Constitutional Political Economy in a Public Choice Perspective

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Charles Rowley
Springer Science & Business Media, 2012 M12 6 - 324 páginas
Constitutional political economy is a research program that directs inquiry to the working properties of rules and institutions within which individuals interact and to the processes through which these rules and institutions are chosen or come into being. This book makes the case for an approach to constitutional political economy that is grounded in consistent, hard-nosed public choice analysis. Effective institutional design is simply not feasible unless the designers build their structures to withstand rational choice pressures from the political market place. If mean, sensual man is here to stay, then let us, in our better moments, incorporate that knowledge into the institutions that must govern his behavior. A distinguished list of public choice scholars pursue this approach against a varying backcloth of constitutional issues relevant to the United States, Canada, Western Europe, the transition economies and the third world.
 

Contenido

Table of Contents
Introduction
The behavioral model of constitutional economics
Notes
Conclusions and outlook
References
Lessons from the Soviet Union
Violating the first principle
Common property in private markets
A commonproperty theory of federalist politics
Implications of federalist politics
The absence of an exit outlet as a condition for the collective action paradox
Direct constitutional implications 9 Parallel governments
Free trade as a substitute to parallel governments
Conclusion
Notes

Objectives postulates and premises
Further discussion
References
A natural experiment
Model and data
Article V amendment process and the 18th
Conclusion
Changing the rules and harnessing consumer interests
Marginal cost sharing and the Articles of Confederation
Notes
Conclusion
Concluding remarks
Mainstream economics of federalism
Federalist politics a virgin field
References
A constitutional perspective 1 Introduction
The purpose and role of government
A federation or a confederation of Europe?
The representation of citizen preferences
The voting rule
Citizenship
The European Union as a constitutional democracy
Notes
Typical problems Ecological units
Subsidiarity and ecological units
The rule space and economic growth
Conclusions
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