those Free Staters who are not inspired by a deadly hatred of England. On the other hand, however, we have proof that the loyal colonists of Natal and Cape Colony are becoming very restless under what they regard as the undue favour shown to the rebels of those colonies. It is a difficult problem with which Ministers have to deal. But one fixed point they are bound to keep steadily before them that is the need of considering not merely the immediate but the distant future, and of making it possible that Englishman and Dutchman may yet live together under the Union Jack in real harmony. As for the future of the Transvaal and the Free State, it is curious to note that leading Liberals, who have been studying the question carefully, are coming to the conclusion that a restoration of independence, even under an undisputed British suzerainty, is impracticable. And they have arrived at this conclusion as much in the interests of Boers as of Uitlanders. logic of the stricken field' carries us far.

The

WEMYSS REID.

The Editor of THE NINETEENTH CENTURY cannot undertake

to return unaccepted MSS.

THE

NINETEENTH

CENTURY

No. CCLXXIX-MAY 1900

THE QUESTION OF SUBMARINE BOATS

WHILE not admitting that the present position of the Navy is due entirely to a small band of naval officers, writers, and journalists, I heartily agree with a great deal that Mr. H. H. Wilson says in his article 'Are we misled about the Fleet?' in the last number of this Review, particularly with his observations on the under-expenditure of the last few years, and on the unsubstantiated excuse which has been made for it, viz. that the capacity of output by private firms in this country has been exhausted. In truth, I half thought to find among the suspected deficiencies of the Admiralty-suspected in consequence of the deplorable incidents of the South African war—some reference to the question that appears at the head of this article. Not only our. foreign critics, but many of our own people at home have been asking whether the British Navy, if tested by a great or a small campaign, would fare better or worse than the British Army has done in the South African war. And when this sort of searching of heart sets in, points at other times deemed of small significance are apt to acquire an unusual and even an undue importance.

One such point is the question of submarine boats. I cannot, of course, profess to deal with it otherwise than as a layman. Five or six years ago I knew the opinion of the technical advisers of the Admiralty on the question as it then stood. I think I am safe in saying that at that time they did not see their way to recommend to the Admiralty or the Government any provision for submarine vessels of war. I happened to be the recipient from time to time of information as to what was being done elsewhere, and I recollect very well the view of the experts thereon. But the question seems to 3 A

VOL. XLVII-No. 279

have advanced a good deal in the interval, and I have, of course, no knowledge of the opinion of the Admiralty or its experts now. The 'man in the street,' however, is beginning to have his suspicions about the submarine boats, and one of his popular magazines plainly asks whether in this matter also England is again napping.1

In the time of the Admiralty which preceded the present Board there was, so far as I can remember, no occasion for a collective judgment. Under the Board presided over by Lord George Hamilton, however, the question appears to have arisen. An experiment was made in Tilbury Dock, with the result that the submarine vessel stuck at the bottom long enough to inspire those on board with serious doubts about the practicability of submarine warfare. I believe the First Lord described the incident in the House of Commons with an accompaniment of laughter, but I did not happen to hear him, and I have failed to find any report of his speech in Hansard. The Naval Annual for 1891, to which I am indebted for this part of the story, adds that it is satisfactory to note that the question of submarine torpedo-boats is receiving a due amount of attention at the hands of the Admiralty.'

The Naval Annual has for many years been an admirable record of the development of, in the first place, our own Navy, and in the second place, other Navies. There never has been in its conduct any trace of political partisanship or professional sectarianism. It is not the organ of any League; it is, if he could only afford to read it, the organ of the man in the street. But the Naval Annual leaves the question of submarine boats very much to the unaided judgment of this hypothetical person. I can remember in the same number of the Naval Annual an article which seemed to prophesy one way, and another article which prophesied the contrary. The submarine boat may some day prove a terrible adversary to the ironclad,' says the Naval Annual of 1893 (at p. 62). On the other hand, the Naval Annual of the same year says (at p. 279):

The value of such craft continues to be problematical, for, although it is alleged that the difficulty of steering the boats when submerged has been got over, there seems no reason to believe that it will ever be possible for those inside them to obtain such a range of view as will be of much practical use unless the boat is at frequent intervals brought to the surface; and indeed experiments in our own waters have shown that vision through the glazed scuttles of a submerged boat is so much impeded that little or nothing can be seen of an object six feet distant when the boat is at a depth such as that from which the bottom of a ship would have to be attacked. The history of the exploits of similar craft during the Civil War in America indicates that upon the whole a submarine torpedo-boat may be expected to be more destructive to her crew than to her foe.

And so proceeds this intelligent and impartial authority year by year. In the Annual for 1894 Mr. W. Laird Clowes writes of the Gustave Zédé that it can scarcely be doubted that she represents a 'The Harmsworth Magazine for April 1900.

very distinct advance upon all other vessels of the kind, and that the question of submarine navigation is rapidly approaching a point at which it will demand from this country far more attention than it has hitherto received.' Mr. Clowes writes, I believe, with as much authority as any other 'writer or journalist,' whether in the Naval Annual or elsewhere. The last word (1899) of the Naval Annual is the following:

Very considerable attention was attracted to the trials of the submarine boat Gustave Zédé in January last, and the results attained created in France a wave of enthusiasm which induced the Matin to open a subscription with the view of presenting a new boat of the class to the nation. The concluding trials took place at the Salins d'Hyères on the 7th of January and confirmed the impression already received. At a signal from the Magenta the submarine boat, after some preliminary evolutions, advanced towards the battle-ship, plunged at a distance of 550 yards, reappeared again at a distance of more than 200 yards, and, plunging again, discharged her missile, which struck the Magenta abreast of the funnels. The mark presented by the Zédé when she showed her cupola above the surface for observation of her course was very small and inconspicuous, so that it would have been practically impossible to hit her. The trials were popularly accepted as a complete success, for after the torpedo trials the boat was able to proceed unaided from Toulon to Marseilles, thus showing her sea-going qualities. Jamais nous n'aurons trop de sous-marins,' wrote M. V. Guilloux in the Yacht. 'Les douze années d'efforts consécutifs et d'études continues pour obtenir une solution à la question de la navigation sous-marine sont enfin couronnées de succès.' For our own part, we do not share the French belief in submarine boats. They have little chance of attacking a ship under way or of operating at a distance from their base. Monsieur Laudry (Lieutenant Maurice Loir), writing at a later date in the Moniteur, remarks that Frenchmen go too far in proclaiming that these isolated trials sound the knell of the battle-ship. He nevertheless believes the submarine boat to be a real element in naval war, because the very fear of its invisible attack will keep at a distance adversaries who might have an object in approaching the coasts. The Zédé is propelled entirely by electricity, and is impeded by the weight of her accumulators and her short range, but the new boats of the Narval class will have steam for surface navigation, giving much greater range, and Lieutenant Loir remarks that if success attends these boats the question of submarine warfare will have advanced a great step.

On the other hand, Feilden's Magazine,' a technical journal of repute, frankly derides the whole conception. The submarine, according to this authority, presents almost every drawback. It is compared to a blinded man wandering about with a quantity of dynamite, which he is quite as likely to bestow upon his friends as his enemies. It is admitted by even its wildest advocates to be useless but for harbour defence, and in that respect the implement is deemed, and rightly so, to have a value which is safely negligible." But the main argument of Feilden is that we already possess an incomparably more formidable object for harbour attack and defence in the famous Brennan torpedo. With the consciousness of possessing a monopoly of this instrument,' it concludes, the imperturbability of our naval authorities towards the vaunted submarines can be satisfactorily accounted for.'

6

This last observation is somewhat surprising. If I may recur again to the Naval Annual, I find therein only one reference to the Brennan, viz. in 1891, shortly after its introduction. The patent of this torpedo, after being declined by the Admiralty, was purchased by the War Office for 150,000l. from the inventor.' It quotes opinions unfavourable to the torpedo, and adopts the view that the experiments (which it describes) would have succeeded equally well with a heavy projectile. The brig would have been sunk and it would not have cost 1,000l.'

Expert opinion in this country would therefore appear to be on the whole unfavourable to the submarine boat, and the same may be said of official opinion. Three successive Boards of Admiralty have sat since the question became prominent and all have abstained from submitting to Parliament any proposal to build such vessels.

But what appears to have made a great impression on the public mind of this country is the persistence of France in her submarine policy, and still more perhaps its adoption by the United States. In the last published Return of the principal Navies of the World3 the French list contains three submarine boats built and nine building. The following is the table :

One of the completed ships is, of course, the Gustave Zédé, which, as we have seen, has already attracted much attention in this country. Public opinion in France, fortified by professional and political authority, appears to have accepted the new arm with enthusiasm, culminating last year in the subscription of 300,000 francs, mostly, we are told, contributed in small sums, for the presentation of a new submarine boat to the State. About this time M. Lockroy, Minister of Marine, was describing the performances and the possibilities of the Zédé in terms which naturally challenged attention;

The eyes of all on board were fixed on the sea. Officers and men stood watching the crest of the waves, and every minute there were exclamations as some one

Fleets of Great Britain and Foreign Countries, 1899, No. 313.