words, “I promise to pay," is signed by two or more persons, they are deemed to be jointly and severally liable thereon. 1909, § 9988.)

(R. S.

General rules of construction.--Held the spoilation of a promissory note by a stranger does not constitute an alteration so as to make it void so far as holder is concerned, unless he subsequently ratifies the stranger's act, and will not prevent the recovery on the original consideration for which the note was given when the alteration was not made with a fraudelent intent. Id. Where an instrument is not dated, it will be considered to be dated as at the time it was issued. Bank v. Day, 145 A. 410, 122 S. W. 756.

As to capacity in which parties agree to be bound, see Mayes v. Robinson, 93 Mo. 114; McCune v. Belt, 45 Mo. 174; Hardester v. Tate, 85 A. 624; Hill v. Combs, 92 A. 242.

As to joint and several liability, see McPherson v. Andex, 75 A. 204; Armstrong v. Johnson, 93 A. 492, 67 S. W. 733.

As to amount, see Murrill v. Handy, 17 Mo. 406.

As to payment of interest, see Finley v. Acock, 9 Mo. 841; Pittman v. Barret, 34 Mo. 84; Koehring v. Muemminghoff, 61 Mo. 403; North v. Walker, 66 Mo. 453; Borders v. Barber, 81 Mo. 636; Macon County v. Rodgers, 84 Mo. 66.

Sec. 805. One who signs the trade or assumed name, when liable. No person is liable on the instrument whose signature does not appear thereon, except as herein otherwise expressly provided. But one who signs in a trade or assumed name will be liable to the same extent as if he had signed in his own name. (R. S. 1909, § 9989.)

Use of trade name.-Facts in suit reviewed and held, answer, unverified, merely confesses note executed as shown. Bank v. Lead Co., 173 A. 634, 158 S. W. 1066. A suit on a promissory note cannot be maintained against an alleged principal whose name in no way appears on the note, the note not being signed in such a way as to make it ambiguous. Id. As to liability upon assuming a trade name, prior to act of 1905, see Keck v. Brewing Co., 22A. 197.

Sec. 806. When agents may sign. The signature of any party may be made by a duly authorized agent. No particular form of appointment is necessary for this purpose; and the authority of the agent may be established as in other cases of agency. (R. S. 1909, § 9990.)

Execution by agent.-The authority of an agent to indorse a note for the payee may be proved as agency is proved in other cases and by the writing conveying the authority. Bank v. Hohn, 146 A. 699, 125 S. W. 539. An instrument relied upon to prove the authority of an agent to indorse a note for a payee is not competent evidence until proof is made that it was executed by the payee. Id.

Sec. 807. Agents, when not liable.-Where the instrument contains or a person adds to his signature words indicating that he signs for or on behalf of a principal or in a representative capacity, he is not liable on the instrument if he was duly authorized; but the mere addition of words describing him as agent, or as filling a representative character, without disclosing his principal, does not exempt him from personal liability. (R. S. 1909, § 9991.)

Section cited and applied. Where notes, given for a piano purchased by a corporation, were signed by the corporation by its president only, and the signature of another person with no official designation whatever, the latter signer was liable thereon to payee, although she was in fact secretary of the corporation and intended to sign merely as secretary and the payee knew her official capacity at the time of taking the note. Wurlitzer Co. v. Rossmann, 196 A. 78, 190 S. W. 636.

Sec. 808. Signature by "procuration."-A signature by "procuration" operates as notice that the agent has but a limited authority to sign, and the principal is bound only in case the agent in so signing acted within the actual limits of his authority. (R. S. 1909, § 9992.)

Sec. 809. Indorsement or assignment by corporation or infant, effect of. The indorsement or assignment of the instrument

by a corporation or by an infant passes the property therein, notwithstanding that from want of capacity the corporation of infant may incur no liability therein. (R. S. 1909, § 9993.)

See Federal Discount Co. v. Backer, 138 A. 54, 119 S. W. 981.

Sec. 810. Forged signatures not binding. Where a sig nature is forged or made without the authority of the person whose signature it purports to be, it is wholly inoperative, and no right to retain the instrument, or to give a discharge therefor, or to enforce payment thereof against any party thereto, can be acquired through or under such signature, unless the party against whom it is sought to enforce such right is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority. (R. S. 1909, § 9994.)

Forged signature.-Section cited and applied. Bank v. Reed, 192 A. 344, 180 S. W. 1002: Held, the provisions of this section do not cover any instrument given for an illegal consideration. Forged and unauthorized signatures may be ratified. Cravens v. Gillilan, 63 Mo. 28; First Nat'l Bank v. Gay, 63 Mo. 33. See notes to Sec. 806.

Sec. 811. Prima facie evidence of consideration. Every negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie to have been issued for a valuable consideration, and every person whose signature appears thereon to have become a party thereto for value. 1909, § 9995.)

(R. S.

Consideration in general.-Section cited and applied. Nelson v. Diffenderffer, 178 A. 48, 163 S. W. 271: Held, consideration need not be of any real value to the promissor. It is sufficient if it is any detriment or inconvenience to the promissor or that he changed his relation to or relinquished his supposed right against promissor or a third party in consequence of such promise. In an action for a claim against the estate of a deceased drawer of a check, it was not necessary for the claimant to prove the original consideration, but the check itself will establish the claim in the absence of a showing that there was no consideration. Fisher v. Bagnell, 194 A. 581, 186 S. W. 1097. Section cited and applied. Bank v. Morris, 156 A. 43, 135 S. W. 1008: Held, where one takes a note, before its maturity, in good faith, from payee as collateral security, he takes it for value and is the holder in due course.

As to necessity of consideration, see Catterlin v. Lusk, 98 A. 182, 71 S. W. 1107. But not necessary that bill of exchange should recite that it is "for value received." Griffith v. Cotrell, 1 Mo. 480; Taylor v. Newman, 77 Mo. 257. See, also, Sec. 793.

Sec. 812. Value, what constitutes.-Value is any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract. An antecedent or pre-existing debt constitutes value, and is deemed such, whether the instrument is payable on demand or at a future time. (R. S. 1909, § 9996.)

Sufficiency of consideration.-See notes under preceding section.

Section cited and applied. Bank v. Sollars, 190 A. 284, 176 S. W. 263. In action on a note given by defendant and another to plaintiff bank in payment certain lands, where plaintiff bank promised to guarantee the title to lands, which failed, defendant was not released from liability on the note, the promise not being made for his benefit. An antecedent debt affords sufficient consideration to make one accepting a negotiable instrument before maturity, as collateral security for such pre-existing debt, a holder for value. Bank v. R. R., 172 A. 662, 154 S. W. 866.