Constitutional Political Economy in a Public Choice PerspectiveCharles Rowley Springer Science & Business Media, 2012 M12 6 - 324 páginas Constitutional political economy is a research program that directs inquiry to the working properties of rules and institutions within which individuals interact and to the processes through which these rules and institutions are chosen or come into being. This book makes the case for an approach to constitutional political economy that is grounded in consistent, hard-nosed public choice analysis. Effective institutional design is simply not feasible unless the designers build their structures to withstand rational choice pressures from the political market place. If mean, sensual man is here to stay, then let us, in our better moments, incorporate that knowledge into the institutions that must govern his behavior. A distinguished list of public choice scholars pursue this approach against a varying backcloth of constitutional issues relevant to the United States, Canada, Western Europe, the transition economies and the third world. |
Contenido
The behavioral model of constitutional economics | |
Notes | |
Conclusions and outlook | |
References | |
Lessons from the Soviet Union | |
Violating the first principle | |
Common property in private markets | |
A commonproperty theory of federalist politics | |
Implications of federalist politics | |
The absence of an exit outlet as a condition for the collective action paradox | |
Direct constitutional implications 9 Parallel governments | |
Free trade as a substitute to parallel governments | |
Conclusion | |
Notes | |
Objectives postulates and premises | |
Further discussion | |
References | |
A natural experiment | |
Model and data | |
Article V amendment process and the 18th | |
Conclusion | |
Changing the rules and harnessing consumer interests | |
Marginal cost sharing and the Articles of Confederation | |
Notes | |
Conclusion | |
Concluding remarks | |
Mainstream economics of federalism | |
Federalist politics a virgin field | |
References | |
A constitutional perspective 1 Introduction | |
The purpose and role of government | |
A federation or a confederation of Europe? | |
The representation of citizen preferences | |
The voting rule | |
Citizenship | |
The European Union as a constitutional democracy | |
Notes | |
Typical problems Ecological units | |
Subsidiarity and ecological units | |
The rule space and economic growth | |
Conclusions | |
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
Constitutional Political Economy in a Public Choice Perspective Charles Rowley Vista previa limitada - 1997 |
Constitutional Political Economy in a Public Choice Perspective Charles Rowley Sin vista previa disponible - 2012 |
Constitutional Political Economy in a Public Choice Perspective Charles Rowley Sin vista previa disponible - 2011 |
Términos y frases comunes
18th Amendment amount analysis argument Article Articles of Confederation authority auto balanced budget benefits bicameral Buchanan budget balance Calculus of Consent Cambridge campaign expenditures capital citizens competition confederation Congress constitutional amendment constitutional change constitutional design constitutional economics Constitutional Political Economy constitutional rules constraints costs court debt decision deficit democracy democratic effects Election Commission electoral enforcement environmental European federal federal subjects federalist finance fiscal function harm incentive pay income income effects Income/Pop increase incumbents individual institutions interest groups issues Journal marginal normative official legislature outcome paper parties percent Pigouvian tax politicians preferences principle problem procedures produce Prohibition property rights proposal public choice ratification referendum regressions rentseeking Repeal representative requisition revenues Russia’s Section separation of powers specific structure Subsection subsidiarity term limits theory Tollison Tullock U.S. Constitution United University Press vote voters Wall Street Journal