be cautious and abstain from adopting any measure which we may hereafter be sorry for. We should leave this matter to be decided upon by those who are to come after us, and we ought not to bind down those who are to succeed us, to a rule which may be injurious to their interests and repugnant to their feelings. Those who are to follow us should be left to pursue that course in relation to this matter, which they think best, with out that restraint which it is here proposed to impose upon them.

When we look around here, and see almost every man who is about to vote upon this question, with a grey head, and reflect, that almost every man has lived long enough to occupy the seats on this floor, which we now occupy in this hali, we should inquire what we are about to do. We should remember that we are about to tie down our own sons, the boys of our own creation, as though they were dishonest knaves, who were not to be trusted with the administration of the affairs of the commonwealth. Shall we say to them, that they are incapable of judgingas we have done for the last forty-seven years-of what was best calculated to promote the prosperity of the state.

If we have conducted the affairs of this commonwealth, from a thinly populated and feeble colony, to a great and populous state, by the wise laws we have provided for the government of our people, is it not fair to presume, that our sons will keep it in its onward course of prosperity? Why should we deprive our sons of pursuing their own course in seeking out their own happiness, as we have been left to do by our own fathers? Why should we bind them up, when we have been left free! Are we to say that we are afraid to trust them, and that we doubt their powers and their ability?

Sir, this must be repugnant to the feelings of every man. I would respect the lessons of age and experience, but I would be far from believing, or supposing, that our sons will be incompetent to carry on and complete the work which we have begun and carried on this long. For the sake of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania, I beg this convention to leave to future legislation, the power over this subject, which was conferred upon us by the constitution, and which we have thus long lived under, and thrived and prospered by, for the better part of fifty years.

Mr. FOULKROD asked for the yeas and nays upon the amendment, which were ordered.

Mr. FORWARD knew the anxiety there was to take this question, but he felt it to be a duty which he owed to himself and his constituents, to express his sentiments on this subject, and he did so, more for the purpose of letting his constituents know what his sentiments were, than for the purpose of convincing any member of this convention.

I, said Mr. F., object to this amendment-first, because it embraces all corporations for religious and charitable purposes. It is not limited to banks, but all corporations for religious or charitable purposes, are laid at the feet of the legislature. I put it to every man of experience, if he would give one dollar to any religious or charitable corporation, on these Why, sir, no man would leave donations to any such societies, when the continuance of their charters depended entirely upon the whim and caprice of a legislative body.

terms.

If I understand this matter right, it is, that all corporations, whether for banking purposes, the making of a railroad, or canal, or for religious and charitable purposes, may be repealed or modified by the legislature. Well, sir, as I said before, would any man give a dollar upon such terms as these?

Who, sir, would endow hospitals or any other charitable institutions, when their charters might be taken away at any moment, by a party in your legislature: when a majority of one in each branch of your legisla ture may repeal their charter, and resume their rights and privileges? Where would you find men to leave estates to charitable institutions, when a majority of one may annul the charters of these institutions, and may do that too without compensation, for this idea of equitable compensation, named in the amendment, is all mere moon shine? Is the legisla ture bound to make equitable compensation by this amendment? No, sir.

Suppose they repeal a charter, and say, that no indemnity is due, where is the power to see that justice be done the institution? There is none. Then, we are here about voting for a proposition, by which every man who contributes, for charitable purposes, fifty or a hundred thousand dollars, may have his money applied to other objects, or taken away entirely, by a majority of one in your legislature. Under such circumstances as these, no man, unless he was mad or drunk, would ever think of leaving money to a charitable or literary institution.

When men of wealth leave large sums of money, for the benefit of charitable institutions, they do it because of the permanence of their charters, and because of the certainty that the money will be applied to the purposes for which it was intended by the donor; and every man who looks around this city, will see the great benefits which have resulted from institutions which have permanent charters. From the very fact, that charters of this description are perpetual, they receive thousands and thousands of dollars, which they otherwise never would receive.

Sir, these perpetual charters have been of immense benefit to this country, and I hope they will never be placed at the mercy of a party in your legislative body, for I fear, if they are, that the greatest injusuce, in many cases, will be done.

My idea will be illustrated by a single remark. Suppose you have a corporation for religious purposes, and they own a large property, and the legislature takes away the charter and disposes of the property in such manner as they think proper, would not this be looked upon as an outrageous proceeding? Here is an objection to the amendment, sufficient for me and every rational man. I have, however, but stated the half of the objection.

Sir, will you not, by this amendment, be creating religious parties, and doing great injustice to religious societies of different descriptions? We will have religious parties in our legislature, and what next? Why, the next thing will be, that some religious society will be odious to this religious party in your legislature.

The Catholics, for instance, are odious to some other religious sects, and, when you have other sects in the legislature, they will repeal and annul the charters of the Catholics.

Next, the Methodists may be odious to the religious party in power, and their charters will be repealed, and thus will you go on criminating and recriminating, until parties will be excited to desperation, and disorder and revolution may ensue.

Mr. INGERSOLL. This never was the intention of the gentleman who submitted this amendment.

Mr. FORWARD. 1 certainly understood it in this way, after hearing it read from the the clerk's table.

Mr. INGERSOLL. I understand that this was not the intention of the gentleman who submitted the amendment, but that it was to apply only to banking corporations.

Mr. FORWARD. Then, if the gentleman had submitted an amendment which cannot be understood by one half of the convention, that is sufficient grounds for me to vote against it.

Mr. HIESTER then explained, that he had intended by this amendment to embrace all corporations of every description, and to give the legisla ture the power of repealing all charters.

Mr. INGERSOLL then said, that he was mistaken in what the gentleman from Lancaster had told him privately.

Mr. FORWARD said, that he was then right in the construction he had placed upon the amendment, on hearing it read by the secretary.

Mr. M'DOWELL then rose and proposed a modification of the amendment to the gentleman from Lancaster.

Mr. HIESTER said, that he was auxious to have some restrictions placed upon banking institutions, and he found that the only way to gain that end, was to yield somewhat to the opinions and views of others—to give and to take. He would, therefore, again modify his amendment, at the suggestion of the gentleman from Bucks, (Mr. M'Dowell) in order that it might conform more nearly to the views of that gentleman, and as he presumed, to the views of a majority of the convention.

Mr. H. then modified his amendment, to read as follows:

"No corporate body shall be hereafter created, renewed or extended, with banking or discounting privileges, without six months' public notice of the application for the same, in such manner as shall be prescribed by law. Nor shall any charter for the purpose aforesaid be granted for a longer period than twenty years, and every such charter shall contain a clause reserving to the legislature the power to alter, revoke and annul the same, whenever in their opinion they may be injurious to the ci zens of the commonwealth. No law hereafter enacted, shall conta

more than one corporate body."

The convention then adjourned.

FRIDAY AFTERNOON, JANUARY 12, 1838.

FIRST ARTICLE.

The convention resumed the second reading of the report of the com mittee to whom was referred the first article of the constitution, as reported by the committee of the whole.

The question being on Mr. HIESTER's amendment, as modified, to Mr. REIGART's amendment,

Mr. FORWARD, of Allegheny, said the amendment was now submitted in a modified form, different from that in which it had previously appeared before the convention. He had asked for the adjournment, in order to see if the proposition contained any objectionable features. It was, in some respects, different from what it was this morning. But in two points, it struck him as particularly objectionable. In the proposition, as it stood this morning, there was a provision of indemnity. It secured, or affected to secure, corporate bodies against loss, in case of the repeal of their charters. That clause is not in the modification. It gives to the legislature power of absolute repeal, for cause, or without cause. This appears

the to be an extremely dangerous power, and threatens, in its practice, the existence of all our institutions. It seems to be the intention to place corporate bodies as far from the pale of legislative protection as possible, and to subject them to all the changes of legislative caprice. I know this power of unconditional repeal, and it appears to me to be a most dangerous power.

I need

This question is, at last, brought within the vortex of party. not inquire how this state of things has been brought upon us. But it appears that these are the institutions on which all have cast a malignant eye. There are some who are opposed to all banks whatever. They want a hard money currency. These are the persons who ask for the immediate destruction of the banks, who are active in assailing the whole system, and in striking at the root of the system. The arguments

of these are in favor of restrictions, to be imposed on this floor. All their arguments are resolved into one, which, if true, ought to strike from existence every bank in the commonwealth. It was said that these corporators are all speculators and aristocrats, and that they are building up a great money interest, injurious to the laboring interests of the country. If so, these banks should be stricken from the list of corporations. It has now become a party question whether they shall be extinguished or not. All parties agreed, until the month of May last, on the question as to the state banks. Since that time, it has become a party question. It has been mixed up with our party politics, and a doubt has been raised as to the propriety of continuing them in existence. This is likely to continue to be an exciting topie. It has been made the stalking horse of party, and a cry of alarm has been sent through the community: and we shall soon find the advocates and opponents of the banking interest in the common

wealth, constituting the grand division of party into two distinct masses, two separate political communities, and on the adverse standards will be inscribed bank" and "no bank.'

In this state of things, can any bank appear perfectly disinterested? Can it be matter of indifference that the party coming into power shall be that which has denounced the whole system? He thought not.

If this extraordinary power be reserved to the legislature, then the banks must be at the feet of the legislature, or must exercise their influence in a political direction. Whenever it becomes the interest of the banks to conciliate, they will so exercise their influence as to give preponderance to the party in their favor. If the spirit which seemed to prevail-an honest one, no doubt-in this body, were to find its way into the legislature, and influence the majority, would it not involve the breaking down of the whole system? And if parties were to make this opposition to banks the stepping stone by which to ascend to power, ought we not to pause, and reflect on the propriety-the expediency of casting this money power at the feet of the majority? A single county might give a majority in each house, and a majority thus made up, might repeal the charters of every bank in the commonwealth. Is such a contingency impossible? Is it so remote that we ought not to guard against it?

In regard to personal property; if the banks abused their power, their charters ought to be forfeited. But if their duty be faithfully performed, there should be no arbitrary power by which they can be controled or influenced in their course.

The banks should have no interest in the polities of the day, and resting in the security of their charters, they will feel no more interest in the politics of the day than the merchant or the shopkeeper. It is their sole object to make a profit of their money. Can this be done better by meddling with politics? It is not their interest to involve themselves in political squabbles. It is now their interest to keep as far aloof from politics as the merchant and manufacturer. If, on the contrary, they are to become subservient to the government, to watch the caprices of the government, to regulate their course according to the fluctuations of prejudice, they may be induced to bring their influence into the political arena. It could never conduce to the interest of the community, to bring them into the vortex of political strife.

The modification does not say that for abuses of trust this power may be exercised by the legislature. In a manner, without cause or complaint, as a thing of right, the legislature may annihilate the charters of the banks. And how would they enforce the payment of their debts? All know that the banks cannot collect their debts suddenly. The charter annihilated, every thing is thrown into confusion. This might be done, if the absolute power be vested in the legislature. And what is the argument in reply to this? That it will not be done, and we are asked, why we are so fearful of the legislature? It may be done, and such results should be placed beyond the reach of legislative power. Every thing is secure in relation to other great interests. What would be the result, if titles to lands were placed in this predicament? West of the Alleganies would any man give half the value of lands for a title so conditioned? Why are the banks to be subjected to these conditions?