opponents, in place of his own. Of this a conspicuous example is seen in the following passage.

"But we have one thing more to add respecting Dr. Taylor's inquiry, Can it be proved from facts that God could secure any of his inoral creatures in holiness without this influence?' (i. e. of the punishment of sin.) Dr. Woods supposes Dr. Taylor in this question to affirm that it could not be done. But the contrary is obvious from the whole tenor of his remarks. He was simply reasoning with his opponents on their own principles; the argument was ex concessis, 'You maintain (what I do not) that God prefers sin to holiness in its stead. On your principles then I ask, may not God have chosen to admit the existing sin into the system as the best means of securing his obedient kingdom in perpetual allegiance? May not this be the good in view of which he chose not to prevent sin? If so, then the reason of the choice is a different one from that which you assign. And until you prove that this was not the reason, you cannot affirm that sin entered the system as the necessary means of the greatest good.' Dr. Woods then has confounded an argument ex concessis, with a statement of Dr. Taylor's opinion on this subject; and has triumphed greatly in the complete overthrow of his opponent, by that which has no existence, except in the inaccuracy of his own conceptions."

"But we have shown (p. 551) that the supposition alluded to by Dr. W., viz. that the sin of some might be necessary to secure the holiness of others,' was no part of Dr. T.'s scheme; that he made it merely as an argument ex concessis, which was fatal to his opponent, while he himself places his reliance on a very different supposition." Christian Spectator for September, 1830, p. 551, 556.

He thus solemnly assures us, that in place of being employed in the passage here referred to, in expressing his own sentiments, he was simply and professedly stating the views of his opponents, and reasoning from them for the purpose of refuting their theory; and that this was SO clearly the fact as to render Dr. Woods' construction of his language and object an inexcusable and most discreditable error. The argument, in respect to which he offers this asseveration, is that in the last paragraph of the following 1 passage.

"Is there then the least particle of evidence, that the entire prevention of sin in moral beings is possible to God in the nature of things?"

All evidence of the truth of this assumption must be derived either from the nature of the subject, or from known facts. Is there such evidence from the nature of the subject? It is here to be remarked, that the prevention of sin by any influence that destroys the power to sin, destroys moral agency. Moral agents then must possess the power to sin. Who then can prove, a priori, or from the nature of the subject, that a being who CAN sin, will NOT sin? How can it be proved, a priori, or from the nature of the subject, that a thing will not be, when, for aught that appears, it may be? On this point is it presumptuous to bid defiance to the powers of human reason?

"Is there any evidence from facts? Facts, so far as they are known to us, furnish no support to the assumption that God could, in a moral system, prevent all sin, or even the present degree of sin For we know of no creature of God, whose holiness is secured without that influence which results either directly or indirectly from the existence of sin and its punishment. How then can it be shown from facts, that God could secure any of his moral creatures in holiness, without this influence; or to what purpose is it to allege instances of the prevention of sin under this influence, to prove that God could prevent it without this influence? Rather do not all known facts furnish a strong presumption to the contrary? If God could prevent all şin without this influence, why has he not done it? Be this, however, as it may, since God has not, so far as we know, prevented sin in a single instance without this influence, how can it be proved from facts, that he could have prevented all sin, or even the present degree of sin in a moral system? Had his creatures done what they could, then indeed there had been more holiness and less sin. But the question is, what could God have done to secure such a result? Had he prevented the sins of one human being to the present time, or had he brought to repentance one sinner more than he has, who can prove that the requisite interposition for the purpose would not result in a vast increase of sin in the system, including even the apostacy and augmented guilt of that individual. In a word, who is competent to foretell, or authorized even to surmise the consequences of the least iota of change in the present system of influence to produce holiness and prevent sin? If no one, then all assumptions on the subject, like that under consideration, are wholly

unwarranted. It may be true, that God will secure, under the present system of things, the greatest degree of holiness and the least degree of sin, which it is possible to him in the nature of things to secure. Neither the nature of the subject nor known facts, furnish a particle of evidence to the contrary. The assumption, therefore, that God could, in a moral system, have prevented all sin, or the present degree of sin, is wholly gratuitous and unauthorized, and ought never to be made the basis of an objection or an argument." Sermon, p. 32, 33.

Were the language and reasoning of this passage to form the sole ground of our judgment respecting his design in it, it would be a matter of some difficulty to find any materials for the conclusion, that he was professedly expressing in it the sentiments of his opponents in place of his own, and endeavouring to convince them by tracing their system to its legitimate results, that it is fraught with the means of its own subversion! To appreciate the difficulties which obstruct such a judgment, it should be noticed that no disagreement exists as to the fact that, as Dr. Woods represented, he actually proceeded in the argument on the hypothesis that "sin is the necessary means of the greatest good;" as this fact he expressly concedes and affirms in the passage in which he disclaims the doctrine itself of that assumption. "He was simply reasoning," he says, "with his opponents on their own principles; the argument was ex concessis;" and the concession from which he argued, he states, was the doctrine "that God prefers sin to holiness in its stead;" whilst the object of the reasoning from it was, he assures us, to show the possibility that God may "have chosen to admit the existing sin into the system, as the best means of securing his obedient kingdom in perpetual allegiance;" and the proof which he alleged to demonstrate that possibility, was the consideration, as he affirms," that as God has not, as far as we know, pre

vented sin in a single instance without this influence, i. e. of the punishment of sin," there are no "facts" from which it can be proved "that he could have prevented all sin, or the present degree of sin," nor that "had he prevented the sins of one human being to the present time, or had he brought to repentance one sinner more than he has, the requisite interposition for the purpose would not have resulted in a vast increase of sin in the system, including even the apostacy and augmented guilt of that individual." The argument itself, therefore, indisputably from his express representation, proceeded on the assumption that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good.

The sole question to be determined respecting it then is, whether any evidences exist in the passage, or its argument will permit the belief, that he was simply reasoning in it from the principles of his opponents, in distinction from his own, and for the purpose of overthrowing their scheme. To form a just judgment on the subject, it should be remarked, in the first place, that the passage itself does not exhibit any indication whatever that he was merely arguing in it ex concessis, in the manner he now represents. A reader who should neglect to compare the passages, would, as a matter of course, infer from the fact that the usual marks of quotation are affixed to the sentences, "You maintain (what I do not)" &c.-transcribed above from the Spectator, in which he professes to repeat the argument in the note to the sermon, that they are actually taken as they purport to be, from that argument, and present, accordingly, decisive proof of the truth of his representation respecting it. No such statement, however, or language, nor any thing bearing any resemblance to them, exists in that passage, and the whole pretense that it is a quotation is a deception. "Not

a hint is given" in that part of the note, “that the supposition" on which he there proceeded, "that the sin of some might be necessary to secure the holiness of others, was no part of Dr. T.'s scheme; that he made it merely as an argument ex concessis, which was fatal to his opponent, while he places his reliance on a very different supposition." (p. 536.) The whole aspect of the passage, on the contrary, is as clearly and exclusively indicative that the views which it expresses are his own, and meant to be exhibited as such, as is that of any other passage in the sermon or note; and to have attributed to him any other intention in it, would have been as utterly unauthorized and unjustifiable, as it would be arbitrarily to impute to him a false design in any other portion of his discussions. This, however, is one of the least of the difficulties with which his representation is perplexed.

A more formidable objection to it is, that the conclusion which it ascribes to the argument in the note, is essentially different from that which it is in fact the object of his reasoning there to sustain. As he represents in his professed quotation of it, the object of that argument is to show, that, on the principles of his opponents, God may have "chosen to admit the existing sin into the system, as the best means of securing his obedient kingdom in perpetual allegiance:" not because he could not prevent the admission of that sin. In place of that, however, the object at which the argument in the note aims is, to show that "the assumption that God could in a moral system have prevented all sin, or the present degree of sin, is wholly gratuitous and unauthorized, and ought never to be made the basis of an objection or an argument;" and "the representation" that no one can prove that the requisite inter

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position for the purpose" of preventing the "sins of one